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David Sissons at his graduation with BA from Melbourne University in 1950 




This volume is part of a larger project intended to make available to a broader 
readership the research activities and lesser known publications of David C.S. 
Sissons, a Fellow in the Department of International Relations at The Australian 
National University from 1961 until his retirement in 1990. This project was 
instigated by Professor Arthur Stockwin, Emeritus Fellow at St Antony’s College 
at Oxford University, who was Sissons’s first PhD student (1961–64) and Keiko 
Tamura who co-edited this volume.
Sissons was productive throughout his academic career, but much of his work 
was either never completed or failed to find its way into major journals or hard 
covers. He left numerous unpublished, but almost publishable, papers, not 
counting others that were published only in relatively obscure places. He was 
an extreme perfectionist, too often prepared to sacrifice an important article for 
want of the last detail, which was sometimes untraceable anyway. He expended 
great effort in composing correspondence, memos and notes, extensively 
recapitulating his research findings while articulating areas where he sought 
further information, and which amount essentially to brief research notes in 
their own right.
Sissons’s research, over 40 years, was concerned with various aspects of 
Australian–Japanese relations. The greater part was devoted to the history of 
Australian–Japanese diplomatic relations, but he retained a strong particular 
interest in the Australian war crimes investigations and trials that ran between 
1942–51. He served as a court interpreter in the Australian trials at Morotai in 
early 1946, and as an interpreter with the British Commonwealth Occupation 
Forces (BCOF) in Yamaguchi in 1946–47. His research covered a myriad of 
matters, including such diverse topics as Japanese immigration to Australia; 
Japanese pearl divers in northern Australia; ‘Japanese acrobatic troupes touring 
Australasia, 1867–1900’; ‘Japanese prostitutes in Australia, 1887–1916’; Japanese 
military intentions towards Australia at the outset of the Pacific dimension of 
the Second World War in 1941–42; and, the breakout of Japanese prisoners of 
war at Cowra in 1944. His work on the Diplomatic Special Section (D Special 
Section) during the Second World War, the subject of this volume, highlights 
a critically important aspect of the relationship between Japan and Australia at 
its most adversarial. It is anticipated that his work in these other areas will be 
collected and edited for subsequent publication by this press.
Sissons had planned to publish an account of the role of the D Special Section, 
together with a top-secret report on its cryptanalytical activities that was 
written after the end of the war, and which he managed to obtain after immense 
perseverance. This project was not quite finalised when he died in October 2006. 
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He continued to explore particular aspects of the Special Section’s activities 
until his incapacitation, having planned to publish further work on the subject. 
This material had lain dormant since 2006, until resuscitated by Stockwin and 
Tamura in 2011.
D Special Section was the most secret of the Allied code-breaking organisations 
in Australia during the Second World War. Its primary role was breaking the 
codes and cyphers that were used in Japanese diplomatic communications. The 
British and Australian governments sought to maintain the secrecy concerning 
the Section’s activities and, indeed, its very existence, for half a century after 
the war ended.
By the 1980s, 40 years after the war, Sissons, on the other hand, was persuaded 
that it was time for the story of the Special Section to be told. The US authorities 
had already broken ranks with their counterparts in London and Canberra, and 
had declassified large quantities of documents concerning the subject, including 
actual decrypts of Japanese diplomatic traffic, which during the war had been 
called Magic. This book is the product of his quest.
It consists of four parts. First, an essay by Desmond Ball describes Sissons’s 
quest and outlines its historical importance. Second is the unpublished account 
of ‘the origins and history’ of D Special Section, which Sissons wrote in 2006. 
Third is the postwar Report of Special Intelligence Section, HQ Australian Military 
Forces, Melbourne [on] Japanese Diplomatic Cyphers: Cryptographic Survey, 
as lightly edited by Sissons in 2006. The fourth part is an Annex consisting 
of notes, interviews, and correspondence concerning D Special Section and 
its activities, either written by Sissons, or his colleagues in response to his 
entreaties, or otherwise directly related to his endeavours. It is an invaluable 
record, contributing immensely to appreciation of the critically important role 
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Chapter 1. David Sissons and  
D Special Section
Desmond Ball
During the Second World War, Australia hosted three organisations concerned 
with the cryptanalysis of intercepted Japanese radio communications. The 
activities of two of these, respectively concerned with Imperial Japanese Navy 
(IJN) signals and Japanese army and air force signals, have been widely described 
and discussed by historians and veterans since the 1970s.1 
This volume, which has been produced primarily as a result of painstaking 
efforts by David Sissons, provides a comprehensive and authoritative account 
of the third, Diplomatic Special Section (D Special Section) of the Australian 
Military Forces HQ in Melbourne, which was responsible for cryptographic 
activities concerning Japanese diplomatic communications. D Special Section 
and its activities remained a closely guarded secret for 20 years after the navy 
and army stories became public. The Australian Government consistently 
refused to admit that it ever intercepted diplomatic communications, even 
in wartime. After all, it was and still is a signatory to Vienna and Geneva 
conventions on diplomatic relations under which ‘the host country must permit 
and protect free communication between the diplomats of the mission and their 
home country’. Fortunately, the US cryptological authorities have been much 
less sanctimonious.
The Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) involvement in signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
activities began in 1940 when two high frequency (HF) radio interception 
and direction-finding (HF DF) stations became operational, located at HMAS 
Coonawarra near Darwin and HMAS Harman outside Canberra. These 
stations operated as part of the Royal Navy (RN) component of the Far East 
Combined Bureau (FECB), then based in Singapore and itself a component of 
Britain’s SIGINT organisation, the Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS). 
Paymaster-Commander Eric Nave, RN, set up a small cryptanalytic organisation 
in Melbourne, which analysed Japanese naval traffic from the Mandated Islands 
and Japanese commercial shipping traffic that was collected at Coonawarra 
and Harman, as well as some Japanese diplomatic traffic. In early 1942, the US 
navy’s SIGINT unit, codenamed Cast, was evacuated in three tranches from the 
Philippines to Melbourne. It was established there on the middle floor of the 
1 Desmond Ball and David Horner, Breaking the Codes: Australia’s KGB Network, 1944–1950 (Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin, 1998), chapter 4.
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heavily guarded Monterey flats in Queens Road, South Yarra, near Albert Park. 
Soon formally known as FRUMEL (Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne), it effectively 
subsumed the RAN’s SIGINT organisation.
The Australian army’s SIGINT organisation was the Australian Special Wireless 
Group (ASWG), which established intercept stations at Coomalie Creek, about 
80 kilometres south of Darwin and initially maintained by the 51st Special 
Wireless Section; Kalinga near Brisbane, maintained by the 53rd Special Wireless 
Section and, from May 1943, the HQ of the ASWG; and, Mornington, south of 
Melbourne, maintained by the 52nd Special Wireless Section. Elements of the 
55th Section moved to New Guinea in July 1942. Soon after General Douglas 
MacArthur arrived in Melbourne, it had been agreed to form a combined Allied 
organisation called Central Bureau. It was established on 15 April 1942 in a large 
house, Cranleigh, at 225 Domain Road in South Yarra and moved to Brisbane in 
September 1942. The bureau was responsible for cryptanalysis of Japanese army 
and Japanese army air force signals, with material collected by both US army 
and ASWG stations.
Both the RAN and the army began fledgling activities with respect to Japanese 
diplomatic communications before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 
1941. In the case of the navy, Nave’s Special Intelligence Bureau (SIB) had worked 
on diplomatic cyphers through 1940–41. In the case of the army, in early 1940 
the Military Intelligence staff at Eastern Command in Sydney formed a small 
group of mathematicians and classicists from Sydney University to practise code-
breaking on Japanese consular traffic. In 1941 the group succeeded in breaking 
the Japanese LA code, a low-grade consular code. In early 1940 a Diplomatic 
and Press Section was formed in Melbourne, with an intercept station at Park 
Orchards that was maintained by the army’s 5th Special Wireless Section. In 
mid-1941 several members of the Sydney University group were called up and 
posted to Nave’s SIB; the first of these was Dr Athanasius P. Treweek. Others, 
including Professor Arthur Dale Trendall, joined it soon after the outbreak 
of the Pacific war.2 When FRUMEL began operations, the SIB joined it in the 
Monterey Building. The uniformed members went to the middle floor to work 
on Japanese naval traffic and the civilian members moved to a one-bedroom flat 
on the top floor to concentrate on diplomatic traffic.
In November 1942, the diplomatic group was transferred from RAN control to 
the army, moved to the second floor of ‘A’ Block in Victoria Barracks, and named 
D Special Section. From January 1942, until his return to Sydney in June 1944, 
2 Peter Donovan and John Mack, ‘Sydney University, T.G. Room and Codebreaking in WWII’, part 1, 
Australian Mathematical Society Gazette, vol. 29, no. 2, 2002; and Peter Donovan and John Mack, ‘Sydney 
University, T.G. Room and Codebreaking in WWII’, part 2, Australian Mathematical Society Gazette, vol. 29, 
no. 3, 2002.
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the section was headed by Trendall, Professor of Greek at Sydney University.3 
Intercepts were initially obtained by the station at Park Orchards. In April 1942 
a station was established at Ferny Creek, in the Dandenong Ranges, specifically 
to intercept Japanese diplomatic traffic for Trendall’s section. In August the 
station was moved to Bonegilla, near Albury-Wodonga, where the 52nd Special 
Wireless Section was formed. It was staffed mainly by women of the Australian 
Women’s Army Service (AWAS). It moved to Mornington in November 1943.
David Sissons
Sissons matriculated in 1942 from Scotch College in Melbourne, where he 
was dux in Latin and also received high marks in mathematics. He entered 
Melbourne University, where he planned to major in Classics, at the beginning 
of 1943. At the end of his first year, however, following his 18th birthday on 
21 December 1943, he was called up for active service and ‘marched in’ for full-
time duty on 27 June 1944. He spent eight weeks at a recruit training camp at 
Cowra in western New South Wales, not far from a Japanese prisoner of war 
camp near the town. Sissons was there on 5 August when the Japanese prisoners 
attempted a mass breakout; during the escape and subsequent recapture of the 
POWs, four Australian soldiers and 231 Japanese soldiers died and 108 prisoners 
were wounded. Sissons was among the young recruits who were employed in 
rounding up the escapees and he went on to receive seven months Japanese 
language training. He was posted to D Special Section as a linguist/translator in 
April 1945, where he worked until September 1945.
In 1978, my colleague David Horner and I published articles on Australia and 
Allied SIGINT during the Second World War in which we noted the existence 
of a unit concerned with cryptanalysis of Japanese diplomatic traffic.4 I had 
found a reference in US Congressional testimony on the Pearl Harbor attack 
in December 1941, published in 1946, which stated that: ‘The Australians 
had a small Communications Intelligence Organization and in December 1941 
they were intercepting Japanese diplomatic radio traffic and reading messages 
in the J-19 system’.5 It also noted that the interception stations in Australia 
often picked up transmissions that ‘skipped over’ other US and British intercept 
stations in Southeast Asia, ‘particularly if the Japanese were using frequencies 
optimised for communications with their Embassies in Washington, Rio and 
3 R.S. Merrillees, ‘Professor A.D. Trendall and his Band of Classical Cryptographers’, Working Paper 
No. 355, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, January 2001.
4 Desmond J. Ball, ‘Allied Intelligence Cooperation Involving Australia During World War II’, Australian 
Outlook, vol. 32, no. 3, December 1978, pp. 299–309; and, D.M. Horner, ‘Special Intelligence in the South-
West Pacific Area in World War II’, Australian Outlook, vol. 32, no. 3, December 1978, pp. 310–27.
5 US Congress, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Pearl 
Harbor Attack (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1946), part 8, p. 3614.
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Buenos Aires’.6 Sissons was excited about our revelation, and was energised to 
compile as much information as he could about the history and activities of his 
former unit. 
He assembled everything he could find on the public record, including relevant 
records held by the National Archives of Australia and the Australian War 
Memorial (AWM) in Canberra. Somewhat disappointed with his scant and 
fragmented findings, he decided to enlist the assistance of others who had been 
involved in one way or another with D Special Section, and Japanese diplomatic 
traffic more generally.
Fittingly, he began with Alan Stripp, a famous wartime cryptanalyst who had 
worked on Japanese cyphers at both the GC&CS HQ at Bletchley Park and one 
of its major ‘outstations’ in Delhi in India. He published a detailed account of 
‘breaking Japanese codes’ in October 1987 and, in late 1988, had just completed 
a book on this subject which included a survey of the codes and cyphers used 
by the Japanese, including several systems used for diplomatic traffic (such 
as J-19, PURPLE and Greater East Asian Ministry (GEAM)).7 In a long letter 
to Stripp in 1988, Sissons explained what he knew at that time about the 
interception of Japanese diplomatic traffic in Australia. He attached to this letter 
a page from the war diary of the 52nd Special Wireless Section categorising the 
4,457 Japanese diplomatic messages that had been intercepted at Bonegilla in 
March 1943, and five pages from the war diary summarising the 3,348 intercepts 
taken at Mornington from 1 to 31 May 1944, which he had found in the AWM. 
This letter and the attachments are reproduced as the beginning entry in the 
Annexes to this volume. (See Annex 1)
In the early 1990s Sissons initiated correspondence with several of his former 
colleagues from D Special Section. His letters were extremely detailed and 
meticulous, sometimes amounting to several thousand words, often with 
annexes. In his inimitable way, he usually followed up with further questions 
to clarify names, events, dates or other details. His principal interlocutors were 
Ronald Bond, Ian Smith, Eric Barnes, Kenneth McKay, and Mary Stewart, a 
member of the office staff from November 1942 to September 1943. He also 
interviewed Treweek in 1990.8 Some of that correspondence, together with the 
interview with Treweek, contains information of immense use to historians and 
cryptanalysts, and is also reproduced later in this volume.
6 Ibid., p. 3615.
7 Alan Stripp, ‘Breaking Japanese Codes’, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 2, no. 4, October 1987, 
pp. 135–50; and, Alan Stripp, Codebreaker in the Far East (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1989), chapter 7.
8 It should be noted that, along with his unique insights, Treweek was surprisingly disparaging about two 
of his colleagues, mathematicians T.G. Room and R.J. Lyons. They were the two initial members of the army’s 
Sydney University group, who had joined Nave’s SIB in August 1941. Lyons returned to Sydney University 
in late 1942, but Room transferred to MacArthur’s Central Bureau, where he headed the unit working on 
Japanese meteorological codes, which alerted the Allies to the targets of forthcoming Japanese air raids in 
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In addition to those who had worked in the Special Section, Sissons corresponded 
with Steve Mason, a former sergeant who spent the war with the ASWG and who 
worked at the Mornington station from December 1945 until his discharge in 
October 1946. His accounts of the ASWG activities at Park Orchards, Bonegilla 
and Mornington, in letters to Sissons and me comprise a unique historical 
record (Annexes 8, 9).
He also began a systematic search in the US National Archives, where most 
of the Japanese diplomatic messages, known as Magic, that were intercepted 
throughout the war had been released for public access. In early 1986 he 
engaged a research assistant, Emma Craswell, to scour this archival material. He 
was excited to find a file entitled ‘Copies of Messages Supplied by Australia with 
Clarifying Notes’, dated 6 April 1943. He concluded to his absolute satisfaction 
that many of the Magic intercepts had originated at the Mornington station 
and been processed by D Special Section. Selections of his correspondence 
concerning his Magic searches in the United States are also reproduced later in 
this volume. 
I joined Sissons in aspects of this quest in the mid-1980s. I interviewed Trendall 
in 1990 and Bond in 1994, and subsequently engaged in correspondence with 
them both. A letter from Bond to me is reproduced herein (Annex 10). It contains 
sketches of the layout of the Monterey Building in Queens Road and ‘A’ Block 
in Victoria Barracks, together with the names of the occupants of the particular 
rooms. (Note that Bond uses the British terminology of Ground Floor, First Floor 
and Second Floor in his diagrams, while most other accounts refer to the First, 
Second and Third floors).
In 1986 Sissons learned from Bond and Smith that, after the war and before the 
Section was disbanded, they together with Barnes had compiled a report on 
the Japanese diplomatic cyphers with which the unit had been engaged. (Over 
the next two decades, Sissons sometimes referred to this as ‘the Barnes Report’ 
or ‘the Bond Report’). He immediately sought to locate a copy and request its 
declassification, as well as that of related material concerning the unit. At first, 
his efforts through the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), the successor SIGINT 
organisation, were consistently stymied on the grounds that the material he 
wanted contained information that ‘reveals details of an arrangement between 
Australian and foreign governments’ and that ‘the foreign governments 
concerned have not agreed to the public release of such information’. This was 
the south-west Pacific area. The US secretary of the army stated in a letter to the vice-chancellor of Sydney 
University in September 1945 that Room had made ‘a very valuable contribution … to the Allied War Effort’. 
See Donovan and Mack, ‘Sydney University, T.G. Room and Codebreaking in WWII’, part 1; and, Donovan 
and Mack, ‘Sydney University, T.G. Room and Codebreaking in WWII’, part 2.
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a reference to the UKUSA Agreement, the postwar arrangements for SIGINT 
cooperation and exchange between the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and finally declassified in June 2010.9
Sissons, however, persisted with his efforts. Finally, after a decade of perseverance, 
in 1997, DSD released the 45-page report, entitled Report of Special Intelligence 
Section, HQ Australian Military Forces, Melbourne [on] Japanese Diplomatic 
Cyphers: Cryptographic Survey, produced in 1946 (NAA Series A6923/2, Item 1). 
The report was lightly edited by Sissons in 2006 with a view to publication. He 
wrote a 13,000-word introduction (not counting three pages of tables), covering 
the section’s origins and history, and also appended a brief note on ‘Sources’. 
He died before publication was secured, however, and his plan lapsed. The 1946 
report, together with Sissons’s introduction, comprises the main body of this 
volume.
Sissons continued to pursue aspects of the subject up until his death in October 
2006. His later efforts were less concerned with reconstructing the organisation’s 
history and more focussed on its cryptanalytic activities. As exemplified in 
his correspondence with McKay in late 2004, and with Bond in early 2005, he 
was particularly interested in the techniques and processes used by Trendall, 
Bond, Barnes, Smith and McKay to break specific Japanese diplomatic codes 
and cyphers, especially the FUJI and GEAM transposition cyphers. Three of 
his letters to McKay in November–December 2004 are reproduced herein 
(annexes 15, 17, 18). Sissons attached to his letter of 9 November 2004 an 
11-page note describing his ongoing attempt to re-create the techniques that 
Trendall had used to break GEAM by encoding the famous Japanese ‘Winds – 
Set-up’ messsage sent from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy in Washington on 19 
November 1941 (Annex 16). He was stymied at the point where Trendall had 
invariably determined the correct sequence of the ten possible bigram columns 
used in the transposition blocks, and sought McKay’s assistance. 
Sadly, towards the end of his last letter in this collection, on 19 December 2004, 
he expresses his disappointment that he had been unable to uncover everything 
he had wanted about the Special Section’s activities, and admits his eventual 
defeat in re-creating the techniques that Trendall had used with GEAM (Annex 
18). He should not have been too distraught at his failure to match Trendall 
who, himself, was unable to explain how he did it. He told me in May 1990 that, 
although he was no mathematician, he had an inexplicable ability to see the 
patterns in the encoded text underneath the jumbled bigrams: ‘You get a feeling 
for it. Your eye lights up on something, and … bang’ (Annex 2).
9 National Security Agency (NSA), ‘Declassified UKUSA Signals Intelligence Agreement Documents 
Available’, 24 June 2010, at http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2010/ukusa.shtml
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D Special Section
D Special Section was a small but select organisation. A total of only 33 people 
worked in the section during the entire period from January 1942 to the end 
of the war. These consisted of eight ‘technical’ personnel, or ‘code-breakers’, 
plus another five lent by Central Bureau ‘during heavy periods’; 11 ‘language 
and translation’ personnel, plus two others ‘lent by Central Bureau for short 
periods of heavy pressure’; and seven women typists and clerical assistants. 
In June 1943, it had ten members, comprised of three ‘technical’ personnel, 
four linguists/translators, and three typists and clerks. In July 1944, it had 17, 
comprised of six ‘technical’ personnel, five linguists/translators, and six typists 
and clerks. In August 1945, it had 18 members, comprised of six ‘technical’ 
personnel, plus one on loan, four linguists/translators plus two on loan, and 
five typists/clerks.
They were an illustrious group. The ‘technical’ members came from the worlds 
of Classics and Mathematics. They included Trendall, Professor of Greek 
and Archeology at Sydney University from 1939 to 1954, and then Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor and Master of University House at The Australian National 
University (ANU) until 1969;10 Treweek, later Professor of Classics at Sydney 
University; Ronald Bond, another Classics scholar who was later Vice-Principal 
of Scotch College for 18 years; McKay, who later became Reader in Classics at the 
ANU; Barnes, who later became Professor of Pure Mathematics and then Deputy 
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Adelaide; and Ian Smith, who was later 
Professor of Modern Languages at the University of Tasmania.
The linguists/translators included C. H. Archer and Hubert A. Graves from the 
British Consular Service, and Arthur R. V. Cooper from the FECB of the British 
Government GC&CS. Archer had been the British Consul-General in Harbin, 
Manchuria. Cooper, brilliant and erratic, had worked at the FECB station in 
Hong Kong until late 1939 when, following Japan’s invasion of China, the main 
body of the station was moved to Singapore. He was evacuated from Singapore 
by ship and submarine, together with his pet gibbon Tertius, and arrived at 
Monterey in March 1942. The gibbon was given to the Melbourne Zoo when 
Cooper returned to the United Kingdom in December 1942. Trendall said in May 
10 Sissons lived in University House from when he arrived at ANU in 1961 until mid-1966. He was a fellow 
of the Governing Board and steward in 1964–66. From August 1965, when he and Bronwen were married, 
they lived in an apartment directly below Trendall’s. They frequently dined with Trendall, on both formal 
and social occasions. Sissons later told me, however, that on no occasion did he and Trendall ever discuss their 
wartime service in D Special Section, nor even intimate that they were aware of the other’s role. Trendall, of 
course, may not have known Sissons during the war, as he only returned to the section infrequently after 
June 1944, whereas Sissons only joined it in April 1945. Sissons would not have broached the subject. His 
natural shyness was a factor, but so was their age difference; Sissons thought himself too junior to the famous 
professor to share confidences. In any case, they were both men of discretion and respect for official secrecy.
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1990 that Cooper ‘had a very fine brain’ and that ‘for intelligence purposes, [he] 
was very much at the top of the tree’. Sissons was one of the linguists/translators 
who was officially ‘on loan’ from Central Bureau. 
D Special Section’s role was to conduct crypanalytical activities with respect to 
intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications. The intercepts were obtained 
by monitoring Japan’s worldwide network of HF radio stations used by the 
Foreign Ministry, including stations in Japan and stations in the Soviet Union, 
Germany, occupied China, French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies, 
and Thailand. The 52nd Australian Special Wireless Section was dedicated to 
intercepting this traffic, at Bonegilla until November 1943 and then Mornington 
until it was demobilised in late 1945. When reception of particular frequencies 
of interest was poor at Mornington, these were monitored by the ASWG stations 
at Darwin and Kalinga in Brisbane.
In addition, the Section received intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages 
from the New Zealand army’s Special Section located at Nairnville Park, 
Wellington, which extended coverage another 2,500 kilometres further east.11 
Messages intercepted by the Special Section, as well as by the New Zealand 
navy’s SIGINT organisation, were sent to FRUMEL on the daily commercial 
flights from Wellington. Much of the Nairnville Park material was forwarded 
to Central Bureau in Brisbane. Intercepted diplomatic traffic, such as FUJI and 
Type B Machine (PURPLE) material, was dispatched to D Special Section, where 
it was sorted according to whether it should be analysed by the Section or sent 
on to the Government Communications Bureau at Berkeley Street in London, the 
Diplomatic Section of GC&CS.
The most lucrative source was the radio telegraphy circuit between Kuibyshev 
and Tokyo, via Irkutsk, which had the call sign RTZ. From October 1941 to 
around August 1943, from the German offensive intended to capture Moscow 
to the withdrawal of the German forces, much of the Soviet governmental 
apparatus, as well as the foreign legations, moved from Moscow to Kuibyshev, 
about 870 kilometres southeast of Moscow. It was also the primary circuit for 
communications between Moscow and Tokyo, relayed from Kuibyshev. 
The Bonegilla station had begun ‘highly successful’ coverage of RTZ before 
February 1943. In early 1943 Bond instructed the station to watch the circuit 
carefully. In the six-month period from February to July 1943, the station 
intercepted 1,421 messages from Kuibyshev to Tokyo and 1,212 messages from 
Tokyo to Kuibyshev. RTZ accounted for 27 per cent of the messages from stations 
outside Japan intercepted at Mornington in May 1944. The New Zealand army’s 
11 Desmond Ball, Cliff Lord and Meredith Thatcher, Invaluable Service: The Secret History of New Zealand’s 
Signals Intelligence During Two World Wars (Waimauku, New Zealand: Resource Books, 2011), pp. 202–04, 213.
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Special Section at Nairnville Park in Wellington maintained a special 24-hour 
watch for Japanese diplomatic communications on the RTZ link between Irkutsk 
and Tokyo.12 
The cyphers analysed by the Section are the subject of the Cryptographic Survey 
produced in 1946. From its inception until July 1943, the Section’s principal 
task was to decypher and process diplomatic messages sent in the high-grade 
FUJI transposition cypher, which was changed daily. The 1946 report notes 
that, by May 1942, ‘virtually all traffic in the FUJI cypher [was] being read 
locally’. Trendall evidently ‘devised an ingenious way of breaking the daily 
cypher so quickly and routinely that he could usually send the solution to 
London before work began there the next morning.13 The Section was the first 
Allied unit to break a transposition cypher introduced by the GEAM in July 
1943. Soon afterwards, it broke the Foreign Ministry’s BA transposition cypher.
The highest grade diplomatic encypherment system involved the HINOKI 
Machine Cypher (JAA, Type B, or PURPLE). The GC&CS obtained a replica 
machine in early 1941, but none was available to D Special Section. It sorted the 
PURPLE intercepts from Mornington and Nairnville Park for forwarding to the 
Diplomatic Section of GC&CS in London for decypherment. It also forwarded 
to London intercepts of messages from the Japanese military and naval attaches 
located with their overseas legations. By the end of 1943, the Section was 
sending about 800–900 attache messages to London per month.
Intercepting Soviet radio traffic
In 1994 Sissons told Horner that he believed D Special Section had had some 
involvement in cryptanalytical activities concerning Soviet radio traffic during 
the war. He explained this further in a letter to me in 1996 (Annex 11). He 
specifically recalled that Bond, who had succeeded Trendall as head of the 
Section in June 1944, had had a Russian intercept in his safe, which Sissons 
thought had probably predated his arrival in April 1945; and that members of 
the ASWG at the station near Darwin were intercepting Soviet diplomatic traffic 
around December 1945 and had been intercepting it ‘during hostilities’.14
One former AWAS member, Margaret McBrien (later Griffin, as described by 
Steve Mason in Annex 8), told members of her family that she was engaged in 
interception of Russian traffic while she was at Mornington from September 
12 Ball, Lord and Thatcher, Invaluable Service, pp. 202–13.
13 Merrillees, ‘Professor A. D. Trendall and His Band of Classical Cryptographers’, p. 14.
14 Ball and Horner, Breaking the Codes, p. 165.
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1944 to January 1946. She recalled traffic concerning Russian troop movements 
prior to their invasion of Manchuria and the northern Japanese islands during 
9–20 August 1945.
By December 1945 the Mornington station was devoted almost entirely to 
Russian transmissions. Sergeant Steve Mason, who arrived at Mornington that 
month, has stated that: ‘We took mostly Russian high speed traffic. On occasions, 
with the use of incentives, full logs were produced — I can remember one 
night’s work which yielded more than 1000 messages’. The Russian intercepts 
were taken on Edison wax cylinders and transcribed later. They were taken 
each Wednesday to Victoria Barracks by a warrant officer, who passed them 
to the Diplomatic Section, now headed by Lieutenant Colonel Alastair (‘Mic’) 
Sandford, who occupied the same room as had Trendall and Bond (Annex 8).
D Special Section was only interested in the Japanese diplomatic traffic, at least 
until after Japan’s surrender in August. It is likely, however, that at some point 
before December 1945, when the Mornington station was intercepting mostly 
Russian traffic, and prior to the ending of the war in August, it was intercepting 
both Japanese and Russian traffic, with D Special Section presumably passing 
the latter directly to London, along with some of the Japanese traffic.
Detection of the Soviet espionage network in 
Australia
It is likely that around this juncture the Mornington station and, incidentally, 
D Special Section, became involved in the beginnings of Australia’s most serious 
espionage episode. On 6 January 1945, in a ‘Top Secret and Personal’ letter to the 
Acting Minister for the Army, General Sir Thomas Blamey, Commander-in-Chief 
of the Australian Military Forces (AMF) reported that, in the course of Allied 
intelligence operations, ‘it has been definitely proved that there are leakages 
of information from Australia which have their origin apparently in Canberra’. 
Blamey gave four examples of intercepts of Japanese signals which contained 
details of Allied ‘plans for certain operations in the Philippines’ and details of 
recent Australian army intelligence estimates of Japanese strength there. The 
information came from Department of Information ‘news background sheets’ 
and AMF Weekly Intelligence Reviews prepared for War Cabinet and Advisory 
War Council meetings. The contents of an AMF Weekly Intelligence Summary 
issued on 4 November 1944 ‘were known in full’ in Tokyo on 11 November. A 
file of material on which Blamey had based his letter was released in Canberra in 
July 1997. It contained details of eight instances of similar leaked information, 
sourced to the Soviet embassy in Canberra, during November–December 1944. 
For example, the details of Australian army deployments in New Guinea that 
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were prepared for a meeting of the Advisory War Council on 16 November 1944, 
and circulated to members a few days beforehand, were in Japanese hands by 
19 November.15
Neither Blamey’s letter nor the supporting file identified the Allied agency that 
had discovered the leakages and thence informed Blamey about them. Neither 
does the material in the file specify the Japanese circuits monitored, or the 
relevant cypher used, or the station responsible for the intercepts.
Declassified files in the UK National Archives, however, indicate that the Allied 
agency which decyphered the Japanese traffic and alerted Blamey was the 
Diplomatic Section of GC&CS in London. It is very likely that at least some of 
the messages were intercepted by the Mornington and Nairnville Park stations. 
Several of the messages originated in Harbin in Japanese-occupied Manchuria, 
and were sent to Tokyo by the Japanese Consulate in Harbin. Sissons thought 
it was possible that Mornington had intercepted these, which would then have 
been forwarded by D Special Section to London for decypherment. In addition, 
monitoring the RTZ circuit would have yielded important pieces of information 
about the leakages. For example, a telegram from Tokyo to Moscow on 13 May 
1944, which said that the Japanese Consul-General in Harbin was receiving 
information from the Soviet Consul-General, was presumably transmitted on 
RTZ. In 1996, Sissons asked Craswell to search a series of recently released 
intercepts of telegrams between Harbin and Tokyo in the US National Archives 
for copies of either three particular messages mentioned by Blamey or any 
similar intercepts, but she found that intercepts for the dates of interest were 
still withheld from public access.
There is also the intriguing possibility that in early 1945 the Mornington 
station was tasked with monitoring Soviet traffic in the Far East in an attempt to 
discover any clues as to the process through which the leaked Australian secrets 
were being passed from Soviet to Japanese hands. Did the Japanese obtain them 
only in Harbin or also in Moscow or Kuibyshev, and in the case of Harbin, how 
were they transmitted from Moscow to Harbin for the handover? The stations 
at Mornington, Nairnville Park, Darwin and Kalinga were best suited for this 
search as they already monitored the airwaves across the relevant geographical 
area for GC&CS’s Diplomatic Section either on a dedicated basis or as radio 
reception conditions required. Sandford, the deputy head of Central Bureau, 
who was fully apprised of the matter from the beginning, took over D Special 
Section in late 1945 and was the personal recipient of the Soviet intercepts taken 
at Mornington. In February 1945 he noted, in connection with the investigation 
15 Ibid., chapter 6; and, Desmond Ball, ‘The Moles at the Very Heart of Government’, Australian, 16 April 2011.
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of the leakages, that ‘the Russian Diplomatic traffic will still be required by the 
United Kingdom’ and had asked that all such traffic should be sent to him at 
Central Bureau.
The subsequent US–UK cryptological operation known as Venona, in which large 
portions of Soviet intelligence communications between Moscow centre and its 
major overseas posts (such as London, Washington, New York and Canberra) 
for selected periods from 1943 to 1948 were decrypted, revealed the existence 
of a Soviet espionage network active in Australia, with at least ten members. It 
seems now clear that the office of Dr H. V. Evatt, the Attorney General and the 
Minister for External Affairs, in Martin Place in Sydney, was the source of the 
leakages concerning Allied war plans in 1944–45. The specific culprits were 
almost certainly Allan Dalziel, Evatt’s private security (who was codenamed 
DENIS by the Soviet foreign intelligence service), and Ric Throssell (later 
codenamed FERRO). For example, it is most likely that Dalziel gave a Department 
of Information ‘news background sheet’ in November 1944 to Feodor Nosov 
(TEKHNIK), the Soviet Press Agency (TASS) representative (and senior Soviet 
intelligence officer) in Sydney. The information in this sheet was later found ‘in 
practically identical terms’ in an intercept of a Japanese message from Harbin to 
Tokyo. Nosov had immediately sent it to Moscow, from whence it was quickly 
sent to Harbin, somehow passed to the Japanese Consulate and then sent to 
Tokyo. Stalin was engaged in the higher statecraft of prolonging the fighting 
in the southwest Pacific theatre for as long as possible, or at least until Soviet 
forces could be moved from the western front to enter the war against Japan and 
enable Moscow to join in the peace negotiations, for which the eventual prize 
was Sakhalin Island and the Japanese ‘Northern Territories’.16
There remain important unanswered questions concerning this opening phase 
of the espionage case. Some answers could well be derived from the files of 
GC&CS’s Diplomatic Section and US Magic records that are still classified. 
Sissons’s painstaking research and analysis of the activities of the Mornington 
station and the possible role of D Special Section in the handling of Soviet 
intercepts, however, uncovered enough to keep the door slightly ajar for 
eventual discoveries.
The Kormoran cryptogram and the sinking of 
HMAS Sydney
In his essay in 2006 on D Special Section’s origins and history, Sissons revealed 
that the Section had successfully decyphered a German account of the sinking 
16 Ball and Horner, Breaking the Codes, pp. xx, 343; and, Ball, ‘The Moles’.
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of HMAS Sydney by the Kormoran, a German auxiliary cruiser or ‘raider’, off 
the coast of Western Australia near Carnarvon, on 19 November 1941. How 
a modified merchant ship could sink a Leander-class cruiser, with the loss of 
all 645 men aboard, has never been satisfactorily explained. Sissons’s essay, 
however, casts new light on this controversial incident.
Sissons recalls that on 11 January 1945, a group of about 20 survivors from 
the Kormoran, including Commander Theodor Detmers, the ship’s captain, 
attempted to escape from a POW camp in Victoria. While a prisoner, Detmers 
wrote an encoded account of the battle, which was found on him when he 
was recaptured a week after the breakout. The cryptogram, which consisted of 
about 6,250 characters, was given to D Special Section to decypher. Smith, who 
was fluent in German, played the main role in its solution, assisted by Barnes on 
the mathematical side. (It should be noted, however, that Treweek told Sissons 
in October 1990 that it had been solved by Keith Miller, who is not listed as a 
member of D Special Section in the 1946 account, but had previously worked 
under Nave in the Special Intelligence Bureau). It involved a relatively simple 
form of ‘polyalphabetic substitution’ cypher; Sissons shows, through a six-page 
reconstruction, how it was soon decyphered. It evidently consisted of the deck 
and engine room logs from the sighting of the Sydney until the scuttling of 
the Kormoran some eight and a half hours later and, Sissons notes, provides 
‘the most reliable account of how Sydney met her fate’. It shows that, ‘before 
verifying the raider’s identity, Sydney approached to within point blank range 
and was crippled by fire from Kormoran’s main and secondary armament before 
she could bring fire to bear’.
The Sissons legacy
Sissons served in D Special Section for only five months. It is only because of his 
extraordinary efforts, however, that the Section’s story could be reconstructed 
and published. It is very likely that the 1946 cryptographic report would have 
remained unreleased and unknown, were it not for his persistence, fuelled by his 
knowledge of its existence. He initiated and pursued most of the correspondence 
with former members of the Section, and arranged key interviews, putting 
together a detailed account of its origins and history that would otherwise have 
not been recorded. He was assiduous and indefatigable. He is owed a great debt 
by scholars and practitioners concerned with the science of cryptography as 
well as historians of the cryptological aspects of the war in the Pacific. 
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Withdrawal of the 1946 report
In late 2012, when we were checking the archival sources cited by Sissons, we 
learned that the Report of Special Intelligence Section, HQ Australian Military 
Forces, Melbourne [on] Japanese Diplomatic Cyphers: Cryptographic Survey (1946) 
had been withdrawn from public access on 2 June 2011. After 14 years of public 
viewing and copying as NAA Series A6923/3, Item 1, the report is now officially 
‘withheld pending access advice from an agency/agencies’. Sissons would not 
have been surprised at the redaction; he would have smiled, commented wryly 
on the ludicrousness of the decision, and continued doggedly with his efforts to 
secure public appreciation of the activities of the Special Section.
We also found that the associated items in Series A6923/3 had recently been 
either recatalogued or removed from access. (We have retained Sissons’s NAA 
references in his footnotes, however; they were undoubtedly correct during his 
last visits to the NAA in 2004–06). Sissons would have regarded all this as just 
another tiresome challenge for investigative scholars.
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Chapter 2. The Diplomatic  
Special Intelligence Section:  
Its Origins and History1
D .C .S . Sissons
Three months after the outbreak of war, the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) on 
12 December 1939 wrote to his colleagues, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) 
and Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) that it had 'been suggested' that it might be 
desirable to set up in Australia 'a cryptographic organisation on the lines of 
the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) in London, with a view to 
breaking down enemy codes and cyphers'. He sought their views. The source of 
the 'suggestion' he did not state. Presumably it had come as an informal feeler 
from the GC&CS through the Admiralty. 
The CNS was lukewarm to the suggestion:
As far as European nations are concerned it is doubtful whether we 
can do much at this distance, either on our own account or to help the 
UK Organisation. As far as Asiatic nations are concerned, any local 
organisation would appear to be a duplication of the UK Organisation 
in the East … .
The CGS was a little more enthusiastic:
I consider that we should have at least a nucleus organisation in Australia 
against the contingencies of operations in and about Australia and her 
territories. The work is clearly of a highly skilled nature and much 
practice is necessary, and the sooner a commencement can be made the 
better.
I agree that the aid of the British authorities should be involved … .
1 As a result of the wholesale and unsystematic destruction of the records of the Naval Intelligence Division 
and the Directorate of Military Intelligence and their subsidiaries, the source material for this study has been 
limited to the occasional file that has survived and to the recollections of some of the participants. 
The only surviving records of the Section’s activities appear to be: (i) the 30-page report (stripped of its 
appendices) tendered by the Section at the time of its disbandment in 1946 (National Archives of Australia 
(NAA): A6923/2, 1); (ii) the Department of the Army, Central Registry file on the Section (NAA: A6923/3, 
37/401/425); unregistered box files from the office of the Captain Ix at Land Headquarters of outwards signals 
dispatched by the Section through the Assistant Director of Military Intelligence for the period 28 November 
1942 – 23 April 1943 (consisting principally of summaries of translations of selected intercepts) and 5 August 
1943 – 27 May 1944 (consisting principally of daily traffic lists and newly solved code groups, cypher keys 
and additives) (NAA: A6923/3, [DMI Diplomatic Message Traffic]).
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The chiefs considered the matter at the meeting of the Defence Committee on 
15 February 1940, at which it was resolved that 'as a preliminary to any further 
action, the advice and assistance of the United Kingdom authorities should be 
sought'.2 At the measured pace of officialdom, the views of the chiefs and this 
request for advice were conveyed to the British Government in a letter over the 
signature of the Prime Minister dated 11 April. 
In the army, the General Staff took prompt preparatory steps for setting up this 
'nucleus organization'. By the end of January 1940 the GSO II (Intelligence) at 
Eastern Command, Sydney had gathered together a group of four academics at 
Sydney University — two mathematicians (Professor T. G. Room FRS and Mr 
R. J. Lyons) and two classicists (Professor A. D. Trendall and Mr A. P. Treweek) 
— to teach each other cryptography in their leisure hours, using as their raw 
material copies of the past traffic of the Japanese Consul-General provided by 
the cable and wireless company.
By October the GSO II was able to report that:
Work has been concentrated on an attempt to break down the Japanese 
commercial and diplomatic codes … . Three definite codes have been 
identified in use and in the case of one of these it has become apparent 
that a new code was brought into operation on 1 October 1940. As the 
general principles underlying this are assumed to be identical, it is 
believed that if the code upon which work is being done is broken, it 
will be an easy matter to apply the results to the new code … .3
He also reported that for variety he had sent the group coded portions of 
overseas mail that had been detected by the District Censor and that, in a single 
sitting, they had broken the dot code in which, through a forwarding address 
in Sydney, an English knight residing in China was exchanging most torrid 
and explicit love letters with a married woman in Melbourne. (It is not stated 
whether the District Censor adopted the academics' suggestion that, prior to 
delivery, they annotate the originals in the same dot code with 'Careful! — The 
Censor').
Similar preparatory steps were taken by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in 
mid-1940 when Commander T. E. Nave RN, an experienced cryptographer 
and Japanese linguist at the Far Eastern Combined Bureau (FECB), Singapore, 
returned to his home in Australia on sick leave. When a medical survey found 
him unfit for tropical service, the Admiralty approved his temporary attachment 
to the RAN to work on Japanese signals intelligence.4
2 NAA: A816, 43/302/18, Cryptographic Organization in Australia.
3 NAA: A6923/3, 37/401/425, [Special Intelligence Section].
4 Captain J. Foley to Secretary Defence Committee, 12 November 1941, ‘Special Intelligence Organisation’ 
(NAA: A816, 43/302/18).
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In response to the Australian request for advice, the British Government replied 
on 15 October to the following effect: (i) It agreed that it would be inadvisable to 
establish any large-scale organization which would duplicate the work done by 
the GC&CS and suggested that the RAN's small section under Nave, which was 
working in close cooperation with the FECB, be expanded; (ii) It was prepared 
to assist with the training of cryptographers; (iii) It would welcome Australian 
assistance in the interception of Japanese fixed commercial stations. 
The British reply was considered by the Defence Committee at its meeting of 28 
November where it was decided that the CNS should further examine the matter 
and take up with the CGS and CAS the question of appropriate training.5
In the months immediately following, the role of Nave's organisation appears to 
have been to assist FECB by traffic analysis and decryption of Japanese naval 
traffic in the Japanese Mandated Islands. Incidental to discharging this function, 
it provided the Dutch signals intelligence department at Bandoeng with 
Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts in exchange for Mandated Islands 
traffic. Nave requested that FECB provide him with 'copies of the Consular and 
Diplomatic codes, and of any other codes regularly intercepted in Australia'. As 
late as March 1941, however, FECB were refusing to do this, on the grounds that 
'the Consular and Diplomatic codes are now so complicated that a large staff of 
experts is required to obtain results, and that anything of interest read from this 
or other codes or cyphers would be forwarded to the [Australian] Naval Board'.6
The engagement of the Sydney University 
group for full-time duty
On 2 May 1941 a conference was convened at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, to 
consider the future employment of the Sydney University group. Those attending 
were: for the navy — the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) and Nave; for 
the army — the Director of Military Operations & Intelligence (DMO&I), the 
Signals Officer in Chief, a GSO II (Military Intelligence) and a Captain (Military 
Intelligence, Cypher Security); for the Sydney University group —Room and 
Treweek. The conference reported that:
(a) The breaking of Japanese diplomatic codes could be regarded as a 
feasible proposition.
(b) It was desirable that a section for this purpose should be organised — 
it being considered that existing facilities at Singapore may not always 
be available.
5 NAA: A816, 43/302/18.
6 Minute by Director of Signals Communications, RAN, 19 March 1941 (NAA: MP1185/8, 1937/2/415).
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(c) The present strength of this section should be four officers and three 
clerks additional to the existing Naval nucleus organization. One officer 
to be a competent Japanese linguist.
(d) The section should be of a Combined Service nature, for the benefit 
of all Services although initially the work would mainly be concerned 
with naval codes.
In the course of the discussion Room and Treweek indicated that, if required, 
the university would probably be prepared to release them (and Lyons also) for 
full-time service in Melbourne after the end of first term.
Following the conference the Acting CNS on 15 May addressed the CGS as 
follows:
1. Consequent upon the interception by Army personnel of Japanese 
consular and diplomatic messages, it becomes necessary to consider the 
means of dealing with these messages. It is desirable that they should be 
handled in Australia if possible, in order to obtain intelligence and also 
in order to avoid relying permanently on Singapore for this work. This 
additional task would be beyond the capacity of the small naval section 
and would throw an additional strain on the Bureau at Singapore.
2. At the request of the DMO&I, Paymaster Commander Nave has 
examined the work performed by the Army Cypher Group from Sydney 
University, and reports that some of the members would be most useful 
in dealing with the Japanese diplomatic messages and other similar work.
3. Before embarking on this work, it would be necessary to secure the 
services of a competent interpreter for translation … .
4. If [the latter] can be obtained, it is recommended that three members 
of the Sydney University Cypher Section be sent to Melbourne to work 
with Paymaster Commander Nave. It is considered that each should be 
provided with a suitable clerical assistant.
5. Before commencing Consular work in Australia, it would probably be 
necessary to send two of the staff to Singapore for a short time to study 
the latest methods.
6. Would be glad to know your views on these proposals. 
On 3 June the CGS tendered to the Minister for the Army (P. C. Spender) the 
letter from the CNS together with a request for 'authority to call up for full-time 
duty with pay and allowances of Major' up to three of the Sydney University 
group. This, Spender approved the same day. 
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Treweek, who was already a Major in the Citizen Military Forces commanding 
a field battery in the Sydney University Regiment, duly reported at the Navy 
Office, Melbourne for full-time duty on 19 June. Engaging other members of 
the group, however, proved more difficult. The university argued that, for the 
professors, appointment to a rank of less than full colonel was inappropriate. 
This the DMO&I would not countenance. The Vice-Chancellor accordingly 
took the matter up directly with the Minister, representing that: (i) the rank 
of Major did not accord with the professional expertise and attainments of a 
Professor; (ii) that the practice of the university with regard to members of its 
staff on war service was to make up the gap between their pay in the services 
and their former university salaries and that the difference between a Major's 
and a Professor's income was so great that this would impose a considerable 
burden on the university. 
It was agreed that the professors and Lyons would be engaged as civilian 
experts at their existing salaries and that the university would undertake their 
superannuation contributions. Room and Lyons took up duty in Melbourne 
on 18 August.7 On 1 September, Room and another newly enlisted member of 
Nave's organisation, Pay Lieutenant A. B. Jamieson were flown to Singapore for 
training at FECB8 (Jamieson had resided in Japan since taking up Melbourne 
University's Mollison Travelling Scholarship in Japanese in 1934). They arrived 
back in Melbourne in November.
Attempts to find the 'competent interpreter' were not immediately successful. In 
April 1941, however, the British Foreign Office, at the request of the Australian 
Government, had despatched a member of the Consular Service on a tour of 
inspection to Portuguese Timor and to report on Japanese activities there. The 
Foreign Office chose for this assignment C. H. Archer, a senior officer who had 
served in a succession of consular posts in Japan and its territories since 1922 
and who was proficient in both spoken and written Japanese. By direction, 
on the completion of his tour he flew on to Australia in May to pass on his 
impressions to the relevant departments in Australia.9 During his meeting with 
the DNI in Melbourne the latter asked him whether, if the Foreign Office agreed, 
he would be prepared to join Nave's organisation. Archer was on leave between 
postings. On completion of his tour of duty as Consul at Tamsui in February 
he had been appointed Consul-General at Mukden to take up his duties there 
on the expiration of his accumulated leave. Recently, however, he had been 
informed that his posting to Mukden was likely to be deferred indefinitely in 
line with the Foreign Office's policy of ensuring that, if war broke out, a nucleus 
7 NAA: A6923/3, 37/401/425.
8 Australian Commonwealth Naval Board to Chief of Intelligence Staff [Far East] 25 August 1941 (NAA: 
MP1074/8/1 ‘Outward Signals (B Category)’, 3B, Serial 155).
9 For Archer’s 40-page report on Portuguese Timor and visit to Australia in April–May 1941, see NAA: 
A981, TIM P9 & TIM P23. 
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of senior Japanese-speaking experts would continue to be available instead of 
their being interned by the Japanese for the duration. Archer welcomed the 
DNI's proposal and on 15 May both he and the CNS cabled the Foreign Office 
recommending it.10 The Foreign Office agreed, in principle; but first it had a 
task for him in Tahiti. It was not until 21 January 1942 that he joined Nave's 
organisation.11
On 19 September the Secretary, Department of the Army, addressed a minute to 
the Secretary, Military Board that:
The Minister notes … that on the 15 May, the Acting Chief of the Naval 
Staff in a minute addressed to the Chief of the General Staff stated that 
'consequent upon the interception by Army personnel of Japanese 
Consular and diplomatic messages it became necessary to consider the 
means of dealing with them'.
In view of the fact that such diplomatic messages are generally immune 
from interference, the Minister desires to have a report as to the extent 
to which such action is being taken to intercept such messages and 
whether this action is in contravention of any international agreement, 
and in accordance with action similarly taken by the UK authorities or 
by Japan.
The Minister was promptly assured that:
In general, the position is that diplomatic messages in secret cypher are 
sighted in Cable Companies' offices. Copies of these messages are secured 
and placed before the Special Section. Similarly, British or Allied 
messages sent from and received in foreign countries would be available 
to the foreign governments concerned. In any case, telegraphic or radio 
communications are not subject to diplomatic privileges … .12
Interception of the 'Winds' message 
The implications of two circular telegrams despatched by the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry to overseas posts on 19 November were of such gravity, indicating 
the imminence of hostilities, that the intercepts were taken to the Secretary 
to War Cabinet (F. G. Shedden) to be shown to the Prime Minister. In the first 
of these the recipient was instructed urgently to nominate the mission best 
qualified 'in the event of the development of an emergency situation' to assume 
10 NAA: MP1074/8/1, 2B, Serial 102 & 103.
11 Foreign Office List, 1947.
12 NAA: A9293/3, 37/401/425.
Chapter 2 . The Diplomatic Special Intelligence Section
21
Japan's responsibilities of locally representing Italian interests. The second 
was the famous 'Winds – Set-Up' message instructing that the severance of 
communications with enemy countries would be indicated by inserting certain 
bogus weather reports in news broadcasts, e.g. 'West wind, clear' would signal 
'Japanese–British crisis (including the invasion of Thailand or an attack on 
Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies)'. These two intercepts were delivered, 
on 28 November, by the Second Naval Member to Shedden, who immediately 
showed them to the Prime Minister. 
On 2 December, in a circular telegram, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs instructed Melbourne and certain other posts to burn their telegram 
files and all codes except 'O' and 'TSU' and to signal the word 'HARUNA' to 
signify completion. This intercept, together with the intercept of Melbourne's 
'HARUNA', was delivered to Shedden on 4 December.13
The code words 'West wind, clear' were not transmitted until four hours after 
the bombing of Pearl Harbor. They were picked up by one of Nave's linguists 
on listening watch, Lieutenant I. L. Lloyd (Australian Intelligence Corps) and 
phoned to Shedden at 8.15 am on 8 December EST (2215 hours on 7 December 
GMT) — 1¾ hours before similar messages were intercepted in the United 
States.
Trendall's diplomatic section under RAN 
control (December 1941 – November 1942)
On Japan's entering the war, Nave's organisation was promptly reinforced. The 
last of the Sydney group, Trendall, arrived for full-time duty on 12 January 
1942.14 Archer and another senior officer from the British Consular Service, H. 
A. Graves, were seconded to the organisation from 21 January and 1 February 
respectively.15 On 28 February, Private R. S. Bond, who had just graduated with 
First Class Honours in Greek and Latin in Trendall's Classics Department in 
December, was marched in from the ranks of the Sydney University Regiment. 
He had just turned 19. He was promptly promoted to Corporal so that he could 
afford to lodge at the same boarding house as Trendall in St Kilda Road and 
continue their work after hours. 
By the end of March, when the entire organisation moved to its new site, the 
Monterey block of flats in Arthur Street, they had been formed into a discrete 
sub-unit within Nave's organisation, headed by Trendall, working exclusively 
13 NAA: A5954, 558.
14 NAA: A6293/3, 37/401/425.
15 Foreign Office List, 1947.
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on Japanese diplomatic traffic. (Room, Treweek and Lyons, however, remained 
directly under Nave, working on naval traffic). At Monterey they were soon 
joined by one of GC&CS's cryptographers and linguists, A. R. V. Cooper, who 
had been with FECB since 1938. Cooper and Lieutenant Norman Webb’s small 
Special Wireless section had volunteered to remain in Singapore to monitor 
the Japanese air attacks. They, together with Cooper’s pet gibbon, Tertius, 
were evacuated to Australia (via Java) on one of the last escape ships, leaving 
Singapore on 11 February.16 In later years Trendall had this to say of Cooper: 
'There was a somebody — a really good linguist … . For intelligence purposes 
he was very much at the top of the tree — a very fine brain'.17
Two trainee cryptographers were recruited during 1942. Gunner J. C. Davies18 
was plucked from the Artillery Training Depot in June. Like Bond, he had secured 
First Class Honours in Trendall's Latin III class at the 1941 annual examinations. 
Dr Elizabeth Sheppard, a resident tutor at the University Women's College, 
whose specialty was English Language and Literature, arrived in August.19
A single-bedroom top-floor flat on Monterey's north staircase overlooking 
Arthur Street was the Section's home throughout 1942, the cryptographers 
(Trendall, Cooper and Bond) installed in the bedroom; the linguists (Archer and 
Graves) and the three clerks/typists, in the lounge.
Trendall's Section operated under RAN control until transferred to the army in 
November 1942. The only high-grade cyphers in use by the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry at that time were FUJI and JAA (i.e. PURPLE). The Section's principal 
tasks throughout this period were, therefore, the solution of FUJI intercepts and 
the forwarding of PURPLE intercepts to GC&CS for solution (GC&CS had been 
operating a replica of the PURPLE machine since early 1941).
The transfer from the RAN to the Australian 
Army
In October 1942, Archer, Graves and Trendall were informed that: (i) It had 
been decided that Nave's organisation was to be absorbed into the US navy 
16 M. Smith, The Emperor’s Codes (London: Bantam, 2001), pp. 102–03. 
17 Cooper and Tertius at Hong Kong in early 1941 figure prominently in Emily Hahn’s, China to Me: A 
Partial Autobiography (New York: Doubleday, 1944).
18 He was professor of French, University of Adelaide, 1971–87.
19 Sheppard’s field was Old English and 15th century Scottish. The biographical chapter of her PhD thesis 
‘Studies in the Language of Bellenden’s Boece’ had recently been published in The Chronicles of Scotland 
Compiled by Hector Boece, vol. 1, Scottish Text Society, 3rd series, no. 15 (1941), pp. 411–61. She had also 
recently been awarded a Reinhardt Fellowship to pursue postdoctoral research in the United States. She was 
associate professor, English language, University of Auckland, 1963–72.
Chapter 2 . The Diplomatic Special Intelligence Section
23
cryptographic unit operating alongside it at Monterey (FRUMEL — Fleet 
Radio Unit, Melbourne); (ii) Nave was being reposted elsewhere and all civilian 
personnel would no longer be required; (iii) The Diplomatic Section would be 
disbanded and the solution of diplomatic traffic concentrated at Washington 
and London, who would pass on to Australia any messages of concern.20
On 22 October, Archer and Graves visited the General Staff Officer Intelligence 
(GSOI) in the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) at Land Headquarters, 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Little, and apprised him of these decisions. They 
urged on him that, rather than the disbandment of the Diplomatic Section, 
Military Intelligence should take it over. According to their experience, 
the prompt and effective decryption at London or Washington of messages 
intercepted in Australia would be quite impossible — principally because of 
garbling and delays resulting from retransmission. In addition, Archer was most 
critical of the process by which the decision had been reached: 'When this new 
proposal came up, the working out of its practical applications was entrusted 
to a Committee consisting of two Commanders in our Naval Service and one 
Lieutenant Commander in US Navy. The future of the diplomatic traffic was 
summarily decided over the heads alike of Foreign Office officials of superior 
rank, and of the Director of Naval Intelligence himself.’21
Trendall and Cooper visited Little the following day and made similar 
representations.
Little addressed a memorandum to the Director of Military Intelligence 
supporting their proposal:
My feeling is that since the advent of the USN Crypto Section under 
Lieutenant Commander Fabian, Army have not been treated fairly as, 
although Army provided about 1/3 of the staff and all the intercepts, 
all Army was allowed to have was a précis of the diplomatic material. 
More recently we have been permitted to read through in the presence 
of a N[aval?] O[fficer?] some of the diplomatic messages that Commander 
Nave was good enough to pass us. These were taken away as soon as 
read.
20 FRUMEL’s decision not to cover diplomatic traffic would have followed naturally from the interdepartmental 
agreement reached in Washington between the army and navy departments on 30 June 1942 regarding the 
rationalisation of cryptographic activities between the two departments. Previously, both departments had 
covered diplomatic traffic on a cooperative basis. Under the agreement it was allocated exclusively to the army 
(US National Archives, 457, SRH-200, ‘OP-20-G File on Army/Navy Collaboration 1931–45’, pp. 44–46). The 
disbandment of Nave’s section and FRUMEL’s decision not to cover diplomatic traffic were included in the 
terms of the bilateral UK–US ‘Holden Agreement’ negotiated at that time (R. Erskine, ‘The Holden Agreement 
on Naval Sigint: The First BRUSA’, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 14, no. 2, Summer 1999). 
21 Archer to Little, 24 October 1942 (NAA: A6293/3, 37/401/425).
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I am of the opinion that this diplomatic group should be continued for 
the benefit of the Commonwealth Government and the Forces but think 
it would be best to keep it under Army away from Central Bureau as, if 
under Central Bureau, it would again be under GHQ, SWPA [South West 
Pacific Area] control who might act similarly to USN.
(In explanation of the preceding, it should be noted that MacArthur's General 
Headquarters (GHQ) was, essentially, an American organisation responsible to 
the US Chiefs of Staff, while 'Army' despite its temporary and misleading title, 
'HQ Allied Land Forces SWPA (LHQ)', was none other than HQ, Commander-in-
Chief Australian Military Forces — the Australian equivalent of the War Office). 
The CGS concurred and, on 30 October, wrote to the CNS informing him that 
Military Intelligence would take over the Diplomatic Section:
From information received, it would appear that it is intended to 
discontinue the Special Intelligence Section dealing with Diplomatic 
traffic, which is at present operating at 'Monterey', and that the civil 
and army personnel which the Army has provided for the purpose will 
not be required thereafter.
It is understood that in your view the information obtained from this 
source is of minor value, nevertheless it has been in the past of great 
interest to the Army on the broad strategic plane and it is considered 
that it may well prove of even greater interest in the future.
For this reason, it is my intention that the Section should continue to 
function because —
(i) intercepts obtained here are frequently not obtained elsewhere;
(ii) delay would occur if intercepts were re-transmitted to London or 
Washington as they would be inclined to deal with intercept traffic from 
areas that would concern them intimately before attending to material 
from more distant fields which delay might, occasionally, be dangerous;
(iii) the danger of corruptions occurring during transmission to London 
or Washington would make successful treatment still more difficult.
It is therefore desired to continue the work, and it is proposed to return 
the personnel to MI at LHQ.
On the same day, Archer, with Little's concurrence, despatched the following 
cable to the Foreign Office:
Presumably you will have been informed that under a new arrangement 
reached between London and Washington American Navy is absorbing 
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naval section of Australian Special Intelligence Unit. No civilian 
personnel will be used and our services with Naval board are therefore 
redundant.
Australian Army which already supplies much of personnel and whole 
of traffic is most unwilling that diplomatic section in which Graves and 
I have been concerned should be abandoned and General MacArthur 
concurs. If therefore our services remain available Army will take over 
and improve diplomatic section.
Following points are submitted for your consideration:
(a) For several months series of enquiries from London mainly on 
economic subjects as well as India has seemed to prove that much material 
was collected here which London did not receive from elsewhere.
(b) Alternative system of relaying all texts to London has so far proved 
dismal failure since additional corruption acquired en route impairs and 
frequently destroys value of material.
(c) Statistics show that thanks to services of extremely skilful local expert 
we have during past three months supplied to London and Washington 
nearly twice as many solutions of recurrent technical problems as we 
have received from both countries combined. This presumably has 
enabled them to handle some material which otherwise would have been 
useless.
On evidence available here therefore it seems that unit is serving imperial 
as well as Australian interest and since improved Army machinery has 
enormously increased volume of traffic received since mid-September 
we hope usefulness may substantially increase. In particular we feel 
that improved local organisation should give us chance of making useful 
contribution to breaking of new Great East Asia system shortly coming 
into force … .
If you concur we suggest that formal application for our services to be 
made shortly by Australian Army be approved … . 22
The Diplomatic Section moved from Monterey to Land Headquarters at Victoria 
Barracks on 27 November 1942 and, from that date, was responsible to the CGS 
through Little (whose appointment was renamed Assistant Director of Military 
Intelligence — ADMI — in March 1943). There it was housed in its own secluded 
and secure area — the small, top floor of 'A' Block overlooking St Kilda Road, 
where it remained for the rest of the war. At the time of the move it acquired 
22 NAA: A6923/3, 37/401/425.
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three more clerical staff and two additional translators — Miss Mavis Tilley 
(one of Nave's translators) and L. R. Oates (a civilian, aged 17, who had just 
completed the 12-month, full-time language course at the Military Intelligence 
Japanese language school at the District Censor's Office). Oates remained with 
the Section until November 1943 when, on reaching military age, he enlisted in 
the AIF (Australian Imperial Force).
On 3 January 1943, one month after the move, Archer tendered to Little a report 
on the work of the Section. He noted that during the previous half year the 
number of messages in high-grade cyphers received by the Section had increased 
as follows: June, 178; July, 211; August, 155; September, 254; October, 466; 
November, 408; and, December, 445; i.e. from a daily average of 6 to one of 15.23 
As a consequence of Cooper's recent return to England, the Section now had only 
two accomplished cryptographers to exploit this increasing volume of traffic — 
Trendall and Bond. Trendall was a cryptographer of outstanding quality and he 
had recently reported that Bond (now a Sergeant) was now no less expert than 
himself. These two were under intense pressure, working seven days a week, 
often until 11 pm. It was therefore essential that Trendall be authorised without 
delay to seek out another member with Bond's potential 'from that small circle 
of bright young men of whom he has personal experience'. It was also essential 
that Bond be promoted to commissioned rank — not only in recognition of his 
skills but also to enable him to deputise for Trendall during his absences. 
Archer's recommendations were adopted. For the new member, Trendall's 
choice fell on E. S. Barnes who, some weeks before at the age of 18, had 
graduated at Sydney University, carrying off the prizes in Mathematics and 
French. He had been brought to Trendall's notice by Room (his Professor) and 
by Bond (his senior by one year at Canterbury Boys High School). Corporal 
Barnes duly joined the Section (and Trendall and Bond at their boarding house) 
in February. It immediately became apparent that he did, indeed, possess the 
cryptographic flair and, in mid-March, Trendall was able to return to Sydney 
University for what was expected to be 'an extended period', leaving Lieutenant 
Bond (commissioned on 11 March 1943) in charge. Barnes was promoted to 
commissioned rank on 10 July 1944.
23 Cf the considerably higher figures reported in 52 Section’s Monthly Traffic Records for November and 
December 1942 — 1,763 and 1,654 respectively. Perhaps Archer’s figures exclude not only low-grade traffic 
(such as LA) but also the traffic in those high-grade cyphers on which his Section was not working, but 
merely forwarded to GC&CS for solution, i.e. PURPLE and Attaché traffic. By the end of 1943 Trendall was 
forwarding to GC&CS about 800–900 military and naval attaché messages per month (NAA: A6923/3, SI/2, 
Military Intelligence file, 16 June 1942, ‘Y Organization in Australia’, folio 158). 
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London's anxieties
While the Section was under Naval control its communications with GC&CS 
had passed through RAN channels, its outwards messages being despatched 
on a Typex machine at Monterey using the appropriate secret settings/drums 
provided by GC&CS. On the Section's transfer to LHQ, its outwards signals to 
GC&CS were despatched by the most secure means available to the army, the 
LHQ (LANDFORCES) — War Office (TROOPERS) circuit, using the one-time 
recyphering pads provided by the War Office for that circuit. This did not meet 
GC&CS's security standards; it meant that, between despatch and delivery, 
the plaintext of the signals could be read by the general cypher sections at 
both LANDFORCES and TROOPERS. The reaction of GC&CS was that it could 
have no dealings with strangers — Military Intelligence at LHQ — who were 
unindoctrinated and had not subscribed to GC&CS's rigorous and elaborate 
directions regarding the secrecy, transmission and distribution of intercepts 
and intelligence derived from them. On 3 January 1943, Archer informed Little 
that no signals had been received from GC&CS since 26 November and that 
requests for the resumption of communications had not been acknowledged.24 
Eventually, on 10 March, the following message from the Director GC&CS was 
conveyed to the CGS through the Commanding Officer of the British Army 
Liaison Mission in Australia: 
He [the Director] is greatly concerned about the handling by the 
Australian Military of ULTRA diplomatic material and, as he is receiving 
requests for assistance, asks me to ascertain the working arrangements 
of the Diplomatic Section under the Australian Military authorities. His 
anxiety particularly concerns the control of distribution of material and 
the number of individuals who have access to it.
Provided he can receive the assurances for which he asks me, that the 
proper security is fully assured, he will co-operate fully.
This was followed the next day by a list of the specific undertakings required 
— chiefly acceptance of the regulations regarding ULTRA telegrams and 
Special Intelligence in force throughout British theatres of war and the US navy 
and an assurance that there would be no 'political interference' in handling 
such material. To this the CGS gave a prompt reply, accepting each of the 
undertakings.25
Later in the month the Army's most senior Signals Intelligence officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel A. W. Sandford (Officer Commanding, Australian Army 
24 Ibid.
25 NAA, A6923/3, SI/10.
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Section, Central Bureau, GHQ SWPA), whose relations with GC&CS were already 
firmly established, was flown to England to confer with GC&CS on this and 
other matters. At a meeting with A. G. Denniston, Head of its Diplomatic and 
Commercial Section, and his officers on 30 April, it was agreed that: 
(i) GC&CS would pass to Australia all relevant cryptographic 
information on Japanese diplomatic codes (including microfilms of 
complete information on FUJI and X) and translations of London 
intercepts thought to be of interest to Australia — with special reference 
to Timor, the Greater East Asia area, and general Pacific strategy; 
(ii) Australia would cease sending summaries, would send cypher 
texts of messages of interest to GC&CS (reserving the right to send 
translations where preferable), and would continue to send at once all 
B [i.e., PURPLE] machine traffic and any other unidentified diplomatic 
traffic intercepted by them (e.g. NE); 
(iii) On receipt by the Australian Army of special Typex settings, 
communications would be transferred from the Navy to the Army and 
passed from LANDFORCES to TROOPERS (MI8); 
(iv) Sandford would arrange with GC&CS a revised allocation of 
intercept coverage (with particular reference to traffic between Berlin 
and Tokyo, where UK stations experienced considerable difficulty).26
The very scattered and fragmentary records that survive suggest that the 
extensive daily exchange of raw material that this envisaged continued and 
expanded. For example, on 3 April 1944, Sandford relayed to Little the following 
signal from GC&CS: 'Reference Little's WWW78. Japanese texts or summaries 
about Portuguese Timor in JBC (the Foreign Office Cypher Book) or other systems, 
but excluding JAA, will henceforth be sent to you for your limited circulation in 
the north. Series JAA will be sent in ABC series just begun'.27 In April 1944 the 
Section was sending GC&CS, in addition to Attaché traffic, between 4,000 and 
5,000 groups of diplomatic traffic daily, consisting of selections from the daily 
lists of intercepted messages, all Moscow to Tokyo traffic and all Greater East 
Asia Ministry (GEAM) commercial traffic.28 Apparently, reception conditions for 
traffic between Tokyo and its Embassy in Russia were better in Australia than 
at GC&CS and its overseas outstations. For example, Bond, on 25 May 1943, 
signalled 52 Section as follows: 'Both quantity and quality of traffic to and from 
RTZ [i.e. Kuibyshev] during the last fortnight has been most pleasing. Hope flow 
26 Interception of Berlin–Tokyo traffic was also difficult in the United States: ‘We eventually found we could 
get best coverage of the Berlin–Tokyo circuit at Corregidor’ (L.F. Safford, ‘Brief History of Communications 
Intelligence in the United States’, US National Archives: 457, SRH–149). 
27 NAA: A6923/3, Military Intelligence file 16/6/289, ‘Central Bureau — Administration of’, folio 75.
28 NAA: A6923/3, SI/10 Military Intelligence file 16/6/328, folio 88.
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will continue from this source as we seem to intercept more of it than anyone 
else'.29 For a period in early 1944, when reception conditions at Mornington 
were unfavourable, the watch on RTZ was delegated to a section of Australian 
Special Wireless Group located elsewhere, with 'considerable success'.30
July 1943 — The Japanese Foreign Ministry 
changes its codes
Since its inception, the principal function of the Section was to decrypt and 
process the telegrams sent in the code FUJI that were intercepted in Australia and 
New Zealand. In February 1943 the Section consisted of: on the cryptographic 
side, Trendall, Bond, Barnes and an assistant cryptographer; on the language 
side, the two British Consular officers (Archer and Graves) and two locally 
engaged translators, and a clerical staff of about five. After the recruitment of 
Barnes to fill the gap caused by the recall of Cooper, Trendall was able, in March, 
to take leave to return to Sydney University. On 1 July, however, the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry replaced FUJI with three new recyphered codes. Next, on 21 
July a new transposition cypher was introduced for communications between 
Asian posts and the GEAM. Then, on 20 August another high-grade cypher, 
BA, was introduced by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Thus, the Allies were 
suddenly deprived of a considerable proportion of Japanese diplomatic traffic 
— until such time as their cryptographic organisations managed to break the 
new systems and laboriously establish their constituent code groups. In this 
vital task GC&CS urgently sought the Section's assistance. The immediate 
response was to recall Trendall to full-time duty on 9 July and to postpone for 
some weeks Graves's transfer to the Department of External Affairs (to become 
Adviser on Political Warfare to the Minister) and his replacement by another 
Consular officer (H. R. Sawbridge).  
The role of the Section in breaking these new systems and establishing the 
new code groups is described in the report on Japanese Diplomatic Cyphers 
reproduced in Chapter 3. It was not until 13 June 1944 that Trendall could again 
be released to the university. He was back with the Section again from 4 August 
until 5 September, on which date he returned to the university for good.31
During 1944 Trendall was able to recruit and train three additional cryptographers. 
Private A. C. Eastway from the 2/3 Machine Gun Company at Merauke joined 
the Section in February. He had probably been brought to Trendall's attention 
29 Australian War Memorial (AWM): 52, 7/39/19.
30 Little to CO Aust. Special Wireless Group 2 March 1945 (NAA: A6923/3, [DMI Message Traffic]).
31 University Archivist, University of Sydney to D.C.S. Sissons, 10 June 1998.
Breaking Japanese Diplomatic Codes 
30
by J. W. Gibbes, his Classics master in his final year at North Sydney Boys High 
School in 1940. Private I. H. Smith (who had taken the exhibition at final honours 
in French language and literature at Melbourne University in December 1943) 
arrived in May. He also had been recommended to Trendall by Gibbes. In July, 
Trendall secured the transfer of Sergeant K. L. McKay from a LAA Regiment at 
Darwin. He had taken high distinctions in Classics in his second year at Sydney 
University when he enlisted in December 1941. The cryptographic section had 
now reached it maximum size and continued at this strength for the rest of the 
war.
Another translator, Warrant Officer II C. A. James (an Oxford classics 
undergraduate who had just completed the British army's Japanese language 
course at Bedford) arrived in May 1944. Later in the year Sawbridge and Archer 
were recalled to the United Kingdom and replaced by other Consular offices, E. 
T. Biggs in July and R. L. Cowley in December. 
The raw material
In April 1942 a small W/T [Wireless/Telegraphy] Section of the Australian Corps 
of Signals was set up at Ferny Creek in the Dandenongs to intercept Japanese 
diplomatic circuits. In July it received reinforcements from 2nd Company GHQ 
Signals to bring it up to strength as a Special Wireless Section (Type B) and was 
named 52 Australian Wireless Section. It operated successively at Ferny Creek 
between April and August 1942, Bonegilla between August 1942 and November 
1943 and Mornington between November 1943 and February 1946. Its sole task 
was intercepting Japanese diplomatic traffic for delivery to Trendall's Section 
(about 20 per cent by hand Morse by a direct landline, the remainder by a 
daily bag delivery). From the time of its move to Bonegilla it was the principal 
source of the Diplomatic Section's raw material and, after the latter's transfer 
to the army it was, with certain exceptions, its sole source of raw material.32 52 
Section's all-ranks strength was 85, comprising one Captain, one Lieutenant, 
one Lieutenant (Australian Women's Army Service), one Company Quarter 
Master Sergeant/Company Sergeant Major, two Sergeants, seven Corporals, 72 
Signalwomen/Signalmen (including seven Lance Corporals). Of the rank and 
32 The principal exceptions were diplomatic traffic intercepted by the New Zealand cryptographic 
organisation and specific intercepts provided to the Diplomatic Section by GC&CS at the former’s request. For 
a period from December 1942 the US army’s 126 Signal Company in Brisbane were providing Trendall with 
copies of their intercepts of Japanese diplomatic traffic (Sandford to DDMI, 14 December 1942, NAA: A6923/3, 
16/6/289). On occasion, when reception conditions at Mornington for a particular station or circuit were poor, 
the task of covering Japanese diplomatic traffic was undertaken by other Sections of the Australian Special 
Wireless Group — e.g. the Russian station RTZ in early 1944 and the low-power Far Eastern network R75 in 
February 1945 (ADMI to CO Aust. Special Wireless Group, 2 March 1945, NAA: A6923/3, [DMI Diplomatic 
Message Traffic]). 
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file, 52 were operators.33 The unit operated 24 hours a day in four shifts using 
communications receivers of various makes (Kingsley, Hallicrafters, AWA and 
Philips) and an elaborate system of rhombic aerials set up on the Bonegilla 
racecourse. The operators kept watch on designated call signs and frequencies 
and were able to identify Japanese diplomatic traffic from the sending station's 
output by the originator and addressee designated in the preamble of each 
message (which, of necessity, was transmitted en clair and at hand speed). The 
text of the message was usually transmitted at machine speed. The operator 
recorded this on Edison wax cylinders and later replayed it at manageable speed 
and transcribed it.34
The Monthly Traffic Records that occasionally appear in 52 Section's war diary 
indicate the quantity and extent of the intercepts received by the Special 
Intelligence Section. An example is their record for May 1944 (see Annex 1, 
herein). It includes a listing of the stations from which traffic was received. 
In the table that follows, I have shown the earliest and latest monthly totals 
available and those of two intermediate months. These figures, of course, include 
much material that the Special Intelligence Section did not read, e.g. naval and 
military attaché and JAA (i.e. PURPLE) traffic (all of which was forwarded to 
GC&CS) and messages in the low grade cypher LA (which were read only if 
specifically referred to in a high grade message).
Japanese diplomatic traffic intercepted by 52 Aust Wrls Sect:35
Originators and addressees
Country
Nov 1942 Feb 1943 May 1943 May 1944
From From To From To From To
Japan 1,000 828 817 1,351 1,318 1,108 1,621
Germany 1 195 101 421 817 315
Russia 2 125 79 293 243 623 266
Netherlands 
East Indies 424 602
French Indo-
China 126 272 126 232 115 173 288
Thailand 231 218 186 88 60 84 50
Afghanistan 16 20 26 48 41 53 25
China 
(Occupied) 2 8 26 29 10
33 War Establishment III/38B/4, issued 31 May 1944 (NAA: A10908/1, 2, ‘Report on Special Wireless Units 
(Signals) 1940–45’). 
34 ASWG Association to D.C.S. Sissons, 26 September 1994.
35 These figures are taken from Monthly Traffic Records occasionally appearing in the war diaries of HQ 
Australian Special Wireless Group (AWM: 52, 7/39/3) and 52 Australian Wireless Section (AWM: 52, 7/39/19), 
November 1942 and March 1943 and May 1943 and May 1944, respectively. 
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Country
Nov 1942 Feb 1943 May 1943 May 1944
From From To From To From To
Sweden 3 3 32 94 61 27 49
Philippines 9 2
Spain 1 9
Switzerland 122 83 23 85 81 45
France 6 44 22 16 26
Burma 16
Portugal 3 8 9
Vatican City 9
Italy 129 153 71 415 186 3
Hungary 3
South 










145,101 126,645 212,723 268,219
The product and its dissemination
From the time of the transfer to the army, Archer produced a weekly Special 
Intelligence Précis of Japanese diplomatic intercepts, which the ADMI 
distributed to the following recipients: Commander-in-Chief Australian Military 
Forces, CGS, Director of Military Intelligence, Director of Naval Intelligence, 
Director of Intelligence (RAAF), Director of Military Intelligence (New Zealand), 
Director of Naval Intelligence (New Zealand), Central Bureau Brisbane, G2 GHQ 
SWPA, and Commander SWP Force (US navy).36 All recipients were required 
to burn the précis after perusal and to sign a receipt stating that this had been 
done. It was distributed to the New Zealand recipients because there was close 
cooperation with the New Zealand signals intelligence organisation, which 
provided Australia with the cypher texts of any Japanese diplomatic telegrams 
that it intercepted.37
36 Northcott to Dewing 16 June 1943 (NAA: A6293/3, 37/401/425).
37 Undated note, Archer to Little (NAA: A6293/3, 37/401/425).
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Initially, the Australian Department of External Affairs was not a recipient. This 
is surprising; in the United Kingdom it was the practice of GC&CS to pass on an 
intercept, under the strictest conditions of secrecy, to those civil departments 
that it might concern.38 And, in this manner, some intercepts reached External 
Affairs in Canberra via the Dominions Office, introduced on each occasion by 
the well understood formula 'Information available from a secret but entirely 
trustworthy source'.39 In June 1943 the content of a telegram despatched by 
the Japanese Ambassador at Kuibyshev on 14 April reached External Affairs by 
this route. In it, the Ambassador reported that he had heard from a diplomatic 
colleague that William Slater, the Australian Ambassador at Kyibyshev, was 
returning to Australia for good the following day because he had found that he 
was making no headway against Russian officialdom. The Domions Office passed 
this on to the External Affairs Officer in London, together with the information 
that the message had been intercepted at Melbourne. 
When this became known to the Secretary of the Department of External 
Affairs, W. R. Hodgson, he immediately called on Little and enquired why the 
information had not been passed to him direct. In replying, Little laid stress on 
the danger to the source should it become known, as it might be if it came to 
the notice of a Minister. For this reason, he said, it was not possible to provide 
Hodgson with the information. Hodgson then intimated that if such information 
were not made available he would have no alternative but to take the matter up 
officially. Little thereupon promised to refer the matter to the CGS.
In a letter to Hodgson dated 14 June the CGS proposed the following solution, 
which Hodgson accepted:
You will be sent a copy of the Special Intelligence Précis issued weekly 
on the understanding that the précis is regarded as being for your own 
personal information and is to be destroyed by fire immediately after 
perusal.
The contents are to be used as background information only. Where you 
consider any information contained in the précis vitally affects Australia 
38 For example, among the 41 GC&CS intercepts of Japanese diplomatic telegrams for the period 21 November 
1941 – 22 December 1941 that were later tendered to the Clausen Investigation (US 79th Congress, Joint 
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, part 35, exhibit 8) a typical distribution 
had been: Director GC&CS (3 copies), Foreign Office (3 copies), Political Intelligence Division, Admiralty, War 
Office (3 copies), India Office (2 copies), Colonial Office, Air Ministry, Ministry of Economic Warfare (2 copies), 
Sir Edward Bridges, and Dominions Office. 
39 For example, in this manner the Australian External Affairs Officer in London was able, on 9 January 
1940, to cable to the Department in Canberra summaries of telegrams from the Japanese Minister at Lisbon 
dated 24 November, 4 and 22 December and his Foreign Minister’s replies of 21 and 30 December regarding 
Japanese plans to apply pressure on Portugal in order to secure oil concessions in Timor (NAA: A981, TIM 
P20).
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and should be disclosed to the Minister, I would be glad if you could 
get in touch with me so that the paraphrased edition of that particular 
portion of the document might be made available.
I will instruct the Intelligence Branch to bring under my notice specially 
any matters of this nature which should be brought officially to the 
notice of your Department so that by this means we will endeavour to 
keep you informed officially apart from our present arrangements.40
Eight months later, on 3 February 1944, Sandford, from Central Bureau, Brisbane, 
informed Little that arrangements had been made for Hodgson to receive texts 
or summaries of telegrams of interest to Australia intercepted by other partners 
in the cryptographic network:
I have just received a personal signal passed by the DMI, War Office from 
the Director GC&CS. He states that the Foreign Office have consulted the 
American authorities and have agreed to send to me texts or summaries 
of Japanese highest grade messages for showing to the Australian 
Department of External Affairs when the interests of that Department 
are directly concerned.
The messages are to contain the phrase 'Pass to Archer', and Archer is 
to be made responsible for passing this material to Colonel Hodgson. 
London insist that Hodgson should be reminded of the conditions 
of security which were enjoined on him last July. They state that no 
further distribution, not even to Central Bureau, should be given to 
these messages which are only intended for Hodgson.
They suggest in a final paragraph that Archer should make it clear if 
necessary that he is not in a position to discuss the political implications 
of the messages.
I shall therefore send the messages when they arrive by safe hand means 
'Most Secret and Personal' to Archer care of you, so that he will be the 
only people [sic] at LHQ to whom they are available. I should think this 
should meet London's requirements.41
Surprisingly, distribution of the précis to US recipients ceased in April 1944. On 
29 March Sandford informed Little that:
40 Northcott to Hodgson, 14 June 1943 (ibid.).
41 Presumably after May 1944, when the Melbourne Section acquired its own cypher section and Typex 
machines, for which GC&CS provided its designated settings, such intercepts were dispatched by GC&CS to 
Archer direct and not through Sandford. 
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(a) London has requested that we no longer supply diplomatic Special 
Intelligence to United States authorities in the South-West Pacific Area 
and they state that this request emanates from G2 (Special Branch) 
Washington.
(b) They also specially request that political intelligence contained in 
these and the UKBJs be not discussed by Australian recipients with 
their United States counterparts.
As a result, G2 GHQ SWPA and Commander SWP Force (USN) were promptly 
excised from the distribution list of the Special Intelligence Précis.42
The content of the intercepts
This is dealt with in the section of the report entitled 'Intelligence Derived 
from the Messages' (see below). On this, one is little able to elaborate; for the 
records of the Section systematically and painstakingly maintained in its own 
office appear to have been destroyed in their entirety. These included: (i) the 
leather-bound foolscap register (dubbed by Trendall 'The Koran') into which 
the particulars of every intercept was entered; (ii) the file of every intercept 
received (including the message form filled in by the telegraphist, and, where 
decrypted, the cryptographer's work sheets and the typed translation); (iii) a 
file of the weekly précis; (iv) a person and subject card index of the contents 
of all intercepts translated; (v) files of the Section's inwards and outwards 
correspondence and signals. 
The Department of External Affairs appear scrupulously to have fulfilled their 
obligation to burn on perusal each document received from the Section.
The recipients of the précis appear to have done the same. Of the copies received 
by G2 HQ SWPA, only one, No. 4, for the week ending 21 December 1942, 
escaped destruction. It has found its way into the MacArthur Archives at 
Norfolk, Virginia (Box 60, Typescript 5 pp). We have, however some indication 
of the contents of No. 13 (22 February 1943) to No. 45 (22 November 1943) 
of the précis; G2 SWPA, when tendering these to the Chief of Staff SWPA for 
his perusal, attached to each a one-page 'brief' of its contents, and these have 
survived among the wartime records of the US National Security Agency.43 Two 
typical examples are reproduced in the following pages.
42 NAA: A6293, 37/401/425.
43 US National Archives: 457, SRH-307. 
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G.H.Q. South-west Pacific area, Checksheet
From: G-2 To: C. of S. Date: July 9/43
Brief of Special Intell. Precis No.32, July 8, 1943
Note the following items:
Russo-Japanese Negotiations: The question of American air bases in 
Russia is still alive; Sato fears Russia will demand Tokyo's assurances 
that Germany will not be granted submarine bases in Far Eastern waters, 
and he discusses the dangers of such grants: German subs would surely 
attack Soviet shipping in order to bring Japan into war against Russia.
Prime Minister Tojo: Extraordinary secrecy surrounding itinerary 
and schedule of Tojo's tour of occupied territories suggests Japanese 
suspicion concerning Admiral Yamamoto's death. (Comment: Central 
Bureau's reports since 1 July indicate the Japanese have introduced new 
W/T security measures). 
Shipping: A Bangkok message indicates no shipping available for 
shipping of cereals from Siam to S. China.
Europe: Jap Minister in Budapest does not expect much action on 
Eastern front this year, nor a European Second Front. He admits that 
grounds for optimism are few, but expects a stalemate rather than a 
German defeat. He also argues that England is playing a deep game by 
seeing the exhaustion of Russia as well as the destruction of Germany.
Japan's Outlook on the War: [About 17 characters expunged by NSA] 
furnish a most interesting insight into past and future Japanese aims. 
It is recommended that this section of the Precis be read in detail. 
Significant items: original Tokyo war aims; attitude toward Russia; food 
and shipping situation; a/c and pilot losses; damage from Tokyo raid; 
policy on treatment of captured airmen; strained Army–Navy relations 
after war reverses.
V.S.M-S [presumably Colonel Van S Merle-Smith]
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G.H.Q. SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA, CHECK-SHEET
From: G-2 To: C. of S. Date: 23 Oct '43
Brief of Special Intell. Precis No.41, 14 October, 1943
Note the following items:
Italy: The Italian diplomats in Greater East Asia have failed to rally to the 
establishment of the Fascist Party, resulting in the Japanese Ambassador 
[sic] having no dealings with them. Japan's decision is still to hand 
over all Italian extra-territorial rights in China to the Nanking Puppet 
Government.
Philippines: Raul Jose P. Laurel, President Designate, and Bargas Jorge 
Vargas, head of prospective Administration, have been summoned 
to Tokyo; also, they have been notified of Japan's decision to grant 
independence. Shozo Murata has been appointed Japanese Ambassador 
to the Philippines and will conduct negotiations for a formal treaty.
French Indo-China: Allied air raids cause considerable damage on port 
of Haiphong. Japan is trying to purchase the newspaper 'La Depeche' for 
propaganda; the French appear reluctant on the matter.
Siam: Pi-bun claims that his health will prevent him from attending 
the Greater East Asia Conference as Chief Siamese delegate. Pi-bun 
has proposed to send a deputy, likely Vichit, who was lately Foreign 
Minister, and is now Ambassador Designate to Japan. The transfer of 
'new territories' to Siam has been fixed for 18 October. In anticipation of 
air raids on Bangkok, the Japanese Ambassador asks that arrangements 
be made for insurance of Japanese property.
Inter-Axis Trade: Bangkok message, 6 October, states a German vessel 
will call at this place to purchase tin. The Germans want 1,000 tons; 
Japan’s tin holdings total 1,747 tons. Purchase of Siamese rubber for 
October have been fixed at 250 tons for Germans, 750 for Japan.
Shipping: Hanoi, 13 October, of the two ships being constructed under 
naval contract, one was laid down 15 April and launched 9 October. the 
engines do not appear ready. Both vessels are the 20 ton class.
C.A.W. [presumably Maj.Gen C.A.Willoughby]
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The report alludes, very briefly, to the high intelligence value of the intercepts 
of the telegrams exchanged between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and its 
Ambassador in Russia, Sato Naotake.
It seems that in its coverage of the Kuibyshev–Tokyo–Kuibyshev circuit, the 
Section was able to provide strategic intelligence of value. In this connection 
two preliminary points should be made. The first point is that, as we have 
already noted, thanks partly to its location, 52 Section's coverage of this circuit 
was successful. Several signals from Bond to 52 Section during the period 
February to May 1943 indicate that 52 Section were instructed to watch this 
circuit carefully, and that they were more successful in this than were GC&CS 
and its various outstations.44 Indeed, it seems that GC&CS were in fact relying 
heavily on 52 Section for its coverage of this circuit. The figures in 52 Section's 
Monthly Traffic Records attest to this success.
Kuibyshev–Tokyo–Kuibyshev circuit
Messages intercepted by 52 Section February–July 1943
Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul
Kuibyshev–Tokyo 125 114 152 293 374 363
Tokyo–Kuibyshev 79 163 192 243 273  262
The second point is that all the communications on this circuit appear to have 
been sent in cyphers that the Section could read — Kahn's statement that the 
Embassy at Kuibyshev was not equipped with a PURPLE machine appears to be 
correct.45
We know the content of some of these messages; some of them (intercepted by 
Washington and its outstations) are quoted in Washington's daily Magic Summary. 
It is likely that most, if not all, of those quoted there were also intercepted and 
solved by Melbourne. An example of this traffic is the Ambassador's long telegram 
of 26 February 1943, the full text of which is reproduced in Washington's Magic 
Summary No. 344 issued on 5 March. One can be confident that 52 Section also 
intercepted this. Their traffic log indicates that, for messages from Kuibyshev, 
26 February was one of their good days — they intercepted 12 messages from 
Kuibyshev on the 26 February, followed by one on 27 February.46 The telegram 
would have been sent in FUJI and, according to the report, by May 1942 the 
Section was able to read virtually all the FUJI traffic it received. Below is the 
telegram in full, as reproduced in the Magic Summary. 
44 AWM: 52, 7/39/3, Trendall to Walker, 10 February 1943, 12 February 1943, 6 March 1943; Bond to 
Walker, 16 March 1943. AWM: 52, 7/39/19, Bond to Walker, 20 April 1943, 21 April 1943, 25 May 1943, 28 
May 1943.
45 D. Kahn, The Codebreakers (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 446.
46 In light of the time difference between Kuibyshev and Melbourne, the message intercepted on 27 
February could also have been sent on the previous day.
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Kuibyshev to Tokyo 26 February 1943
What the Russians have done to the Germans this winter has astonished 
everyone. Whether the Russians can continue their headlong advance 
for three or four weeks more until the middle of March defies conjecture, 
but everything up until February 20, about which I have already wired 
you, indicates that this is a possibility. The course of the war between 
Germany and Russia naturally has great bearing on the battle of Greater 
East Asia. That is why I venture to express to you my very frankest 
feelings, and I hope that my Government will not fail to consider them.
1. It is problematical whether the Germans will stop in the Ukraine at 
the Dnieper line, or whether they will flee beyond the border, form a 
line and come back this summer as they did last. Some say they can and 
some say they can't, but I will tell you my frank opinions. I personally 
am pessimistic. The Germans have to think about the war in North Africa 
and I don't think they can afford to waste too much of their strength 
in this dim battle of the East. I think that they will, rather, get out of 
the Soviet Union and then make a truce. Germany lacks men, materials, 
and oil, so I believe that she will concentrate on Western Europe and 
will strive to save North Africa, all the while continuing her aerial and 
U-boat campaign against British and American ships.
2. The fall of Stalingrad caused Germany to propagandize the danger of 
the Bolshevization of Europe. That was, of course, to frighten England 
and the United States, and this prospect, to tell the truth, is a real 
danger. I think it may be quite true that in their hearts England and 
America have both begun to fear the dread strength of the Soviet. But 
I do not think they will let up on the Reich, nor do I believe that they 
will forsake the Soviet, refusing her aid. Nevertheless, facing what they 
consider the peril of Bolshevism, they must be in quite a dilemma.
Of course, I do not know, but I think it hardly likely that after the Soviet 
forces chase the Germans beyond the borders they will pursue them far 
into the Reich. Stalin's various statements indicate that they will not. I 
do not mean to say that we can take every word that falls from Joseph 
Stalin's mouth as the gospel truth, and we have to make allowance 
for the possibility of his changing his mind, if it is to his advantage. 
Nevertheless, under the present circumstances in Europe, I doubt if 
Stalin considers it to his own advantage to see Germany exterminated. 
So rather than cooperate further with England and the United States, 
he might, quite possibly, let Germany turn on them and fight it out to 
the destruction of both sides. It would seem to me that after driving 
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Germany completely out of her borders, after retaking her cities, and 
being faced with the problem of reconstruction, the Soviet Union would 
be loath to have the Red Army go on and on.
In other words, I believe that when she gets back all the land she has 
lost, she will not try to annihilate the Reich. I think that she will let it 
go at that and turn to the task of rebuilding her nation.
3. That is how it seems to me the German–Soviet situation is shaping 
up. As soon as it becomes apparent that a German–Soviet peace or truce 
is imminent, England and the United States will, of course, do their 
level best to prevent it. However, I think there is every likelihood that 
the Russians will stop at the border. I already seem to perceive a lack 
of interest throughout the land of the Soviets as to what happens in 
Western Europe, and I doubt if Russia will continue her blows against 
Germany for the sake of the Anglo-Saxons. Thus, if the Kremlin adopts 
an entirely new policy, there will be no point for England and America 
to try to sway her. As soon as Russia decides just what to do with respect 
to Germany, it will have a tremendous effect.
4. And again I must point out to you that these sudden changes in the 
European picture will certainly have a big effect on our own Empire. I tell 
you that the time has already come when we must reconsider our policy, 
which has been one of friendliness towards Germany, neutrality towards 
Russia and war on England and the United States. I know that in Japan 
there are those who agree that we must save Germany, because if we 
don't the Soviet will get so great that she will forever be a tremendous 
threat against us. They say that, while Germany is recouping, we ought 
to strike the Soviet immediately, breaking her suddenly, and make our 
Empire safe and stable.47 But as for me, I tell you that the only course 
to follow is to do our level best to avoid a clash with Russia. As man to 
man, that is how I see it.
We Japanese can be expecting harder blows from America and England, 
so we ought to try to wean the Russians from them. I earnestly pray that 
we will not attack Russia, because, if we do, don't you know that she 
will join hands with the United States, establish a new front and ruin 
47 As the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) analyst editing that number of the Magic Summary noted, 
this is probably a reference to the repeated advice from Oshima, the ambassador at Berlin, that Japan should 
come to Germany’s aid by launching an attack on Siberia. Oshima again urged this on the foreign minister in 
a telegram dispatched on 26 January (see C. Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and 
MAGIC Intelligence, 1941–45, University of Kansas Press, 1993, pp. 62–65, 79–80).
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us? That is a thought from which I recoil instantly. In spite of all the 
vicissitudes to which our Empire has been exposed, have we not, thus 
far, managed to keep level-headed in our policy toward Russia?
5. Let us consider our own Empire's relations with Germany and with 
Russia. Germany has already fought twenty months in Russia and in 
the end she has lost much and gained nothing. In the meantime, we 
got into war with America and England, but we still maintained good 
relations with the Soviet. Of course, if Germany had been able to whip 
the Russians, everything would have been better for Germany and for 
us, but that is like crying over spilt milk. Now Germany herself is so 
thoroughly demoralized that I personally do not believe that she can 
keep up her fight against the Soviet. So let us forget Russia for a moment.
We Japanese have one thing in common with the Germans: It is to our 
mutual interest to increase our prowess against the Anglo-Saxons, and, 
at the same time, wean Russia from their camp. Let Russia and Germany 
make peace if they will — because if Germany didn't have to waste so 
much of her strength on the Eastern front, she could help us out more 
against America and England. I don't need to tell you that.
As a matter of fact, since it has already been demonstrated that it 
would be futile for Germany again to try to shatter Russia and take her 
resources, I think we should take it upon ourselves to try to mediate 
for peace between those two powers, at the same time making clear to 
Germany that our Empire expects her to help us out even in Greater East 
Asia in our struggle against America and England.
Let me repeat again, this time more clearly, that I think the time has 
come for us to become even more friendly with Russia and to convince 
Germany that the time has come to desist, and for us to try to mediate 
for peace between the two combatants.
6. If Germany is headstrong, and says she is going back for more, let her 
go. But as for me, I still say that, insofar as the battle of Greater East Asia 
will permit, we should remain on the best of relations with Russia and 
do nothing that would harm those good relations. I tell you that this is 
of the utmost importance, because, even if Germany is not now ready 
to stop, sooner or later she is going to find it necessary. Let us, in the 
meantime, do our best to wean Russia from the United States, and when 
Germany has had a belly full, mediate for peace.
7. In trying to settle the question of border lines, the question of 
interests in northern Sakhalin comes up most frequently. Judging from 
my experience, since I arrived here a year ago, the question of those 
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interests is the most important obstacle to amity between our two 
nations. In the spring of 1941 Molotov and Matsuoka talked this over. 
If war hadn't broken out, I think we would have already settled this 
trouble, and, if so, we wouldn't have this facing us now in the midst of 
fireworks.
Right after I took office here last April, I expressed this feeling in an 
interview with Molotov and we both agreed that the present was no 
time to worry about it and that we had better wait, leaving the status 
as of 1941. However, it is true that this status is very shaky, a status in 
name only. The fact is that, after the Communist regime was established, 
it took over many of the rights of other countries which held over from 
the Imperial regime, and the only instance where foreigners are still 
allowed to manage and control any of these interests is in the case of our 
rights in northern Sakhalin and our fishing rights.
We can easily imagine that Russia is worried considerably about this, 
because it is a question of a great nation saving face. The fishing question 
is a little different and they have not yet called us to task about it, but 
the question of our interests in northern Sakhalin is a source of great 
dissatisfaction to them. I think, therefore, that, for the time being, we 
should withstand their pressure as much as possible, and, if we come to 
mediate between Germany and Russia, or when we independently begin 
to improve our relations with Russia, we should certainly do our very 
best at the outset to settle these provoking questions once and for all.
[The parts numbered 8 and 9 were so badly garbled in transmission that they 
cannot be read]
10. The best policy would be for us Japanese to get together with the 
Germans and help them to make peace and ourselves to establish better 
relations with Russia. I would like to see a truce between those two 
nations, but, if Germany won't listen, we must remember that we are 
waging a terrible battle in Greater East Asia and we will have to make 
up our own mind. What Germany says need not matter! Our country is 
free to make her own diplomatic decisions, isn't she? Please bear that in 
mind when you negotiate with Berlin.
11. Of course, it may be said that, if Russia gets out of the war and 
we keep fighting America and England for a long time, as soon as 
we are exhausted there is the great danger that the Far East will be 
Bolshevized. This is the same problem that confronts Europe. But is it a 
real problem? I doubt it. If we are exhausted, the Soviet will still be so 
busy reconstructing her nation that she would be no great menace to us.
Chapter 2 . The Diplomatic Special Intelligence Section
43
However, the settlement of borders and interests is something for the 
future. Right now we are forced to fight the United States and England, 
and until we have whipped them, it is very necessary to keep on the 
good side of the Soviet Union. So I say that we should continue to strike 
at the Anglo-Saxons and, in the meantime, endeavour to establish firmly 
what we call Greater East Asia. That is enough for our present objective. 
After we have established this Greater East Asia, then it will be time 
enough to make it a bulwark against Bolshevism.
12. What I have told you here has direct bearing on our war effort in 
Greater East Asia, so will you please follow my advice? Please get in 
touch with the military, and as soon as you can possibly get a chance 
bring about a Cabinet decision along these lines. Also please listen 
to what Morishima* has to say and see that his views are given due 
consideration.
I have confidentially given the Army and Navy Attachés here a copy of 
this message.
[* Minister Morishima, second in charge at the Japanese Embassy in 
Russia, recently returned to Tokyo to submit a first-hand report to the 
Foreign Office.]
From the telegrams quoted in successive issues of the Magic Summary, it becomes 
apparent that Sato's policy of accommodation with Russia at all costs was 
adopted and pursued. In early May, Morishima telegraphed to Sato that he was 
returning on 15 May and that: 'As for the big thing … I have reached a degree 
of understanding with the quarters concerned here which makes me think there 
is no longer any question of there being a disaster after I leave'. Shigemitsu, 
the Foreign Minister, telegraphed to Sato on 26 May: 'We are agreed that the 
fundamental principle of Japan–Soviet relations must be adjusted. Therefore 
we are glad to say that we are able to concur with the message you sent us by 
Morishima … . We want to get down to business now, and in all subsequent talks 
you are to make our primary object the ironing out of all political difficulties 
between Japan and Russia'. Shigemitsu's telegraphed to Sato again on 28 June: 
' … These negotiations are designed to settle gradually all problems pending 
between Japan and Russia and to compose relations between the two nations. 
… As you say, we are going to conduct these negotiations in order to keep the 
Soviet neutral.’ The daily totals of 52 Section's Kuibyshev–Tokyo–Kuibyshev 
intercepts shown in its Monthly Traffic Records for the period February to July 
indicate that Melbourne was intercepting at least as much of these exchanges as 
was Washington. 
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The talkative signalman
About 20 per cent of Mornington's intercepts were delivered to the Section 
in hand Morse by a direct landline. The telegraphist on duty would bring 
each message into the cryptographers' room as soon as he had taken it down. 
One evening late in 1944, one of these telegraphists, an Australian Corps of 
Signals corporal, was relaxing in the servicemen's recreation hut beside St Paul's 
Cathedral. He was an outgoing, helpful chap by nature, and the few drinks 
that he had had at Young & Jackson's across the road had made him more so. 
He got into conversation with a young soldier at the same table who had just 
completed his recruit training and was awaiting allocation. The corporal urged 
him to apply to join the Section and explained to him in some detail the work 
that it was doing. By way of illustration he sketched out the transposition block 
of the GEAM cypher (JBB) and showed him how each row was read off from 
it. He told him to go to Victoria Barracks and ask for Little. The following day 
the recruit did so. He was directed to the office of Little's Captain I(x). There 
he stated his business and the Corporal was placed under arrest. There were 
several courses open. One was to charge him with the unlawful communication 
of secret information under Section 79 of the Crimes Act (Penalty: seven years 
imprisonment). This, however, could be tried only by a civilian court and this 
would entail the secrets being further disseminated. An alternative was to charge 
him under Section 73A of the Defence Act with communicating naval, military 
or air force information otherwise than in the course of his official duty (the 
charge commonly preferred against soldiers who mentioned troop movements 
in their letters to their families). This was tryable by court martial, which could 
impose a penalty up to £10. Instead, the matter appears to have been disposed 
of extra-judicially: he was posted forthwith to a remote and insalubrious part of 
New Guinea and remained there for the duration of the war. 
The Kormoran — HMAS Sydney Vigenère
Early in 1945 a small cryptographic task, quite unrelated to signals intelligence 
or Japanese cyphers, was assigned to the Section. On 11 January, 20 German 
prisoners of war (POW), including Commander Detmers, the Captain of the 
raider Kormoran that had sunk HMAS Sydney off the coast of Western Australia 
in 1941, tunnelled their way out of the Dhurringile POW camp in northern 
Victoria. When, a week later, Detmers was recaptured, there was found in his 
possession an exercise book of the type on sale in the camp canteen (the local 
'VANA’ brand), the contents of which were in code. This was seized by Military 
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Intelligence and sent to the Section for decryption.48 The text, amounting to 
about 6,250 characters (the 26 letters of the alphabet plus an additional four: 
A, B, C, D), consisted of 25 sections (or entries) of unequal lengths varying from 
39 to 525 characters. To give an example, the largest section read as follows: 
As Smith was fluent in German, he was given first shot at the material. With 
some help from Barnes and from one of the clerical staff whose native language 
was German, he soon broke it. The method, Smith tells me, was simple. First the 
cryptogram was examined for its constituent symbols. This showed an alphabet 
of 30 characters — the standard 26-letter alphabet plus the additional A, B, C, 
and D — each of the 30 symbols appearing frequently. Next, a sample portion 
was tested for periodicity — the recurrence of the same interval between 
repeated polygrams. This revealed numerous examples of intervals of 15 and its 
multiples between repetitions — e.g. in the sample above, between: the HZs in 
rows 1 and 2, the OIHs in rows 2 and 12, the OSJMDs in rows 11 and 16, and 
the GWOHPBs in rows 17 and 20. 
Taken together, these phenomena strongly suggested polyalphabetic substitution 
in which a cycle of 15 encyphering alphabets was employed. Working on this 
hypothesis, they then sought to identify in each of the 15 encyphering alphabets 
the most frequently occurring symbol. These should each represent the most 
frequently occurring letter in the plaintext message, which if the message was 
48 A copy of Detmers’ GEFECHTSBERICHT cryptogram and the solution of it by GC&CS in England is 
available from NAA: B5823, ‘Folder of documents titled Dietmars’ Diary — account of action between Kormoran 
and Sydney — decode and translations’. Treweek, when interviewed in 1990, had a clear recollection of what 
he termed the GEFECHTSBERICHT cryptogram and its speedy solution by his colleague at FRUMEL, Miller, 
at the time of its capture.
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in the German language, must be E, which constitutes about 16.7 per cent of 
normal German text (The runners-up are N and I with 9.9 per cent and 7.8 per 
cent respectively).
If we apply this method to our sample section, ordering it into the 15 columns 
representing the encyphering alphabets produces the following:
 
Chapter 2 . The Diplomatic Special Intelligence Section
47
In each of the columns, the most frequent characters, it will be observed, are as 
follows (c denoting cyphertext, e denoting plaintext):
This, unfortunately, gives us no clear signs for Ep in alphabets 1, 2, 3, 7, and 
15; but, as we have indicated, it provides hopeful indications in each of the 
others. The next step is, in the test section, to convert each character in these 
encyphering alphabets into plaintext. 
Taking the first row, LXCFURYIBYBDUVE, as an example, U in Column 5 must be 
the product of plaintext encyphered with Alphabet 5. In Alphabet 5 cyphertext 
Hc represents Ep. This leads us to the assumption that Uc represents Rp. For, 
in polyalphabetic substitutions, the usual method adopted by the encypherer 
to provide and designate the various alphabets used is for him to write out a 
Vigenère square. In this, the top line is the letters of the alphabet in alphabetical 
sequence. This becomes the plaintext alphabet. Underneath it he writes out the 
same alphabet shifted one letter to the left, and so on, with each succeeding 
alphabet shifting one letter to the left. These are the encyphering alphabets, 
to each of which he gives an identifying letter, which he uses in the keyword. 
Thus, the usual Vigenère square is 26 x 26, with A at the top-left corner, the 
top row and the first column each extending from A to Z. But Detmers, the 
cyphertext indicates, was using the alphabet plus an additional four characters 
— A, B, C, and D. We assume, therefore, that his Vigenère square was 30 x 
30. We also assume that, for ease of encypherment, he put the additional four 
characters in sequence at the end. Converting back into plaintext on this basis 
the characters encyphered with these ten alphabets, the sample section will read 
as follows:
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Unfortunately, when we examine the plaintext above, it is evident that 
in Alphabet 4 Sc cannot represent Ep, for that would sometimes produce, as 
plaintext, letters that do not exist (e.g. C in Column 4, Row 3; D in Column 2, Row 
4; Column 3, Row 6; and, Column 4, Row 4). For the same reason in Alphabet 12, 
Hc cannot represent Ep (this would produce as plaintext B in Column 1, Row 6; 
C in Column 2, Row 6 and Column 3, Row 4; and, D in Column 4, rows 3 and 4). 
Our solutions for these two alphabets must therefore be struck out. The string 
ZENT?AL in Column 4, Row 8 suggests that in Alphabet 12, Ac represents Rp, 
which would produce ZENTRAL (i.e. that Nc, the runner-up in our frequency 
count represents Ep). We shall therefore assume this.
It now remains for us to identify the unsolved alphabets by filling in the missing 
letters in obvious words in the plaintext that has so far emerged. TE?EFON?SC? 
in Column 3, Row 8 is obviously TELEFONISCH. This indicates that in Alphabet 
7, Bc represents plaintet Lp (i.e. Yc represents Ep); in Alphabet 12, Rc represents Ip 
(i.e. Nc represents Ep — confirming our assumption in the previous paragraph); 
and, in Alphabet 15, Bc represents Hp (i.e Yc represents Ep). 
If in Alphabet 15, Bc represents Hp, then Uc represents Ap. In the light of these 
identifications the string DEMK?MM?????TE in Row 5, columns 1 and 2 becomes 
DEMKOMMA????NTEN. This, obviously, is DEM KOMMANDANTEN, which 
means that in Alphabet 1, Uc represents Np (i.e. Lc represents Ep); in Alphabet 
2, Ic represents Dp (i.e. Jc represents Ep); in Alphabet 3, Gc represents Ap (i.e. Kc 
represents Ep); and, in Alphabet 4, Sc represents N (i.e. Jc represents Ep).
In this manner, each of the 15 encyphering alphabets has now been identified as 
follows: 1 Lc = Ep, 2 Jc = Ep, 3 Kc = Ep, 4 Jc = Ep, 5 Hc = Ep, 6 Mc = Ep, 7 Yc = Ep, 
8 Xc = Ep, 9 Gc = Ep, 10 Jc = Ep, 11 Wc = Ep, 12 Nc = Ep, 13 Hc = Ep, 14 Mc = Ep, 
15 Yc = Ep. This enables the whole passage to be decrypted. It reads as follows:
es war jetzt nur noch ewerk zwem klar. Der Versuch des Pumpenmeisters 
die Feuerlochleitung von dem Aggregat im Schraubenmotorenraum unter 
Druck zu nehmen misslang weil in der Beschadigten Feuerloschleitung 
der Druck sofort wegfiel.
1745. Eins wach Maschinist meldet mundlich dem Kommandanten auf 
der Brucke zu dieser zeit gingen die Motoren durch. Kmdt befiehlt zu 
versuchen wenigstens einen Motor wieder klar zu bekommen. Alle 
Versuche in den Maschinenraum ein zu dringen waren erfolglos. Eins 
wm ubermittelte befehl Kmdt telefonisch von Leck zentrale an L.T. im 
Masch leitstand L.J. meldete zuruck dasl befehl …
When devising a cypher of this type the encypherer usually prefers to designate 
each of the alphabets on his Vigenère square by a distinguishing letter, rather 
than by a number, and to form the cycle from a codeword; this is easier to 
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remember than a string of figures, both during the encypherment process and 
afterwards. A convenient choice is the letters at the margin of the square. In this 
case the encypherer used the right margin — the column of letters encyphering 
Dp — and chose the code word:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
G E F E C H T S B E R I C H T
This means 'Action Report' and probably served also as the document's title.
Reference to the other 24 sections indicated that they were consecutive parts 
of the one document, the encyphering of each section beginning with the first 
letter of the keyword. The divisions appear to have been made at random; 
their purpose may have been to make decryption by the enemy a more tedious 
process. 
This Action Report purports to be the deck and the engine room logs for the 
period from the sighting of Sydney (3.55 pm 19 November 1941) until the 
scuttling of the Kormoran some 8½ hours later. It provided the most reliable 
account of how Sydney met her fate. The material passage reads as follows:
1715 hrs — Cruiser cuts across starboard at range of 800 metres.
1725 hrs — Further signal: 'Hoist your secret call'. Further delay can 
only make situation worse … Thereupon at 1730 hrs identity declared. 
Strike Dutch flag, German colours clearly shown. Time taken to reveal 
identity 6 seconds. Order to stand by with guns and torpedoes. Enemy 
falls slowly astern … Salvoes 3, 4, 5 up four points — about 4 seconds 
later hits on bridge and control tower… . AA [Anti-aircraft] machine-
guns and starboard 37 mm guns effective on bridge, pom-poms and AA 
guns. Until 5th salvo no reply, then X Turret opens rapid and accurate 
fire. Hits on [sc. our] funnel and engines. Y Turret only fires two or three 
salvoes, all wide. A and B Turrets silent …
In short, before verifying the raider's identity, Sydney approached to within 
point blank range and was crippled by fire from Kormoran's main and secondary 
armament before she could bring fire to bear.
Disbandment
After the Japanese surrender, the Section was disbanded and its members 
returned to civil life. Bond joined the teaching staff at Scotch College Melbourne 
where he later became Vice-Principal. Eastway joined the postwar cryptographic 
organisation. The other three resumed their studies. Barnes went to Cambridge 
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and was elected to a Fellowship at Trinity in 1950. He became Professor of 
Mathematics and Deputy Vice-Chancellor at the University of Adelaide. 
McKay went to Cambridge and took a First in the Classical Tripos in 1950. He 
became Reader in Classics at The Australian National University. Smith went 
to the Sorbonne, where he took his doctorate. He became Professor of Modern 
Languages at the University of Tasmania.
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1 National Archives of Australia, Series A6923/2, Item 1.
Breaking Japanese Diplomatic Codes 
54
Part IV: Breaking the Recyphering Tables
1. Letter-Figure Substitution
2. Placing of Messages in Depth
3. Breaking of Additives
4. Indicator Systems
Part V: Miscellaneous Cyphers
1. HINOKI Machine Cypher (JAA)
2. SAKURA Emergency Cypher (JBL)
3. Unidentified Cyphers
Part VI: General Remarks
1. Code-Building
2. Cypher Systems
3. Errors in Encyphering
4. Distribution of Cyphers
5. Cooperation with Linguists
Part VII: Personnel 1942–45
Appendices2
A: Best Groups
B: Starts and Ends
C: R7F Low-Power Far Eastern Diplomatic Network
L: Code and Keys for GEAM (JBB)
Q: Unused Emergency Cyphers
2 The following Appendices, though referred to in the text, are missing in the xerox copy of the Report 
that is deposited with the National Archives of Australia  — D: Copy of NU (Date and Number Codes); 
E: Copy of TO (Address Codes); F: Copy of LA; G: Copy of X; H: Copy of CA: I: Copy of YO; J: Standard 
Japanese Diplomatic Vocabulary (1620 words); K: Copy of FUJI and Catalogue of Recovered Keys and Cages; 
L: Code and Keys for GEAM (JBB); M: Complete Information on BA: N: [Title Unknown]; O: [Title Unknown]; 
P: [Title Unknown]. Presumably these were stripped from the original document some time between its 
creation and its examination by the Department of Defence for access clearance in 1996. [All footnotes in this 
report were inserted by Sissons.]
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Abbreviations
Three-letter nomenclature for diplomatic cyphers
JAA HINOKI Machine Cypher





JAM NE Recyphering Table
JAO GEAM Recyphering Table (Repeated Indicator)
JBA BA Foreign Office Transposition Cypher (TOKI)
JBB GEAM Transposition Cypher
JBC Cypher Book No. 1 (Foreign Office)
JBD 10101 Interdepartmental Recyphering Table
JBE 50505 GEAM Recyphering Table
JBL SAKURA Emergency Cypher
JBN SOSOS Foreign Office Recyphering Table
Introduction
Work on Japanese diplomatic cyphers was first begun by the Section in 
December 1941 under the auspices of the Navy. During 1942, the staff consisted 
of only three cryptographers, but after the Section was taken over by the Army 
in November of that year, the technical staff was increased to deal with new 
cyphers. Professor A. D. Trendall of the University of Sydney was in charge of 
cryptography, assisted by Lieutenant R. S. Bond and Lieutenant E. S. Barnes. 
Mr. C. H. Archer of the British Consular Service supervised the language and 
translation section, and on his return to England in December 1944, Mr. R. L. 
Cowley was sent to replace him.
When the Section began work on Japanese diplomatic cyphers in February 
1942, there were in force four codes, LA (also known as JAH), X (JAI), CA (JAJ) 
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and YO (JAK), and two cyphers, HINOKI machine (JAA) and FUJI/TSU (JAF). 
All were used in conjunction with the Number (NU) and Address (TO) codes. 
The four codes, together with NU and TO, had already been broken and copies 
were supplied to this section. LA, X, NU and TO were virtually complete, but 
CA and YO required considerable expansion and correction.
During l942, all four codes and virtually all traffic in the FUJI cypher were being 
read locally, and the breaking of the daily keys for FUJI was the principal task of 
the section at the time. Traffic in JAA (the highest grade of Japanese diplomatic 
cypher) was sent direct to London where a copy of the HINOKI machine was 
held.3 
Between 1943 and 1945, the Japanese introduced eight new cyphers — two 
transposition systems and six recyphering tables. The Section was the first 
to break the new Greater East Asia Ministry transposition cypher (GEAM) 
introduced in July 1943. The breaking of the Foreign Office transposition 
cypher (BA) followed soon afterwards, and the Section concentrated on 
working out the available keys, while London turned to the machining of traffic 
in the recyphering tables. Once London was able to establish preliminary facts 
about the recyphering tables, the Section contributed code-equivalents and 
many pages of the pads, although relying upon recovery by hand without any 
mechanical aid.
Approximately 90 per cent of traffic received in these cyphers was read.
Intelligence Derived from the Messages
Messages sent in code rarely contained any important information, as the 
Japanese themselves realized that their codes had little security value. 
Low-grade cyphers were chiefly confined to financial and staffing problems 
within the various embassies, visas, couriers, rations and similar routine matters. 
Traffic in high-grade cyphers showed the reaction of the enemy to naval, military 
and political events abroad, and in addition provided a reliable general picture 
of the situation within Japan itself.
An idea of the importance of reading diplomatic cyphers may best be gained by 
mentioning a few examples of information received. 
Of considerable local interest was a message despatched by the Japanese 
representative at Dili which revealed that the enemy was reading the Australian 
guerrilla code in Timor. 
3 In the American literature on this subject, JAA is often referred to as the PURPLE cypher and the HINOKI 
machine as the PURPLE, the Type-97 Injiki, or the Type-B, Machine.
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The official Japanese attitude to the general war situation was regularly circulated 
by Tokyo, with particular reference to their reaction to 'Big Three' conferences 
or negotiations with the Soviet. The earthquake off Nagasaki and the American 
bombings of Japan were reported in full, including complete details of damage 
and casualties.
Posts abroad regularly sent through diplomatic channels reports from their spies 
and agents. Spy reports on the European and Russian front were frequently 
received from the Minister at Stockholm; Kabul was the nerve centre of a 
spy organization throughout India and the reading of their reports enabled 
us to supply the Indian authorities with information about the movements 
and activities of these agents. In 1942 one message from Kabul revealed that 
a Japanese agent was present at a British naval trial, and was supplying full 
details of carriers and battleships stationed at Bombay. Spy reports, dealing 
with the internal situation in China, came from an agent at Chungking and 
were transmitted to Japan from the embassy at Canton. One of these messages 
disclosed that the French Minister at Chungking was in the pay of the Japanese. 
Information about Chandra Bose and his puppet government was obtained from 
messages sent from Rangoon and other places visited by the Indian National 
Government.
Posts in occupied Europe constantly sent detailed accounts of the effectiveness of 
Allied bombings on their respective cities, and long reports upon local politics.
Russo-Japanese relations were always delicate, and from a survey of reports 
submitted by Ambassador Sato recording his interviews with Molotov and 
Lozovsky, the gradual hardening of the Russian attitude became apparent.
For several months before the Russian entry into the Far Eastern War, reports 
were coming through from Japanese couriers via the Vladivostok consulate on 
the eastward movement of troops and material.
Much material recovered from Japanese diplomatic cyphers was of use to the 
Ministry for Economic Warfare in London. Reports from Far Eastern posts 
were mainly of an economic nature, generally trade reports and statements of 
shortages. Up to the end of 1942 shipping information was often sent in diplomatic 
cyphers but thereafter this practice was discontinued. However, we were able 
to follow the progress made by the Japanese in the building of wooden ships 
in French Indo-China and Siam to alleviate their shipping shortage. In addition 
air raid reports came frequently from Bangkok, Hanoi and Chiengmai [Chiang 
Mai]. London displayed a marked interest in the Japanese need for supplies and 
commodities, particularly Swedish ball bearings and Turkish chrome.
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Part I: The Codes
1. NU (Date and Number Code)
2. TO (Address Codes)
3. LA Code (JAH)
4. X Code (JAI)
5. CA (Head of Mission) Code (JAJ)
6. YO Code (JAK)
1 . NU (Date and Number Code)
This code was used in conjunction with most Japanese diplomatic codes and 
cyphers. 
The date and serial number of each message were contained in a single five-
letter group generally immediately preceding the cypher text. In this group the 
first three letters designated the serial number, the fourth letter the part number 
and number of parts, and the fifth the date and the period of day (i.e. morning 
or afternoon). 
The complete alphabet was used in each part of this code (e.g. ADYIP indicated 
No. 304, Part 1 of a two-part message, sent on the morning of the 31st of the 
month).  
Serial Number
There were two separate codes used, one for ordinary (place-to-place) messages 
and the other for circulars. 
In the 'hundreds' place, each letter of the alphabet was assigned a number 
from 0 to 25 at random. The numbers assigned to the one letter for circular and 
ordinary messages added up to 25 — e.g. B (ordinary) = 0, B (circular) = 25. For 
numbers beyond 2,599, two thousand was subtracted before encoding — e.g. 
2600 would be encoded as 600. There was little chance of confusion, as few 
series ever reached such high numbers, and in those which did, several months 
separated the identically encoded numbers.
For the 'tens' and 'units' places, the figures 0 to 9 were distributed over the 
alphabet at random, a few letters being left blank in each column. In no case 
was a letter left without a figure equivalent in the corresponding columns of 
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both circular and ordinary numbers. This fact sometimes helped in establishing 
doubtful cases (e.g. If E occurred in the 'units' place, the number had to be a 
circular because E had no equivalent in the ordinary 'units' code).
In June 1943 the circular and ordinary codes were interchanged. Thus whereas 
ADY had signified Message 304, it now became Circular Message 304. There was 
no further change in the code at any stage.
Message Parts
The fourth letter of the date-and-number group designated the parts of messages. 
Each letter was given an equivalent ranging from 'single-part message' to 'part 
six of a six-part message'. There were six optional letters for 'single-part message', 
and one for each part of two-, three-, four-, five- and six-part messages. When a 
message exceeded six parts, all its parts were externally encoded as single-part 
messages and numbered internally (i.e. within the cypher text). This practice 
often proved of real assistance in the breaking of recyphering tables and in 
the finding of initial 'fits' in BA. Occasionally the several parts of a multi-part 
message were designated in LA code before the cypher text.
Date
The final figure only of the date (except in the case of 31st) was encoded. Each of 
the figures 0 to 9, and 31 was allocated two letters at random, one for morning 
and one for afternoon. The remaining four letters were reserved for special 
cases (e.g. 'date in text'). Thus B in the final place of the date-and-number group 
could designate the morning of either 10th, 20th or 30th of the month, the 
precise date normally being clear from the date of transmission. In the case of 
delayed messages confusion could arise, but generally traffic records decided 
any uncertainty.
Reference Code
When a message referred to a previous message an additional five-letter group 
was inserted between the date-and-number group and the beginning of the 
cypher text. In this code the first letter indicated the source of the message 
referred to (e.g. 'my circular', 'your telegram (+2000)'), the second, third and 
fourth letters provided the number of that message and the fifth letter the part 
or paragraph thereof. The whole alphabet was employed for each of the five 
codes involved, alternatives being freely used. The fifth letter of the group was 
almost always one of the five choices for 'dummy' (used when the whole message 
was referred to and not merely a section of it).
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Foreign Ministry Revised System
On February 15th 1945 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a change 
in the date-and-number system, although the Greater East Asia Ministry 
retained the old system. In the revised system the same code was retained for 
the numbering and reference sections, but an improved date code was brought 
into force. The original five- letter groups were each expanded to two groups 
by doubling each letter, and for the date a bigram was substituted, there being 
a separate bigram for each day of the year. Thus Circular Message 48, Part 2 of 
3, on 28th March in the old system would be BZUXT, but now became BBZZU 
UXXRH. This new system may have been introduced to diminish the chance of 
error arising from corruption.
The new date code consisted of bigrams formed at random from consonants. No 
provision was made to differentiate between morning and afternoon. Sufficient 
traffic was normally available to establish the code on sequence of messages, but 
it was possible to check most bigrams by means of the JBC indicator system 
which employs the date of origin. Occasionally the old date code was used, 
reduplicated, in place of the bigram code. The new date code was established, 
virtually complete for dates from 15th February 1945 to early September 1945 
when cypher traffic ceased.
For copies of the date-and-number code together with the reference code see 
Appendix D [Missing].
2 . TO (Address Codes)
Both the Greater East Asia Ministry and the Foreign Ministry used the same 
system of addressing messages but each had its own code. These codes were 
originally supplied to the Section by London and were complete only in as far 
as the posts with the greatest volume of traffic were concerned. Efforts were 
directed towards filling in the missing sections by inference from the texts of 
messages and from number series, but neither code was recovered in its entirety.
Address codes consisted of bigrams and trigrams, the bigrams being instructions 
for the distribution of the message (e.g. 'This message is addressed to …', 'Please 
forward to …'); and the trigrams, place-names. To complete a five-letter group at 
the end of a series of addresses the fillers SIMO were used. Where re-addressing 
involved numbering a message in a different series, the original number and 
address always came last, i.e. immediately before the cypher text. Thus in the 
Greater East Asia Ministry address code, a message from Shanghai Embassy to 
Tokyo, which Tokyo is forwarding to Hanoi and Saigon as a circular, would leave 
Tokyo with the following address code groups:- QQFZQ FVBMO (my message 
to Hanoi, Saigon) (date and number group) NNCZS (message from Shanghai to 
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me (date and number group). When a message addressed primarily to one post 
was repeated merely for information to a number of other posts, the primary 
addressee was normally indicated at the front, and the remainder at the end of 
the message.
Copies of the address codes will be found in Appendix E [Missing].
3 . LA Code (JAH)
This is a simple code consisting of bigrams and tetragrams, indicated by the 
letters LA at the beginning of the text. Bigrams are of the form, consonant-vowel 
or vowel-consonant; and tetragrams are special combinations of two bigrams, 
the first bigram being, SI, TU, VE, WO or XY. All the letters of the alphabet are 
used except Q; and Y is regarded as both a vowel and a consonant.
The bigrams are patterned according to the order of the kana vowels, i.e. A, I, 
U, E, O and the tetragrams are arranged in blocks of related words.
LA code has little security value and is used extensively for communications the 
contents of which the Japanese merely wish to keep from post office officials. 
However, cypher clerks on rare occasions did make the mistake of sending 
confidential matter in LA code but, on the whole, LA messages contained little 
of interest and value.
A copy of LA code may be found in Appendix F [Missing].
4 . X Code (JAI)
This is an unrestricted alphabetic code of bigrams and tetragrams, indicated 
by one of the five bigrams IP PA AP AN IK at the commencement of the text. 
The code book is not patterned and is thus of higher grade than LA. X was not 
nearly as extensively used as LA — most messages in X coming from Kabul — 
but its subject matter was usually more interesting.
A copy of X code is attached as Appendix G [Missing].
5 . CA (Head of Mission) Code (JAJ)
CA is an unrestricted bigram code held only by the Head of the Mission and is 
indicated by CA at the head of the text. Its security value is the same as that of X.
The code was usually sent unencyphered, but was occasionally used in 
conjunction with any one of the current cypher systems.
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As only the Head of the Mission was able to decode these messages, the subject 
matter of CA messages was usually confined to staff problems. 
Encyphered CA messages usually contained general statements on policies 
which Tokyo did not wish to disclose to embassy staffs.
A copy of CA code may be found in Appendix H [Missing].
6 . YO Code (JAK)
YO is an unrestricted bigram code indicated by YO at the head of the text.
This code was rarely used, but occasionally appeared encyphered in the same 
manner as CA. Owing to the small amount of traffic, this code was only partially 
recovered and is attached as Appendix I [Missing].
Part II: The Transposition Cyphers
1. FUJI (TSU) Cypher (JAF)
2. GEAM Transposition System (JBB)
3. BA (TOKI) Cypher (JBA)
1 . FUJI (TSU) Cypher (JAF)
This transposition cypher was current between June 20th 1941 and June 
30th 1943, and was the main cypher used by the Japanese for diplomatic 
communications over this period. The cypher system had already been broken 
in 1941, and a few basic code groups recovered. Such information as was known 
was supplied to the Section.
The indicator of FUJI is a five-letter group immediately preceding the cypher 
text, the first three letters being invariably consonant-vowel-consonant. 
The initial consonant classifies the message as (a)  European, (b) Far Eastern, 
(c) American, or (d) a Tokyo circular, while the remaining four letters progress in 
a fixed self-checking cycle. The cypher was designed to be used for a period of 
one year, all four regions having a separate key for each day, thus giving a total 
of 1464 keys. At the conclusion of the cypher text a checked five-figure group 
gives the number of cypher groups (e.g. 13777).
The code is composed of unrestricted bigrams and tetragrams, the total 
vocabulary of 1576 groups comprising 676 bigrams and 900 tetragrams. This 
vocabulary is slightly smaller than the standard Japanese diplomatic vocabulary 
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of 1620 words (v. Appendix J [Missing]). Bigrams are used for kana, numerals, 
punctuation and short commonly used words; tetragrams for paragraphs, place-
names, weights and measures, and longer words and phrases. Those bigrams 
which form the beginnings and ends of tetragrams (e.g. AL, BJ, YM, ZB) are 
used for dates and spellers.
An encoded message is written into a single transposition form which varies 
in width from 19 to 25 according to a key supplied by the indicator. The form 
contains random blanks which are inserted according to the date and which 
normally change on the 1st, 11th and 21st of each month. The maximum number 
of blanks is 53, and they are arranged in sets so that no blank is ever isolated. 
The blanking pattern does not extend below the l2th row of the form. 
The Breaking of FUJI Keys
Progress on FUJI was at first slow and difficult. The recoveries supplied to the 
Section were few and unreliable, and the only keys broken in this country prior 
to February l942 had been obtained from short messages the contents of which 
were known or presumed (e.g. messages reporting the departure of such ships as 
the Queen Elizabeth or Queen Mary from Sydney Harbour).4 As FUJI (apart from 
the HINOKI machine) was the only diplomatic cypher in use at the time, the first 
task of the Section was to discover a general method for reading all traffic within 
a few hours of receipt.
The first attack was made on the following lines: An arbitrary width of key was 
chosen and the cypher text was written out in strips. Efforts were then made 
to find two strips which when correctly placed side by side produced good 
basic groups (v. Appendix A). Messages under seventy cypher groups were not 
worked upon if it could be avoided, because as we had only an elementary 
knowledge of the code, everything depended upon finding a good 'fit' in the 
section of the message clear of the blanks. This method of attack was very 
cumbersome and seldom profitable as the arbitrary width was almost always 
incorrect, and after a week this method was abandoned.
In March 1942 a member of the British Foreign Office from Singapore who 
possessed an excellent knowledge of Japanese joined the Section.5 On the basis 
of his knowledge of the language a new and more direct attack was made upon 
the cypher.6
4 FUJI came into operation on 20 June 1941. The Queen Mary‘s departures from Sydney after that date 
during 1941 were 13 June, 29 June, 21 August, 3 September, 15 October, 1 November; the Queen Elizabeths‘s 
arrivals were 13 June, 15 October, 15 December. 
5 A. R. V. Cooper of the British Government Code and Cypher School. 
6 Bond insists that it was Trendall, not Cooper, who devised ‘zoning’:
I cannot really accept this paragraph which suggests that it was Cooper who introduced ‘zoning’.  
It was Trendall, and the latent mathematician in him. I was there, and as a minion I did the hack-
work. Does this statement mean that the author of the Report was not personally involved in 1942. 
But the details of zoning on this page are ‘spot-on’, 100% correct. 
(R. S. Bond to D. C. S. Sissons, 15 November 1998)
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As the common kana symbols wa, wo, no, ni, shi, and to were bound to occur 
frequently in any message of reasonable length, a search was made for these 
groups by 'zoning' out the letters of the cypher text which formed these code 
groups. Owing to a weakness in code construction the common group wa 
had only one equivalent, AG. Consequently AG usually proved a profitable 
investment for the zoning treatment.
A given letter, say A, was 'zoned' by writing all the 'A's of a message along a 
line of graph paper and writing, above and below each A the 15 letters which 
respectively preceded and succeeded it. Although 'zoning' might appear 
cumbersome the writing out rarely exceeded ten minutes and invariably 
produced results.
After, say, 'A's and 'G's had been zoned in the above manner they were placed 
together in turn until a 'fit' was found. To be classified as a 'fit', a column had 
to contain a high percentage of good groups. Value of groups was the most 
important factor in determining a fit, but experience alone decided its validity; 
even though a column might be found containing shi, wa, no, and to, if it also 
contained several rare or unknown groups like AZ or LY there was little chance 
of its being correct. In addition a correct fit had to be mathematically possible 
(e.g. letter 178 could not fit with letter 180, however good the resulting groups 
might be!).
When a fit was found that seemed reliable, the numbers of the letters were 
studied in an endeavour to establish the width of the key. For example, if a line 
ending at letter 24 fitted with a line ending at 72, and the message contained 
530 letters, the average length of a column was 24 and the key was probably 
22 wide. Owing to the bigram and tetragram basis of the code an odd key (i.e. 
23 wide) would give a column in which code groups would be formed only on 
alternate rows. An even key (i.e. 20 wide) would form code groups on every 
row. At first even keys proved more difficult than odd keys, as columns had to 
be found separately and then fitted together according to sense; but with odd 
keys each alternate row had a split group which was of great assistance in fitting 
on a third line to the original two. For instance if a split group H . Z occurred in 
a message from South America there was a high chance of this being EHZB, the 
tetragram for Chile.
If the blanking system for the period was already known, a set of four or five 
lines was usually sufficient to determine the width of the key and the position 
of the set in the cage. When this had been done, a very useful device, known 
as the principle of isolated columns, was used. An isolated line was a section 
of the cypher text whose beginning and end were determined but which had 
not yet been fitted. The lengths of all isolated lines were checked off against 
the calculated lengths of all the lines in the setting. If a certain length occurred 
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only once, the corresponding isolated line could be immediately written into 
the form, irrespective of whether it had been fitted to other lines or not. Such 
isolated lines were extremely useful as 'bridges' in expanding the original fitted 
lines.
If the cage was not known, all the lines of the message had to be fitted together, 
the end-point of the message determined by sense, and the number of blanks in 
each line calculated. The cage was then broken purely on the sense of the message 
and was, of course, greatly assisted by stereotyped beginnings (v. Appendix B).
Using the method outlined above, by May 1942 we were able to read virtually 
all FUJI traffic; and all bigrams, except those of very rare occurrence, and most 
tetragrams had been recovered.
The technique and speed of breaking keys gradually improved to such an extent 
that 'zoning' could almost be eliminated and the following simpler method was 
usually adopted: Messages were typed out, numbered, and an 'apartage' marked 
(i.e. letters were marked which were at a distance of two or four apart, as these 
distances were easily noted and accounted for both even and odd key-lengths) 
— e.g. … XZLAN AFKTA … which would be checked with PAQLD GYYOG, 
giving (since AG = wa) two was. Groups like wa, wo, no, shi, ni etc were so 
common in the body of a message that there was a high possibility that they 
would occur over one another in the same column. If a search for a wa over wa 
proved unsuccessful, a wa over no, or ni or shi was almost certain to be found. 
By this method fits came quickly and easily, and from May 1942 onwards it was 
only in rare instances that the 'hammer' method of zoning had to be adopted to 
discover an initial fit.
Change 1
On July 1st 1942 the first of three changes in the encyphering of FUJI messages 
was introduced. In normal times a completely new cypher would probably have 
been introduced but distribution during wartime to overseas posts prevented 
the Japanese from changing their cyphers after the usual period. The first 
change was as follows: The top line of the original cage was removed and the 
key 'telescoped' (i.e. arranged in the order first, last, second, second-last etc). 
The instructions for this change were circulated in a SUPER FUJI message (see 
below) which could not be read, but as soon as a key was broken after July 1st 
the system was quite apparent.
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Change 2
From October lst 1942 messages to and from Europe and South America were 
encyphered by moving the fifth row of the cage to the top. Far Eastern posts 
continued to use the system introduced on July  1st 1942. Kabul now used 
European cages with Far Eastern keys.
Change 3
The third variation in FUJI cypher was introduced on February 1st 1943, when 
all posts with the exception of the Far East used cages formed by moving the 
original blanks ten columns to the left. In addition a new key was used, derived 
from the original key in the following manner: Step 1: To each key number the 
preceding was added, retaining only the units digit in the sum. Step 2: These 
digits were then numbered in ascending order from the left to provide the new 
key.
E.g. Original Key:
11 1 3 8 13 16 5 6 10 19 18 15 12 4 2 17 9 7 14
Step 1: Rewrite, retaining only last digits.
1 1 3 8 3 6 5 6 0 9 8 5 2 4 2 7 9 7 4
Step 2: Repeat this sequence but now put the final digit (4) first.
4 1 1 3 8 3 6 5 6 0 9 8 5 2 4 2 7 9 7
Step 3: Add above two rows in columns without carry
5 2 4 1 1 9 1 1 6 9 7 3 7 6 6 9 6 6 1
Step 4: The new key is obtained by entering down the numbers 1 to 19 in the 
order determined by first using all 0s, then all 1s, and so on up to all 9s.
0s





6s 10 11 12 13 14
7s 15 16
8s
9s 17 18 19
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New Key
9 6 8 1 2 17 3 4 10 18 15 7 16 11 12 19 13 14 5
Although a new key could be derived from the old, no method was found for 
deriving the original key from the new.
The Ministry at Kabul used the new key method and the new cage while 
continuing to use Far Eastern and not European keys.
Instructions for the third variation of FUJI encyphering were circulated by 
Tokyo in a SUPER FUJI message which was afterwards put through the HINOKI 
machine.
FUJI cypher was discontinued on June 30th 1943. A catalogue of recovered 
keys and cages together with a copy of the code may be found in Appendix K 
[Missing].
SUPER-FUJI System
This is a special variation of FUJI with an extremely high security value, and 
is reserved by the Japanese for communications of a 'most secret' nature. The 
system was supplied to the Section by London who had read the instructions.
For this special cypher the normal FUJI indicator is repeated at the conclusion of 
the cypher text. The variation is as follows: Until February 1st 1943, the key in 
force at the time was reversed in pairs. The first 13 numbers of the new key were 
taken and the letters A through M were arranged in the order of these figures. 
Underneath were written letters N through Z in normal order. These thirteen 
pairs of letters were then used to provide a reciprocal substitution which was 
applied to the message.
E.g. Using the above mentioned key as original key:
11 1 3 8 13 16 5 6 10 19 18 15 12 4 2 17 9 7 14
Reverse the order in pairs
1 11 8 3 16 13 6 5 19 10 15 18 4 12 17 2 7 9 14
Keep only first 13
1 11 8 3 16 13 6 5 19 10 15 18 4
Insert A through M according to the order of these numbers
A H F B K I E D M G J L C
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Write N through Z under these
N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Thus AG in the original code is substituted as NW.
This system is virtually unbreakable, as each message has the equivalent of a 
new code. Efforts were made by London, Washington and Melbourne to break 
one SUPER-FUJI message which was known to contain cypher instructions; but 
without success.
On February 1st 1943 the system changed, but the instructions were circulated 
in JAA which London read.
This new system is one of double transposition without substitution. In 
encyphering, the first transposition form is identical with the current form for 
ordinary FUJI. The second form uses the original cage with the top line removed 
and a special key derived as follows: If the width of the original key is n, the 
first n actual digits of the key are written down in order. Underneath these are 
written the last n digits of the key read backwards. These two rows are then 
added and arranged in order as described above for FUJI Change 3.
E.g. Using the same original key:
11 1 3 8 13 16 5 6 10 19 18 15 12 4 2 17 9 7 14
First 19 digits
1 1 1 3 8 1 3 1 6 5 6 1 0 1 9 1 8 1 5
Last 19 digits
4 1 7 9 7 1 2 4 2 1 5 1 8 1 9 1 0 1 6
Add without carry
5 2 8 2 5 2 5 5 8 6 1 2 8 2 8 2 8 2 1
Use order of numerals to write new key
1s 1 2
2s 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3s
4s
5s 10 11 12 13
6s 14
7s
8s 15 16 17 18 19
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New Key
10 3 15 4 11 5 12 13 16 14 1 6 17 7 18 8 19 9 2
Messages in the SUPER-FUJI system were not numerous, perhaps owing to 
the cumbersome method of encyphering. From the material these messages 
contained there is every reason to believe that the Japanese believed implicitly 
that the system was unbreakable. However, they compromised the system by 
sending both SUPER-FUJI and ordinary FUJI messages in the same key, which 
meant that a direct attack on a SUPER-FUJI message was rarely necessary; for 
once the original key had been determined, the SUPER-FUJI could then be 
decyphered immediately.
2 . GEAM Transposition System (JBB)
GEAM was introduced on 21st July 1943. It is a transposition cypher with 
a bigram and tetragram code, the bigrams being consonant-vowel or vowel-
consonant and the tetragrams made up of double consonant and a bigram. All 
letters of the alphabet are used and Y is regarded as both consonant and vowel. 
The code is patterned after the manner of LA. 
The transposition system has appeared in three forms:
(a) Originally messages were transposed in blocks of ten by ten without blanks. 
There were 26 indicators, each providing a column and a row order, the row 
order containing only nine figures, as the bottom row of the cage was composed 
of dummies, namely the first letter of the indicator repeated ten times. The 26 
keys were designated by the letters A through Z and each key was indicated 
by its letter and the following letter of the alphabet in the form ABABA. The 
indicator was located at the head of the cypher text.
(b) Shortly afterwards a new system appeared which was used conjointly with 
(a), but which eventually displaced it. The code remained the same, but the 
size of the transposition block was altered to 13 by 10, the dummies now being 
omitted, and a figure check added at the end of the text as in FUJI. Thirteen 
indicators were used each providing a column order and row order, and were 
built up on the pattern AZAZA, BYBYB etc, the keys being lettered from A 
through N excluding M.
(c) A further change was introduced on October 1st 1944. The size of the block 
was altered to 13 by 13, nine blanks being inserted in the cells with coordinates 
(1,1) through (9,9). The columnar keys of system (b) were reversed and used as 
both column and row orders. Any two keys could be used in conjunction. For 
example, the indicator ABABA gave B as the column order, A as the row order.
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The Breaking of GEAM
As this cypher was introduced in a simple form, the breaking of the original 
system and the two subsequent improvements was not a difficult task. The 
actual steps of the analysis were as follows:
(a) A frequency count of a few messages showed that consonants and vowels 
were used in almost equal numbers. As we already had an example of a vowel-
consonant, consonant-vowel code (LA), the theory was straightway suggested 
that GEAM was such a code transposed. The regular occurrence of the dummy 
letter at intervals of ten gave the probable length of the lines as ten. Moreover, 
as the dummies appeared at shorter intervals at the end of a message (when the 
final transposition form was incomplete) and these final dummies always began 
after a multiple of 100 letters, it was obvious that the size of the block was ten 
by ten. When a few messages were tested on these theories, fits of the required 
type were quickly found, while the only discrepancies were groups of the form 
BB, HH etc. Experience of the Japanese method of code construction showed 
that these were parts of tetragrams, and the five separate fits for all messages 
were soon established.
It merely remained to put these groups together on repeats. This part of the 
job did actually present a few stumbling blocks, as the presence of a row-order 
was not at first suspected and we were unfortunate enough to have constructed 
all the repeats backwards. The code-breakers were therefore somewhat baffled 
when these texts were presented to them — although it was later found that 
the main difficulty was the fact that the early messages were encoded from an 
English text.
The first guide to the real solution was given by the incomplete blocks in which 
an incomplete line of five letters appeared at the end of the line instead of at the 
beginning. Thus we saw that we had our keys backwards; this was remedied 
and then long repeats were found going from one line to another, the second 
line not necessarily being the next in order. From then on the breaking of the 
code and row order was a relatively simple matter and the complete code and 
cypher system were known within a fortnight.
(b) On the appearance of the second type of GEAM, the first messages were 
immediately examined for fits of the required type, but without success. Next 
day, when two messages in the same key had been received, these were written 
over one another producing repeats of letters at distances of l3. Moreover these 
repeats were the letters A D F I S S T U U V V V Y Z; our knowledge of the 
code immediately showed that these could be anagrammed into the traditional 
telegram reference: SSZA TI VU VVDY UF (kiden 12 ni kanshi). When the letters 
were lined up correctly in this order it was seen that two adjacent lines contained 
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both code groups and split groups, and therefore the cage had an odd width and 
a row order. All 13 keys were then broken as soon as traffic in the keys was 
received.
(c) The third variation of GEAM was broken by London shortly after its 
inception. A few keys were broken by the Section and by London, whereupon 
it was seen that the new keys were the reverse of the previous set.
GEAM was the main cypher of the Greater East Asia Ministry, its other two 
cyphers JAO and JBE being rarely and spasmodically used. Although GEAM 
was by no means a high-grade cypher, the Japanese appeared to have no fear 
in transmitting secret data encyphered by this system. When the Embassy 
at Bangkok was bombed out the cypher clerk was able to continue sending 
messages, relying upon his memory for code and keys. This the Japanese 
regarded as an excellent recommendation for their cypher.
The code and keys of GEAM cypher will be found in Appendix L [Missing].
3 . BA (TOKI) Cypher (JBA)
This transposition cypher was introduced on August 20th 1943, and was the 
first of the new Foreign Office cyphers to be broken.
The code is unrestricted bigrams and trigrams, transposed in blocks 25 by 10. 
The keys for the blocks are given by a five-letter indicator located at the end 
of the text. The first letter of the indicator is one of the consonants B, C, D, F, 
G, the second a vowel (including Y), the third one of the consonants N through 
Z, and the last two progress in sets of five according to a fixed cycle. Each of 
the 1,500 indicators is assigned a key number, this key being used for the first 
transposition block. For the second and third blocks the two following keys are 
used (e.g. if the indicator BANAY is 127, the first three blocks would have keys 
127, 128, 129). Any further blocks repeat the same keys in order.
First System
Ten nulls are inserted in each setting in Column 1 Row 1 through Column 10 
Row 10 (according to the key), the nulls spelling out the originator's name, rank 
and post in English.
Blanks are inserted according to the date, the same blanking system being used 
for dates whose difference is a multiple of six. Such blanks are always in vertical 
blocks of five cells, and extend either from Rows 1 through 5 or from Rows 6 
through 10. The number of blanks in each block range from 5 to 45, and varied 
for each block.
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Incomplete blocks of more than five rows receive special treatment in that the 
first five rows and the remaining rows are taken off separately.
Second System
On December 20th 1943 a new system was introduced as follows: Nulls were 
abolished and fifty blanks were inserted in each block, their location depending 
upon the key; beginning from Cell 1,1 five blanks were inserted vertically, from 
Cell 2,2 five blanks horizontally to the right etc, as far as Cell 10,10. Incomplete 
blocks were now treated in the normal fashion.
Breaking of First System
First a frequency count was made which showed that the code was probably 
unrestricted as in FUJI. Tentative attempts were made at finding repetitive fits 
on the same style as FUJI, but no conclusive results were obtained. One message 
was received which from its count suggested that it was highly numerical, but 
although certain progress was made on it, the message was unfortunately too 
corrupt to be of any real use.
Some messages in the same key were written over one another giving repeats 
at intervals of eleven letters, whereupon it was found that these repeats were 
nulls. As in GEAM these nulls were regularly spaced except towards the end 
of messages, suggesting that the encyphering was done in blocks but here 
difficulties were encountered as the lengths of the separate sections could be 
245, 235, 225, 215 or 205. The longer blocks tended to be those at the beginning, 
but apart from this no rule could be established. The unevenly spaced dummies 
were naturally examined, but the system by which they were distributed was 
not at all clear.
Within a fortnight of the introduction of BA, Minister Morishima at Lisbon 
compromised the system by sending identical messages in two different keys. 
London was fortunate in intercepting both of these messages and quickly 
pieced them together. As the message was less than one complete block, it first 
appeared that the two parts of the block had different keys but these two keys 
were obviously related and were seen to be identical when sets of blanks were 
introduced. An analysis of this message gave a few of the high frequency groups 
and one or two more keys were broken. Our technique was rapidly improving, 
although almost no code groups were known, when Tokyo sent out a six-part 
circular in both BA and GEAM. The GEAM cypher was already completely 
known by this time and all efforts were made to break the BA keys. This done, 
the equivalents of several hundred code groups were immediately recovered, 
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the only small difficulty being the presence of trigrams, the form of which was 
not at all obvious. From now on the breaking of BA keys was merely a matter of 
technique and experience.
Although the complete system by which the blanks were inserted was not 
discovered for some weeks, it was roughly known that the blanks were fairly 
evenly divided between the top and bottom of the cage, the top blanks being 
in Columns 11, 12 etc and lower blanks in 20, 21 etc. So that if the length of a 
block were 235 letters, the blanks were either in Columns 11, 12 and 20 or in 
11, 20 and 21.
The method of breaking the keys was simply to write out a block in its twenty-five 
columns, inserting the required number of blanks on the above tentative basis. 
Fits were not difficult to find as the position of every letter in its line was 
determined and the whole process was greatly facilitated by stereotyped starts 
(c.f. FUJI where the beginnings and ends of lines were initially indeterminate). 
However the presence of trigrams and dummies gave no regularity in the pairing 
and splitting of two letters as in FUJI.
Virtually all traffic in BA was read until the introduction of the second system. 
Breaking of Second System
All attempts to break into the second system failed until in January 1944 we 
received two small messages in the same key. Both of these were found to 
possess all the requisite letters for a 'repeat request' (v. Appendix B), and were 
successfully pieced together although they were so small that the actual key and 
blanking system could not be completely determined. The result was sent to 
London who fortunately possessed messages with complete blocks in both the 
old system and the new. They were thus able to establish the blanking system 
and to show that the transposition keys had not changed.
New messages in known keys were now readable but the breaking of new keys 
presented grave difficulties. Doubts were expressed both here and in London 
whether the breaking of the new system would ever become a working and a 
profitable proposition in view of the complexity of the system and the necessity 
of breaking three keys in order completely to read one message. Moreover the 
main recyphering tables were now well in hand and occupying almost the 
complete staff of the Section so that for many weeks no work was done on BA.
However, the volume of BA traffic began to increase in April 1944 when it began 
to be used as an interdepartmental cypher in conjunction with 10101, and it 
was decided to make serious efforts to evolve a technique for breaking new 
keys. Progress was slow and very difficult in the early stages and only possible 
when there were several messages in the same key. Eventually an effective 
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method of verticalising was found (v. Appendix M [Missing]) whereby we filled 
in the thirty blanks whose positions were known and distributed the remaining 
twenty horizontal blanks as evenly as possible. Fitting was of course difficult 
in view of the shallow depth of the blocks, the presence of unknown blanks, 
the lack of pattern in the pairing of the code groups and the uncertainty of the 
beginnings and ends of lines. 
One of the main resources was as follows: Messages in the same key were written 
over one another and each was examined for a stereotyped beginning which 
would give possible beginnings for all the other messages. (e.g. JOR being kiden 
[meaning: 'your telegram'], letters corresponding to all the Js, Os and Rs in one 
message would be written down and all combinations of them examined. If for 
example one found the sets JSK, OBD, RKR, giving kiden, Ōden [meaning: 'my 
telegram'] and the first letters of '1', these lines would be written down and 
examined as potential fits).
Incomplete blocks were always virtually unworkable and even after a great deal 
of experience it proved almost impossible to break a key on one message alone. 
London was the first to discover the principle that the key of Block 2 of one 
indicator might be identical with the key of Block 1 of another indicator; it 
was then obvious that indicators could be linked together (See Appendix M 
[Missing]). This fact was most helpful in that additional depth was obtained 
when breaking keys. Furthermore if upon the breaking of Block 1 of an indicator 
it was found that the key was identical with Block 2 of another of which the key 
for Block 3 was already known, Block 2 of the new message could immediately 
be decyphered.
Employment of BA
BA was discontinued in April 1945, although the transposition system was used 
from then on to re-encypher JAA (HINOKI machine cypher) messages and for 
use in Super JBC described below.
BA was used only to a moderate extent and the material it contained was of varying 
interest ranging from general Tokyo circulars upon international happenings to 
dull routine matters about couriers. Most BA messages from Russia were on the 
subject of couriers, visas and rations. However Stockholm was in the habit of 
sending all his chōhōsha (spy reports) in BA and much information was obtained 
therefrom. Although the second system of BA cypher might well have proved 
unbreakable the Foreign Ministry did not regard it very highly and issued 
instructions that it was to be used only for routine matters; more confidential 
material was to be sent in the recyphering tables. This was satisfactory from our 
point of view as we encountered far more difficulty in breaking and reading the 
second BA system than we did in recovering recyphering tables.
Complete information on BA may be found in Appendix M [Missing].
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Part III: The Recyphering Tables
1. Cypher Book No. 1 (JBC)
2. NE (JAM)
3. SOSOS (JBN)
4. 10101 (JBD) 
5. JAO
6. 50505 (JBE)
1 . Cypher Book No . 1 (JBC)
This is a recyphering table using a four-figure code and sent in five-letter groups 
with the letter-figure substitution OLFSCGRNYK equivalent to 0 through 9. The 
code contains 1620 groups with the following restrictions: the first three figures 
of the groups are all even or all odd; there is no zero in the first, second or 
fourth places and no 9 in the second place (N.B. This applies only to the code as 
recovered: it has been shown that the true Japanese code is 1111 lower).
The additive pad contains l00 pages numbered 00 through 99, each page 
containing 100 five-figure groups arranged in ten rows and ten columns. The 
rows and columns of each page are separately coordinated.
A dummy indicator of the pattern, consonant consonant vowel consonant 
consonant, stands at the head of the text. There are two true indicators, one 
at the beginning and one at the end of the text. The indicators are decyphered 
as follows: To the first four figures of the actual cypher-text add the day of the 
month, repeated to form a four-figure group. Use the result to find a five-figure 
group in the pad, the first two figures being taken as the page, the third the row 
coordinate and the fourth the column coordinate (11111 must be added to this 
group in our figures). This five-figure group is now subtracted from the first 
indicator. Then the date tetragram with the addition of a zero is subtracted from 
the result. This final five-figure group denotes the starting point, the first two 
figures giving the page, the next two giving the coordinates, and the last giving 
the digit of the five-figure group at which encyphering begins (e.g. a message 
on the 12th, front indicator 68053 and first cypher group 99256; the control 
is 9925 + 1212 = 0137; page 01, co ordinates 3.7 gives, say, the group 90981; 
this subtracted from 68053 gives 78172; subtracting 12120 from 78172 gives 
the starting-point 66052, i.e. page 66, coordinates 0.5 beginning at the second 
figure of the group).
Breaking Japanese Diplomatic Codes 
76
The rear indicator, also denoting the starting point, is decyphered on the same 
system, save that the first four figures of the second text group are used as the 
control.
JBC was introduced on July 1st 1943. On February 1st l944 the recyphering pad 
changed, but the second pad was quickly broken into and the first pages were 
recovered by this section in March. The complete pad was soon recovered, and 
all messages in this cypher have since been read on receipt.
Super JBC
This combination of BA and JBC was introduced on April 20th, 1945. Additives 
are obtained by transposing a page of the recyphering pad in a setting 25 by 25, 
using a BA key, and with 125 blanks inserted in 25 sets of 5 in accordance with 
the second system of BA blanks. Each page is used once only by each post and 
the pages are used in order. Separate BA keys and sections of the pad are allotted 
to posts abroad and to Tokyo. Full instructions were given in Tokyo Circular 383 
of April 5th 1945, which was in BA put through a machine.
Only four messages in this system have been received to date, and consequently it 
is not yet known whether the BA keys progress similarly to the pages of the pad.
2 . NE (JAM)
This recyphering table, introduced on July 1st 1943, has the same appearance as 
JBC, save that the indicators are systematic, are used in alphabetical order and 
are repeated at the end of the text.
A four-figure code is used, recyphered and sent in five-letter groups using the 
same letter-figure substitution as JBC, the middle letter of each group being a 
null. The code consists of 1,620 groups and has the following restrictions (N.B. 
These apply only to our recovered code; the actual Japanese figures are not 
known): The first three figures of a code group are all even or all odd. Even 
groups have no zero in the third place and no 2 in the fourth place; groups with 
a 2 in the third place begin only with 06, 20, 44, 46, 80 and 82; no groups begin 
with 08. Odd groups have corresponding restrictions: no 3 in the last place; 
groups with 1 in the third place are restricted to six pairs of starters which are 
not completely determined, although the pairs 17, 55, 57 and 93 are confirmed; 
no groups begin with 19. The main part of the code (elementary kana, numerals, 
punctuation and common words) is confined to the even groups, the odd groups 
corresponding roughly to the tetragrams of FUJI.
Two recyphering tables were employed, one for messages from Tokyo, one for 
messages to Tokyo. There is no figure indicator, the letter indicator giving the 
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starting-point, though no relation exists between the order of the indicators and 
corresponding starting -points. Encyphering always begins at the beginning of 
a group.
In July and August 1943, NE was used extensively, particularly by Tokyo, but 
thereafter was almost entirely replaced by JBC, traffic in NE averaging only 
about one message per month. Consequently NE was left over in favour of 
the more commonly used cyphers until October 1944. When these had been 
exhausted, several pages of the NE pad together with code recoveries were soon 
forwarded to London. London in turn passed these findings to Washington only 
to learn that the Americans had already been working on NE for some months 
without informing the rest of the world. Their recoveries, when made available, 
proved to be based on a different code and were very unreliable, and therefore 
they were of little assistance to this section. London accepted our recoveries and 
basic code and resumed work on NE shortly afterwards. The combined efforts of 
London and Melbourne have only resulted in the breaking of certain sections of 
the two pads and the establishing of the commoner code-groups, as very little 
workable depth was available.
The Japanese regarded NE as their highest-grade recyphering table and, after 
the initial abuse of this confidential cypher by Tokyo, instructions were issued 
that its use was to be confined to highly secret reports.
3 . SOSOS (JBN)
This recyphering table was introduced on October 1st 1944 for use between 
Moscow, Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk and Tokyo. Very little traffic in this cypher 
was received.
In appearance it is similar to JBC and is a four-figure code recyphered and sent 
in five-letter groups, with the group SOSOS at the head of the text. There is no 
dummy indicator, but two figure indicators appear at the beginning and end of 
the cypher-text.
The second and third digits of the code-groups are of the same parity, and 
the first two digits are restricted to the ranges 4 through 9 and 0 through 5 
respectively. It is presumed that there is a one-figure restriction in the last place, 
reducing the book to the normal 1620 groups.
The pad is made up of five-figure groups and encyphering can commence 
only at the beginning of a group. No additives have been recovered owing to 
insufficient depth and work on the cypher was abandoned upon Russia's entry 
into the war against Japan.
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4 . 10101 (JBD)
This is the interdepartmental recyphering table, introduced on July 1st 1943. It 
is a four-figure code recyphered and sent in five-figure groups prefixed by the 
group 10101. The message-number and number of parts are sent in clear.
The code contains 1,620 groups with the following restrictions: the first digit is 
even, but not zero; the third digit is odd and the last figure not zero; no groups 
begin with 86, 87, 88 or 89 (N.B. This is the actual Japanese code).
The recyphering pad contains 100 pages numbered 00 through 99, each page 
containing 100 five-figure groups arranged and coordinated similarly to JBC. 
Encyphering always commences at the beginning of a five-figure group.
There are two figure indicators, one at the beginning and one at the end of 
the text, the front indicator denoting the starting point and the rear indicator 
the end-point. The control for the first indicator consists of the 4th through 
7th figures of the cypher-text, the first two giving the page in the pad and 
the last two the coordinates of a group on this page. The group thus found is 
subtracted from the front indicator to give the starting-point as page, page, 
check, row coordinate, column coordinate. The control for the rear indicator is 
the 4th through 7th figures reading from the end of the text and it is decyphered 
similarly.
The basis of the cypher was discovered by Washington's machining, and this 
section began work on JBD in April 1944; in May we recovered and telegraphed 
to London the first consecutive stretch of additives together with basic code 
groups. London immediately joined forces with us and practically the entire pad 
and code book were broken.
A second pad was brought into force on October 21st 1944, but poor local 
interception delayed the recovery of the new pad until April 1945. With 
the discontinuation of BA (which was also used to a moderate extent as an 
interdepartmental cypher), JBD traffic increased enormously after April and the 
pad was almost entirely recovered by August in cooperation with London. The 
entire traffic in this cypher was read until the cessation of hostilities.
5 . JAO
This is a recyphering table for use within the Greater East Asia Ministry, 
introduced on July 1st 1943. It has a four-figure code  book, the text being 
sent in five-figure groups with the middle figure checking the first two. The 
Chapter 3 . Japanese Diplomatic Cyphers
79
indicator, which is repeated at the beginning, is a five-figure group, the first 
two figures being the originator's number and the last three the serial number 
in this cypher.
JAO has not been broken, but the following facts have been established:
(a) Encyphering is done in sets of 58 groups, so that the 59th group has the same 
recypherer as the first, and so on.
(b) The last code group of a message must be either 6300 (tsuzuki) or 0940 
(owari). The actual number of the message is encyphered at the head of the text 
and is encoded in the following way: the number is divided into pairs from the 
beginning, each pair being made into a self-checking, four-figure group by the 
addition of its complement (e.g. 24 becomes 2486). If a single digit remains it is 
repeated to form a four-figure group (e.g. 247 becomes 2486 7777). The part of 
the message is treated in the same way.
(c) An unrecyphered message from Nanking has shown that the code is not built 
up on any apparent pattern.
London has informed us that their machining of this traffic has proved that it 
is not homogeneous. This cypher is not extensively used and the length of a 
message rarely exceeds 58 groups.
6 . 50505 (JBE)
This is apparently a recyphering table, with the text sent in five-figure groups, 
the middle figure checking the first two figures of each group. The group 50505 
stands at the head of the text, followed by two non-checking groups which are 
presumably indicators or encyphered message-numbers.
50505 has not been broken. A suggestion was made by Washington that it was 
encyphered in sets of 97 groups (this being the 'normal' length of a message) but 
no confirmation has been found. Machining by London and Washington has 
produced no results.
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Part IV: Breaking the Recyphering Tables
1. Letter-Figure Substitution
2. Placing of Messages in Depth
3. Breaking of Additives
4. Indicator Systems
1 . Letter-Figure Substitution
NE and JBC, which both used the substitution, were introduced on the same day 
and were examined in conjunction. The original machining done by London 
revealed that NE was a recyphering table, and it was observed that the letters of 
the substitution divided into two Classes, CFORY and GKLNS, such that the 1st, 
2nd and 4th columns of the five-figure group depth were each made up mainly 







Columns 1 and 2 being Class I, and Column 4 Class II. The natural division of 
numbers into two Classes being evens and odds, it was deduced that the code 
consisted of five-figure groups in which the 1st, 2nd and 4th figures were either 
all even or all odd. Very soon after the introduction of NE, Tokyo sent out a 
three-part circular which proved conclusively that the middle figure of each 
group was a null: in one part of the message S was used practically throughout 
while in another part the middle place was filled with all the letters of the 
alphabet.
The actual recovery of the letter-figure substitution proved a tedious job. 
London decided to work on NE only (in view of the initially large volume of 
traffic), and it was several weeks before the problem was solved, whereas it 
was later seen that it could have been written down by inspection of a few JBC 
columns (in view of the 9 and 0 restrictions in the second digit).
The first method adopted was that of examining the frequencies of the basic 
differences with every possible system of substitution. As the only restriction 
known was that of the even and odd sets, the possibilities apparently ran into 
millions, but careful analysis showed that the relevant permutations of each 
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set were only six in number. Assuming, for example, that CFORY represented 
02468, then any cyclic permutation of this order gives the same frequency 
distribution of basic differences; furthermore, the common difference of the 
arithmetical progression CFORY can be altered to 4, 6 or 8 without altering the 
frequencies, so that CFORY, COYFR, CRFYO and CYROF are all equivalent. Thus 
the 120 possible permutations of CFORY are divided by 5 and then by 4, to give 
only 6 basic permutations.
This method would certainly have given the order of the two sets, but the depth 
available for differencing was unfortunately not great and was further reduced, 
as only columns whose first three digits were all of the same class could be 
examined. The six frequency sets proved to be distressingly similar, and no 
conclusion could be made with any confidence.
At this stage a further restriction in the code was discovered by London, who 
noticed that one of the five figures was always missing from the third column, 
while another figure was rather rare. In this way a relation was quickly 
established between the five letters of each set, as the missing figure (zero) 
and the rare figure (2) obviously bore a constant relation to one another. The 
orders OFCRY and LSGNK were proved correct, and further examination of the 
relation between the two sets in the third column of the depth indicated the 
complete order OLFSCGRNYK (The evidence for this was rather scanty, but was 
fortunately conclusive). As any cyclic permutation of this order could be used, 
the above order giving O as zero was decided upon, and was finally proved 
correct by the JBC indicator system.
2 . Placing Of Messages In Depth
Although the general rule for setting messages in depth is to break the indicator 
system, or, if this is not possible, to run all messages through a machine, the 
structure of the various codes studied by this section made such arduous work 
unnecessary.
NE
Obviously, if a recyphering table is used to encypher groups whose first three 
figures are all of the same parity, then the 'pattern' of the even and odd figures 
of the table will be evident from an inspection of the encyphered messages (e.g. 
If a four-figure group of the table is E O E E, then any group encyphered with 
it must appear as E O E or O E O). The possible arrangements are only four in 
number, and so each group of a message was classified as 0, 1, 2, or 3 (0 when 
all three figures were of the same parity, 1 for the first two, 2 for the first and 
third, and 3 for the second and third digits). Thus a message was typified by 
a series of numbers, known as its 'pattern', or more correctly as the pattern of 
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the section of the additive book from which it was encyphered. The problem of 
tying in messages was thus reduced to that of finding repeats in their patterns, 
which was easily done by logging sheets. An example of this patterning follows:
Additives: 3891 2675 3940 8827 6394 2831
Code: 3731 3578 8849 4408 3774 1775
Cypher Text: 6522 5143 1789 2225 9068 3506
Pattern: 2 1 1 0 3 1
which is the pattern both of the cypher text and of the additives.
It was established that the NE recyphering table consisted only of four-figure 
groups, encyphering always commencing at the beginning of a group, so that 
this method was sufficient to place all messages in depth.
JBC
The JBC recyphering table consists of five- figure groups with encyphering 
beginning at any figure of the pad, so that the above patterning system was not 
completely effective as it accounted only for messages whose starting points 
were a multiple of four figures apart. For JBC, therefore, a method of 'partial 
patterning' was evolved as follows: Numbering the figures of the additive page 
000–499, a message is said to be on 'Cut' I, II, III or IV according as its starting 
point is 4m, 4m + 1, 4m + 2, or 4m + 3. Now if two messages on Cut I and Cut 
II respectively are examined, it is easily seen that the parity of the second and 
third figures of the groups of the Cut I message corresponds to that of the first 
two figures of groups of the Cut  II message.7 Accordingly, all messages were 
typified by the parity of the first two figures of the groups ('A' Pattern) and also 
by the parity of the second and third figures ('B' Pattern). The patterning was 
simply done by underlining pairs of figures which were both even or both odd 
and writing down the distances between them, e.g. 2294 8362 9004 3746 2215 
0762 3485 0926 4408 'A' Pattern for this stretch would be (.) 3.1.4. …
As Cut I was by far the most commonly used, the various Cuts of a page could 
quickly be established, and when the entire pad was known the NE patterning 
system was resumed (all four Cuts on any page having, of course, separate 
patterns).
7 Code Groups 3731 3578 8849 4408 3731 3578 8849 4408
Additives 3814 5211 6963 4084 8145 2116 9634 0846
∴ Cypher Text 6545 8789 4702 8482 1876 5684 7473 4244
OE  OE  OE  EE OE OE OE EE
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10101
The initial machining of JBD by Washington revealed that, when messages were 
placed in depth, in every second column the figures in that column were of 
uniform parity.
E.g. 29386 14077 29348 62314
48728 06953 85754 50436
This led to the assumption of a four-figure code book in which the first figures 
were of a uniform parity and the third figures were of a uniform parity. An 
elementary patterning system was devised: in alternate digits of the text the 
evens were marked and the distances between them noted down. This system 
was continued until it was discovered that the pattern of the odd digits of one 
message could be linked with that of the even digits of another thus showing 
that, of the first and third digits of a code group, one was even and one was odd 
and thus Cuts I and III and Cuts II and IV could be linked by patterns.
The obvious defect of the patterning system outlined above was that each 
message had to be patterned twice, once for its even digits and once for its odd 
digits. The following method was therefore devised: As the cypher-text was 
sent in five-figure groups, there were three relevant digits in the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 
etc text groups, and two in the 2nd, 4th, etc groups. The odd-numbered groups 
were classified as 0, 1, 2 or 3 in the same way as NE patterns. The even-numbered 
groups were classified as 4 or 5 according as the two relevant digits were of the 
same or opposite parity.
E.g. 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
20946 34857 00428 39156 35338 29044 28927 
Pattern 2 5 0 4 1 5 3 
Thus messages on the same Cut or on Cuts differing by two had identical 
patterns, the actual cut being easily determined by the starting point.
The essential difference between JBC and 10101 was that, while all Cuts of the 
former could eventually be found from patterns alone, it was impossible to link 
Cuts I and III with Cuts II and IV of 10101. This difficulty was serious in the 
early stages, but when a good knowledge of the code had been acquired, it was 
not difficult to break a few groups of additives on two Cuts alone, pattern these 
additives and thus find the other two Cuts of the page.
SOSOS
The structure of the SOSOS code book presented by far the greatest problem in 
patterning. The text was divided into four-figure groups, and each of these was 
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classified as O or E according to the parity of the second and third digits. These 
patterns were very difficult to distinguish, and of course it was impossible to 
relate any of the four Cuts. The total traffic received before the cypher was 
discontinued gave a maximum depth of only five, which was however sufficient 
to portray the restrictions on the first two figures of the code-groups.
A sample depth was:
0709 6914 9778 9278 6099
0851 4221 0512 8167 2120
2544 73l5 5680 8293 4010
2679 5110 7466 8210 3766 
4834 6916 7313 4233 1941
from which it may be seen that the first two figures of each group can always be 
limited to a 6-digit range, the actual ranges being as yet indeterminate.
The ranges were tentatively determined from an inspection of fillers (see 
Appendix B) as 4–9 for the first place and 0–5 for the second. This assumption 
was finally proved correct when London found a message on a Cut adjacent to 
that of a known depth.
The actual finding of such Cuts was an arduous process and was never completely 
developed, as the ranges were only established a week or so before Russia's 
entry into the war. The only method was that of writing down the possible 
additives for the first figure of each group of a depth and then searching among 
the remaining messages for one such that the second digit of its group could 
always be placed in the range 0–5 by at least one of these possibilities.
3 . Breaking of Additives
Apart from the usual method of differencing columns, many other devices were 
used which depended on stereotyped starts and ends, fillers, the restrictions on 
the codes, and, of course, the actual sense of the Japanese.8 There is no need to 
discuss these in great detail, as experience alone can allow one to 'spot' columns 
and 'prapse' effectively.9 The information on starts and ends may be found in 
Appendix B; it is a simple matter to exploit the restrictions of each code: e.g. a 
column in 10101 —
8 Differencing columns: Where a large depth of messages has been established, two common words, e.g. wa 
and no (whose code values in 10101 are 8559 and 8416 respectively) will often occur in the same column. Where 
recyphered with the same additives their difference (0143), of course, remains constant. The cryptographer 
has beside him his list of frequently occurring differences and, in the same columns of cypher-text, subtracts 
groups from each other in search of these.
9 To ‘prapse’ — a verb coined by Professor Trendall from the adverb ‘perhaps’.











has fairly certainly the additive 9 for the first figure, giving five 6s, three 8s 
and one 4; the additive for the second figure can only be a 3 to eliminate the 
combinations 86, 87, 88 and 89; two groups with a difference of 0001 and 
beginning with 60 are most likely to be 6096 (wo) and 6097 (stop), and a trial of 
the required additives 07 for the last two columns gives a result which is seen 
to be certainly correct: quote, wa, so, ni, dai, stop, unquote, wo, ki. The open 
and close quotes will require their complements; the stop will have a final verb 
or brackets before it, possibly a paragraph after it, and the 'so' will probably 
either be in quotes or be followed by 'ren' or 'gawa' [meaning 'Soviets'], and so 
on. In this way the whole section may be extended without great difficulty, the 
restrictions showing quickly whether one's 'prapses' are possible or not.
4 . Indicator Systems
These were not broken by this section, as the great labour involved requires 
either a machine or a very large staff.
Part V: Miscellaneous Cyphers
1. HINOKI Machine Cypher (JAA)
2. SAKURA Emergency Cypher (JBL)
3. Unidentified Cyphers
1 . HINOKI Machine Cypher (JAA)
JAA is the highest-grade of Japanese diplomatic cypher. The indicator is a five-
figure group at the head of the text and is made up of all the permutations of the 
groups 02468, 13579, 01234, 56789.
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2 . SAKURA Emergency Cypher (JBL)
This emergency cypher was introduced for use by posts which were forced to 
burn their cyphers, as the system can be easily memorised. It is a plain-language 
double-transposition without blanks, indicated by the group XXXXX at the 
head of the text, with a figure check at the end. The instructions were circulated 
in NE and JAA, both of which messages were read.
The key for the first transposition, in encyphering, is derived from the word 
umiyukaba by numbering the letters in alphabetical order from the left (Thus the 
key is 764985132).10 The key for the second form is derived in the same manner 
from the word umiyukaba followed by the originator's name (e.g. umiyukaba 
Harada produces the key 13 11 9 15 14 10 1 6 2 8 3 12 4 7 5).
3. Unidentified Cyphers
Following is a list of unidentified Japanese diplomatic cyphers. With each the 
small amount of traffic intercepted did not justify any serious work being done 
on them.
Hanoi-Vichy Figure Traffic
This was sent in five-figure groups and was used only in the circuit Hanoi–
Vichy–GEAM. Only five messages of this type were received.
9009
This cypher was mainly used between Canton and other China posts. It was 
indicated by the group 9009 at the beginning of the text and was sent in four-
figure groups. 
10   Umiyukaba is the first word of a passage from a famous patriotic poem of the Late Nara period (8th 
Century AD):
We are the sons of the fathers who sang
‘At sea be my corpse water-soaked
On land let it be with grass o’ergrown,
Let me die by the side of my Sovereign!
Never will I look back’.
When this was set to music by Nobutoki Kiyoshi in 1937, at a time of national fervour following the outbreak 
of war with China, it achieved wide popularity. The Japan Broadcasting Corporation used it as the background 
music for the declaration of war against the United States and, later, for bulletins announcing naval or military 
reverses. 
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5005
This cypher was current in the GEAM area and was sent in four-figure groups. 
The indicator 5005 led to the suggestion that it might be a form of 50505 (JBE) 
in which the middle figure check was omitted.
Petropavlovsk Code
This was a simple code, which came into use simultaneously with SOSOS (JBN) 
and was used by the same posts. Only ten messages of this type were received.
Part VI: General Remarks
1. Code-Building
2. Cypher Systems
3. Errors in Encyphering
4. Distribution of Cyphers
5. Cooperation with Linguists
1 . Code-Building
A great deal of evidence has been found that the Japanese regarded their 
cypher systems as completely unbreakable. However, it is not advisable when 
constructing codes to have patterns or restrictions; and alternatives for common 
groups are most necessary. Yet no alternative groups were ever found in the 
figure codes, while the letter codes had only two equivalents for a few common 
groups: the alternatives in FUJI were wo, ni, no, and ga; in BA wa, wo, ni, no, 
ga, and mo.
As the standard Japanese diplomatic vocabulary is 1,620 groups, their figure 
codes had to be tetragrams restricted in some manner. The obvious method is to 
choose 1,620 groups at random, but a patterned code not only reduces chances 
of corruption but also saves a great deal of time by allowing the decode to be set 
up on charts and facilitating memorisation of the code groups. A study of Part 
IV: Breaking the Recyphering Tables will show what invaluable assistance the 
patterned codes were to us.
2 . Cypher Systems
The recyphering tables introduced in July 1943 were the first the Japanese had 
ever used for diplomatic communications. Hitherto transposition systems had 
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been solely used, but curiously enough the Japanese regarded their recyphering 
tables as of such high grade that they were chary of using even the second 
system of BA for important messages, although this latter system proved to 
be the most difficult for us to read. Perhaps the swing from transposition to 
recyphering tables was most fortunate from our point of view, as it is impossible 
to say how complicated the transposition systems might have become.
3 . Errors in Encyphering
[1 paragraph (approx. 7 lines) expunged]11
(a) Both BA and GEAM were introduced in a reasonably simplified form, the 
complexity being afterwards increased by a series of changes in the cypher 
system while keeping the code consistent. [Concluding portion of the paragraph 
(approx 7 lines) expunged]. 
(b) [1 paragraph (approx 9 lines) expunged]
(c) [1 paragraph (approx 22 lines) expunged]
4 . Distribution of Cyphers
A state of war invariably produces great difficulties in distribution, the usual 
result being that cyphers must be kept in force much longer than is safe. The 
Japanese, faced with this position, attempted to compromise by introducing 
changes in the existing cyphers (e.g. in FUJI — see Part II above). But however 
ingenious a new system may be, a knowledge of the previous system and code 
is usually sufficient to break it. 
Another result of the war was that when the European countries were being 
overrun, the problem of cypher security became acute and the Japanese posts 
were forced to burn their cyphers and use emergency systems which could be 
memorized. The instructions for these systems had, of course, to be circulated 
in existing cyphers; they might have proved difficult to break, but it was 
fortunately not necessary to attack them directly.
5 . Cooperation with Linguists
Although military and naval recyphering tables, with their great bulk of 
traffic, can be broken by purely cryptographical methods [1 paragraph (length 
unknown) expunged].
11 The expungements in this part were made by the NAA on 17 February 1998, pursuant to Australian 
Archives Act §33(1)(a) and (c) — ‘information of a class concerning operational methods/techniques that 
remain current’.
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PART VII: PERSONNEL 1942-45
Technical
Professor A. D. Trendall (University of Sydney) (January 1942 – June 1944)
NX139540 Lieutenant R. S. Bond (February 1942 – )
Dr Elizabeth Sheppard (September 1942 – March 1943)
N450470 Lieutenant E. S. Barnes (January 1943 – )
NX139427 Sergeant K. L. McKay (July 1944 – )
NX82807 Sergeant A. C. Eastway (February 1944 – )
VX94295 Corporal I. H. Smith (May 1944 – )
V143841 Sergeant P. Grange (Clerical Duties) (October 1943 – ).
The following personnel were lent to Special Intelligence through the kind 
offices of Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Sandford, Commanding Officer, Central 
Bureau, during heavy periods: 
Sergeant A. W. F. Rogers, Sergeant H. W. MacKenzie (January 1945 – ), Warrant 
Officer II P. Pledger (October 1944), Sergeant J. C. Davies (June 1942 – February 
1943), Private K. McLeod (February – May 1944).
Language and Translation
Mr C. H. Archer (British Consular Service) (January 1942 – December 1944)
Mr H. A. Graves (British Consular Service) (February 1942 – September 1943)
Mr A. R. V. Cooper (British Government Codes & Cyphers School) (March – 
December 1942)
Mr J. O. Lloyd (British Consular Service) (December 1942 – March 1943)
Mr D. MacDermot (British Consular Service) (December 1942 – March 1943)
Mr H. R. Sawbridge (July 1943 – February 1944)
Mr R. L. Cowley (British Consular Service) (December 1944 – )
Mr E. T. Biggs (British Consular Service) (July 1944 – )
Miss Mavis Tilley (November 1942 – )
Mr L. R. Oates (February – November 1943)
Lieutenant C. A. James (British Army) (May 1944 – )
Lent by Central Bureau for short periods of heavy pressure — Warrant Officer 
II B. Pitman (British Army) (June 1945 – ), VX128886 Private D. C. S. Sissons 
(April 1945 – ).
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Clerical and Typing
A staff of typists and women clerks was headed by Miss Reba Shearer (January 
1942 – ).
Clerical
Miss Mary MacRae Stewart (November 1942 – September 1943)
Mrs Marjorie Hattam (1943 – )
Mrs Catherine Gahan (September 1943 – ) 
Typing
Miss Pauline Dennis (1943 – June 1945)
Corporal Vailima Parbery (AWAS) (May 1944 – )
Corporal Thora Martin (AWA) (June1945 – )
[Report of Special Intelligence Section ends.]
Sources
It was, I think, in 1978, that my colleagues at the Australian National University, 
Desmond Ball and David Horner, came upon evidence in recently declassified 
files that a diplomatic Special Intelligence Section headed by Professor A. D. 
Trendall had operated in Melbourne from about January 1942 until the war’s 
end, its function being to intercept the encyphered signals traffic between the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassies and consulates overseas 
and to decrypt so much as was possible. They suggested that I make an attempt 
to put together a history of that Special Intelligence Section.
At the time it proved impracticable. Persistent enquiries at the NAA elicited 
the suggestion that the records of the Section had either been destroyed in toto 
in the 1950s or were held by the Department of Defence which was unlikely to 
declassify them in the foreseeable future. 
I attempted to prepare the ground by writing to former members of the Section 
for their recollections: Eric Barnes, Ronald Bond, Kenneth McKay and Ian Smith 
among the cryptanalysts, and Mary Stewart from the office staff. They were 
patient and indulgent and provided a treasure trove of background information. 
Ronald Bond and Ian Smith remembered that before the Section was disbanded 
they spent much time compiling a detailed and comprehensive report on the 
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Section’s activities. This prompted me in about 1986 to apply to the NAA for 
access to that document. This elicited a reply from the Defence Signals Directorate 
(DSD) that the Report had survived as had an Army Central Registry file, 
‘37/401/425: Special Intelligence Section’ (NAA Series A6923, Item 37/401/425) 
that, when declassified, might be of considerable help to the historian. These 
documents were eventually declassified in about 1997. At the same time, in 1986, 
DSD presented me with a Xerox copy of a file held by the US National Archives 
& Records Service containing translations of diplomatic intercepts cabled by 
Trendall’s Melbourne Section to the US Navy’s cryptographic department in 
Washington throughout 1942. 
At the time of the 1997 declassifications, DSD also declassified what appeared 
to be two wartime office files of the Major I(x) in the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence who administered the Section (NAA Series A6923, Items: ‘Diplomatic 
Message Traffic’ and ‘SI/2 Attachment’) which cast some light on the Section’s 
daily activities over certain periods.
It would appear, therefore, that the office records of the Section, which were 
complete and in good order at the time the Section was disbanded, have been 
destroyed in toto — including the leather-bound register, referred to by the 
office staff as The Koran, in which the particulars of every intercepted message 
was recorded!
Surely the time has come for Defence to declassify their files on the ‘TRENCODE‘, 
used by Allied operatives working behind enemy lines, and its development. 
(Incidentally I remember that it was still in use in the British Commonwealth 
Occupation Force in 1947) There can no longer be ‘security’ objections. After 
all, it was never considered to be unbreakable — merely that it could resist 
decryption for a period of two or three days. 
My impression is that the Section was essentially one of the overseas out-
stations of the United Kingdom’s cryptographic organisation, the Government 
Code and Cypher School (GC&CS). Following the recent declassification of 
GC&CS wartime files, their detailed listing by the Public Record Office indicates 
that GC&CS had a much less cavalier attitude to their records than our Defence 
Signals Directorate has demonstrated to its own. There should be a good deal 
of information about the operations of Trendall’s Section in the GC&CS files 
available at the Public Record Office at Kew.
My editing of the Report is confined to: 
(i) Re-arranging the sequence of some of the chapters; 
(ii) The insertion of section headings; 
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(iii) In the interests of clarity identifying each of the codes by the title used by 
the Section at the time, e.g. GEAM, 10101, BA, JBC, Umiyukaba; 
(iv) The addition to the list, Personnel 1942–1945, of a few names that the 
authors had apparently forgotten; 
(v) The rewriting and expansion of a few sentences where Ian Smith agreed that, 
as written, the meaning was not sufficiently clear; and 
(vi) My attempt to reconstruct, using American sources, Appendix L (which is 
one of the several Appendices missing in the file). 
Appendix A: Best Groups
Following is a classification of the best groups in the Japanese diplomatic 
vocabulary (This list must be used with discretion, as certain 'position' groups 
such as gokuhi, jōhō etc which are often very good at the beginning of a message 
are on the other hand very rare in the body of a message).
Class I: no, ni, wa, wo, shi, mo, to.
Class II: chi, dai, ga, i, ji, ka, kai, kan, ki, kō, ku, ri, sen, su, tai, tō, tsu.
Class III: bei, bu, bun, chō, chū, dō, doku, e, fu, gawa, gō, gun, hi, jō, ken, koku, 
kyō, mono, nari, naru, ru, ryō, sei, shin, shō, so, sō, suru, ta, taru, teki, tokoro, yō.
Class IV: ari, arita(shi), aru, bō, gen, go, jin, kaku, kin, koto, mi, migi, mu, ni oite, 
re, sho, shū, te, yori.
To this must be added punctuation and low numerals, which are usually 
'position' groups.
Appendix B: Starts and Ends
Starts 
Following are the most common starts of Japanese diplomatic messages:
Ōden or Kiden [numerals] ni kanshi. 1,
Gokuhi or (gai) kimitsu.
Kanchōfugō.
For multi-part messages — [Numeral no numeral] or [numeral].
[Place) hatsu [place] ate dempō dai [numerals] gō (ni kanshi).




Other traditional starts were sometimes used by certain posts. e.g. Stockholm 
sent many spy reports which almost invariably began with some variation of 
'chōhōsha hōkoku [date] sa no tōri'.
Tokyo circulars very often began with 'kokusai jōhō'.
Ends
Apart from final verbs (of which 'nari' was by far the most common), circulars 
could usually be relied upon to finish with a formula listing addresses, like one 
of the following: 
[Place, place, etc] ni tenden seri.
[Place] yori [places] ni tenden aritashi/o kō.
Honden atesaki [places] ni tenden seri.
Honden zaiō kaku taishikan (so wo nozoku) ni tenden seri. 
The number of parts of a multi-part message was also found at the end 
occasionally, also 'tsuzuki'.
Fillers, if a whole four-figure group, were often stop, comma, or close brackets. 
The usual fillers, however, were of the type 0000, 0123, 1234, etc, (the sequence 
often carrying on from the last figure of the final code-group).
Very short messages were often requests for repetitions and, if so, could usually 
be written straight in on the following formula: Kiden [numerals] kaiyaku funō 
ni tsuki chōsa no ue saiden aritashi/o kō.
Appendix C: R7F Lower Power Far Eastern Diplomatic 
Network
Traffic on this low-power Far Eastern diplomatic network was first intercepted 
in Melbourne towards the end of August 1944. By far the greater part of GEAM 
and interdepartmental messages were sent through this channel and in the year 
preceding the cessation of hostilities only a very small portion of the total Far 
Eastern traffic passed over commercial links.
The transmission procedure was somewhat different from that used by 
commercial stations.
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(1) Addresses were in code instead of in clear (v. Appendix E [Missing]).
(2) Signatures of originators were not sent.
(3) The text was not sent in normal fashion from left to right. Each page of 
the transmission form contained 50 groups in five columns, and the text was 
transmitted by reading down the columns, the end of each column being 
denoted by the kana break AL.
(4) In figure messages the following short figure substitution was used:
T A U V 4 5 6 B D N
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Appendix L: Code and Keys for GEAM (JBB)
[Ed. The original Appendix is missing in the xerox copy of the Report held by 
the National Archives of Australia (NAA). What follows I have reconstructed 
from information derived from the US Army Signal Security Agency's file, 
'US/UK Technical Exchanges and Information on Solution of JBB' (US National 
Archives, Record Group 457, Box 1328, File 190/37/34/3 (19 pages).] 
The following description is of GEAM in its final form, in use from October 1st 
1944.
The Indicator and Keys
The indicator is the group of alternating letters (e.g. BKBKB) following the 
date and number group. These letters (A through N excluding M) indicate the 
horizontal row order and vertical column order respectively in the 13 x 13 
transposition block, namely:
A 5 2 11 9 3 13 8 1 10 6 4 7 12
B 2 7 11 1 6 13 9 3 12 8 4 5 10
C 11 6 4 3 2 13 1 9 7 8 12 5 10
D 10 9 5 11 7 3 6 13 4 1 8 2 12
E 1 13 3 6 11 7 10 4 12 5 2 8 9
F 11 2 6 4 5 10 12 3 7 1 8 13 9
G 13 4 10 5 3 11 7 1 2 9 6 12 8
H 11 10 5 3 4 9 7 1 13 8 2 6 12
I 9 7 2 8 12 6 13 5 3 11 10 1 4
J 4 9 13 1 8 5 2 6 12 3 10 7 11
K 13 10 2 9 6 4 11 8 1 3 12 7 5
L 11 6 8 3 7 5 12 10 2 9 4 1 13
N 5 10 13 7 2 11 8 1 3 12 4 6 9
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These keys also determine the positions of the nine blanks, which are inserted 
in the cells with the coordinates (1,1) through (9,9). Thus, for example, the 
transposition block indicated by the indicator group ABABA would be as 
follows: 














Encoding and Transposition by the Sender
In this example the originator sends the following message in GEAM using the 
indicator ABABA.
Janku yusō ni kanshi
Dai 20 ji
Kinmangen (kane. yorozu. minamoto) 78 ton
Fujōhatsu (futsū no fu. senshū no shū. hatsushin no hatsu) 33 ton
Dai 21 ji
Chinryūjun (chinkōin no chin. ryūtai no tai. suna …







MIUFIFYLTOERNIIFCYIB GOIFUKYLWYGOWYUKDUGA  .  .  . 
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He divides this from the left into packets of 160 characters (i.e. 13 x 13 – 9) each 
of which he successively enters into the transposition block, row by row, from 
the left, in the numerical sequence indicated by the row key, as follows:
2 7 11 1 6 13 9 3 12 8 4 5 10
5 U K J I G A J O F O N U
2 V V D Y U F A S V U S A
11 I U F I F Y L T O E R N I
9 I Y I D G O I Y N U W E
3 M I U F I C A J E L N I
13 L W Y G O W Y U K D U G A
8 U K E D Y F G O Y F U K
1 J J X Y E R C U R U D Y
10 W E O F U F A S V V T I M
6 U T E V O F U F H U Y H
4 C A G E U K R O K O M U
7 I Y N I H U I R G O H U
12 I F C Y I B G O I F U K Y
Usually the final block of the message will contain less than the full 160 
characters. In such cases he will reduce the number of rows accordingly, from 
the bottom. If the bottom remaining row is not full he will insert from the left 
edge the necessary number of blanks to fill it.
On completing the transposition he writes out for transmission the cypher 
text by reading off each block, column by column, from top to bottom, in the 
numerical sequence indicated by the column key. In the present example this 
would be:
IDIDF  GDFVE  NYUII  MLUJW  UCIIO  ATIUO  CSUOI  ONURU etc.
Decryption
The recipient goes through the same procedures in reverse — he makes out the 
same transposition block as indicated by the indicator group, enters the cypher 
text column by column, reads off the encoded message row by row, and decodes 
it by reference to the GEAM decoding charts, which are here reproduced. 
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Appendix Q: Unused Emergency Cyphers
Super – LA
Instructions for use of this refinement of JAH (LA code) were sent out in JAA in 
June 1942, but no traffic of this type was ever intercepted.
Method of encyphering 
The message is first encoded in JAH. A figure bigram is substituted for each 
letter of the coded text according to a substitution table formed in the following 
manner: All the letters of the alphabet excluding Q are written in order into a 
square 5 by 5 beginning at the top left-hand corner. The columns are numbered 
from 0 to 4 beginning at the left and the rows from 0 to 4 downwards. The figure 
bigram to be substituted for a given letter is formed by combining the row co-
ordinate with the column co-ordinate of the letter. Thus, if A is in the top left-
hand corner of the square A = 00, and X = 42.
The figure text is then written out in blocks of 40 figures consisting of two rows 
of twenty. A block of less than forty figures is likewise divided into two. 
Starting from the left of the block each upper figure is combined with the figure 
beneath to form a figure bigram which is converted to a letter according to the 
substitution table. This is the final cypher text. 
The substitution square is altered for each message and is indicated as follows. 
The co-ordinates of A are encyphered according to the number code appendix 
to JAH (v. Appendix F). The resulting bigram is written before and after the 
letter Q. Thus if A = 00, then the substitution square indicator is BAQBA.
A five-figure group giving the data and serial number of the message is placed at 
the head of the text. 01001 would signify message No. 1 on the 1st of the month. 
In March and April, 1944, when Rumania and Bulgaria were threatened by 
the Russian advance and the legations in these countries were forced with the 
necessity of burning their cyphers, each minister formulated an extremely 
primitive and cumbrous emergency cypher. Neither cypher was ever employed 
and in May 1944 instructions for the use of SAKURA (JBL), a much simpler and 
securer emergency system, were circulated from Tokyo. 
Bucharest ‘Consonant-Vowel’ Substitution
Details of this system were sent to Tokyo in March 1944. It is based on the kana 
syllabary, the redundant ‘wi’ and ‘ye’ being omitted. Each syllable is written 
in reverse order against the remaining 45 syllables to form a substitution table. 
Thus ‘–N’ is substituted for ‘I’ and ‘SU’ for ‘RO’.
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Each syllable, however, is always to be represented by a bigram of the form 
‘consonant-vowel’. If single vowels have to be substituted, they are preceded 
by one of the fillers V, X, or Z. Instead of ‘–N’ ‘Q: plus any vowel’ is employed. 
The consonants B, C, D, F, G, J, L, P, are used with any vowel to indicate the 
following:
B = preceding syllable is nigoried.
C = preceding syllable is half-nigoried.
D = long vowel
F = several syllables follow in quotes
G = stop
L = comma
P = close brackets
The text was to be sent in five-figure groups. The specimen text sent by the 
minister at Bucharest himself best illustrates the weaknesses of the system. 
‘DAI NIPPON BANZAI’ was encyphered as follows:
Cypher 
text: HU BE QU MO YA HI CE XI SE BO ZI RU BA QE
Clear: TA nig I NI TU HO semi-nig N HA nig N SA nig I
In April 1944 Tokyo replied, adding a further process to the original system. 
The bigrams obtained by the first substitution are further substituted according 
to the following substitution table. 
The letters from A to M are written above the letters from N to Z so that A is 
above N and M above Z. Substitution is effected in the following manner:
(a) Where both letters of the bigram are in the same row, the corresponding 
letters of the other row are substituted. Thus AB becomes NO; UV 
becomes HI.
(b) When the letters of the bigram come one in each row, the 
corresponding letter of the opposite row are taken in each case, but the 
order is reversed. 
(c) Where the letters of the bigram are in the same vertical line, the letters 
immediately to the right of each are substituted. Thus AN becomes BO; 
MZ becomes NA. 
(d) Double letters are treated as in (a) above. Thus LL becomes YY; XX 
becomes KK. 
All tetegrams used in this method were to bear the prefix “BASBA”.
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Sofia Emergency System
Details of this emergency cypher were intercepted in a message from Sofia to 
Tokyo in April 1944, but were somewhat obscure due to the actual phrasing of 
the message and signal corruption. 
The basis of the system is as follows: The message is first encoded in JAH and 
the coded text is written out in two rows. The first group of the first half of the 
final cypher text is formed by taking the first letter of the upper row, the first 
of the lower row, the second of the upper row, the second of the lower row, and 
the third of the upper row. The first group of the second half of the final cypher 
text consists of the third letter of the lower row, and the fourth and fifth letters 
of the upper and lower rows taken in order. Succeeding groups are taken off on 
the some alternating principle. 
In the case of fillers the method employed is unknown and the specimen text 
given at the end of the instructions was so corrupt that no inferences could be 
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Annex 2. Notes from an Interview with 
with Professor Arthur Dale Trendall by 
Desmond Ball on 10 May 1990
Interview with Professor Arthur Dale Trendall, in his suite at La Trobe 
University, Melbourne, on 10 May 1990. (Introductions made by Professor J. D. B. 
Miller and D. C. S. Sissons).
Trendall moved to Melbourne soon after Japan’s entry into the war. He returned 
to Sydney University in the latter half of 1944.
In 1940–41, when he was Professor of Greek at Sydney University, he used to 
get together from time to time, mostly at weekends, with three other colleagues 
to test their teeth on various coding systems. They were mainly Japanese 
transposition and substitution codes. The other members of the group were 
Professor T. G. Room and Mr R. J. Lyons, mathematicians, and fellow classicist 
Dr A. P. Treweek. On one occasion, probably in January 1940, they worked out 
a simple Japanese code from scratch, even without knowing the language. 
Trendall was introduced to the group by Professor Room. ‘I was approached 
by Room’. Treweek was a Lecturer in Trendall’s Department, and a Major in 
Sydney University Regiment.
Room, Lyons and Treweek had done some ‘practice’ on Japanese codes before 
Trendall joined them, ‘but I was with them for about two years before Japan 
entered the war’. Trendall had only moved to Australia in August 1939.
The ‘practice’ consisted mainly of becoming acquainted with cryptographic 
theory and techniques, rather than working on actual Japanese traffic. In 1941, 
they were given some messages encoded with the LA system. They found these 
‘relatively easy to decrypt’. They realised the code involved repetitive patterns; 
the clue was the repetition at the end of each sentence. It used two-letter 
combinations (one vowel and one consonant). LA was a very simple, straight-
forward code. 
Nobody was doing any translation at this stage. The messages were not current. 
They were being used by the Sydney University group only for experimentation. 
Translation was not necessary as the content was not important.
Trendall was asked to join the Army in late 1941, but he preferred to remain 
a civilian and to take secondment from Sydney University. The Army reached 
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an agreement with the University that he would be paid the equivalent of his 
Professorial salary; he was nominally given Lieutenant Colonel rank. The Vice-
Chancellor was told that he was to work ‘in intelligence’.
Treweek was in the Army Reserve already, but Trendall, Room and Lyons all 
remained civilians throughout the war.
Trendall stayed as a civilian mainly to preserve the option of returning to Sydney 
University at a time of his choosing. However, it had the incidental benefit that 
as a Professor he had more access to senior Army authorities than he would have 
had as a Lieutenant Colonel.
Trendall moved to Melbourne at the very beginning of 1942. He worked 
initially with the Royal Australian Navy’s cryptanalytical group under Eric 
Nave. They worked in what is now a block of flats near Albert Park in St Kilda. 
He worked there for several months. His commanding officer was Commander 
Long, the Director of Naval Intelligence. Trendall headed the group at Monterey 
which worked mainly on Japanese diplomatic traffic, while Nave was mainly 
responsible for Japanese Naval traffic.
In fact, Trendall worked on both Japanese diplomatic and Service traffic. It was 
‘mainly diplomatic’, but all personnel worked on ‘whatever came in’.
Trendall never dealt with Japanese machine cyphers at any time during the war. 
He had ‘no contact with them whatsoever’.
Trendall moved to the Army, and to Victoria Barracks, in November 1942. His 
commanding officer was now Lieutenant Colonel A. W. Sandford, the CO of 
Central Bureau. He has ‘no idea’ why the diplomatic activity was transferred 
from the RAN to the Army.
Trendall had no knowledge of the interception stations. An Army Sergeant 
simply brought the messages in on signal pads. He had no recollection of the 
station at Park Orchards. He remembered Ferny Creek, ‘but only that a station 
was there’. He also remembered Mornington, ‘but the stations were of no 
significance to us’.
When Trendall was with the Navy group, the cooperation was just with Britain, 
not the United States. The exchanges principally involved ‘current keys’. After 
the diplomatic section was hived off to the Army, it worked almost entirely with 
the British. Trendall had ‘no knowledge of contacts with Washington’.
The numerical code 10101 was introduced in 1943. Messages encoded with this 
system began with ‘10101’. It involved a ‘block’ from which some squares had 
been blacked out. It usually involved two-letter groups, but sometimes three-
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letter and sometimes four-letter groups. Trendall ‘worked it out from the key’. 
‘We could be lucky and break one in no time at all — a matter of half an hour’. 
‘Sometimes we got a beautiful fit. Otherwise, we had to slog it out’. 
10101 traffic came in the greatest quantities. It provided enormous amounts of 
material for ‘depth’. It involved ‘prepared groups of 5 random numerals’, which 
were added without carrying. Patterns would emerge with sufficient ‘depth’ of 
messages. A ‘considerable bulk of messages’ was required. It was introduced in 
mid-1943, and ‘it took considerable time before sufficient material built up’. We 
‘prayed for check and repeat’ messages.
On Arthur Cooper: ‘There was a somebody’. He was a really good linguist 
(Chinese). When he first appeared in Melbourne—having come by submarine 
from the Philippines—he had a gibbon called Tertius with him. (He gave Trendall 
a book, with an inscription dated 15 July 1942). His ‘special knowledge’ was 
Icelandic, but he was also especially good at classical Chinese. Tertius was later 
presented to the Melbourne Zoo. Cooper worked at Victoria Barracks for as 
long as Trendall was there; he was still there after Trendall returned to Sydney. 
Trendall tried to persuade him to take up a Chair at Sydney University. (In 1973, 
Penguin Books published Cooper’s annotated and translated collection of poems 
by Li Po and Tu Fu). Cooper had ‘a very fine brain’. ‘For intelligence purposes, 
Arthur Cooper was very much at the top of the tree’.
On decryption: The patterns kept repeating, given the relatively small code 
books used. Cooper prepared a chart of the Japanese words likely to be 
commonly used. Often, the senders had to spell out a word, and that was very 
helpful. This was particularly the case with place names. ‘Really, when you get 
into the hang of it, with practice, it becomes fairly easy. It was not as difficult as 
it appears to be’. ‘So often it was a matter of luck’. 
Trendall had an inexplicable ability to see the patterns in the encoded text 
underneath the jumbled bigrams and random additives. ‘You get a feeling for it. 
Your eye lights up on something, and … bang’.
Trendall only ever worked on Japanese codes. He has ‘no knowledge of any 
others, including Russian’ codes.
He recalled that Miss Shearer and Miss Robertson ‘worked with us at Vic 
Barracks’. He also recalled that Tony Eastway and Alan Rogers had joined 
Australia’s post-War cryptographic organisation.
The TRENCODE: It was designed to fulfil the need for a safe means of 
communication that would be unlikely to be broken for at least some hours or 
even days. It was sufficiently simple to use in the field but difficult to break 
quickly. He developed it in Melbourne in 1943 (?). It is ‘correct that Treweek got 
it out’. However, he ‘cheated a bit’, and it took him a long time.
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Annex 6. Ronald Bond, Notes on 
Sissons (3 August 1990), Smith (8 
August 1990) and Treweek  
(11 October 1990), undated but 
probably late 1990
(i) Notes on [letter from] Sissons to Smith on  
3 August 1990
Page 2: When Trendall and I left the Navy block at Vic Barracks early in March 
1942 to go to Monterey, Graves and Archer were in the next room to us at 
Monterey, together with a few female clerical staff. So it is not correct to say that 
Archer joined Graves at the end of 1942. (Archer incidentally was much more 
senior than Graves in rank and influence). When Trendall and I moved to ‘A’ 
block in Vic Barracks in early 1943, Archer, Graves and their staff came with us 
and worked in the adjoining room. They stayed there 1943, 1944 and, I think, 
were still there when I started to break loose about September 1945, though 
Graves might have disappeared just before then. (I cannot be sure about Graves, 
as I was by then tired, bored, and exploring possibilities for early discharge).
Trendall must have come to Melbourne in January 1942. He was certainly here 
in February 1942, because he met me at Spencer Street and took me to Nave’s 
office at Vic Barracks. I wrote several times to Trendall from Georges’ Heights, 
(NSW) begging him to extricate me from my pit of misery, and I am 90% certain 
that I wrote to him in Melbourne.
I think it was 28th February 1942 that I arrived on ‘The Spirit’ — much to 
everyone’s surprise! — and Trendall took me firstly to Nave, then arranged for 
me to be a Corporal, so that I could afford to live with him in a boarding house in 
St. Kilda Rd, so that we could work for 30 hours each day! Working conditions in 
the Navy block were overcrowded. I think we were there for about a fortnight, if 
that, before moving to Monterey. I have sketched for David Jenkins our location 
in Monterey (which I believe is about to be demolished for a huge block); RAN 
people moved in simultaneously, and so did the United States Navy (USN). USN 
provided armed guards at all (or most) entrances. Commander Newman was the 
RAN chief. An American cypher section (machine sent messages) was on the 
second floor. This I know, for sure, having taken information to it.
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We moved to ‘A’ Block at the beginning of 1943 and came under the aegis of 
Lt. Col. R.A. Little D.S.O. Mr. A.R.V. Cooper worked with us at Monterey. He 
arrived from Singapore (with two very beautiful young ladies!!) where he had 
been working. I vaguely recall that previously to that he had worked in Hong 
Kong. We had already moved to Monterey before Cooper arrived. [The fall 
of Singapore fits that time table.] Cooper was still at Monterey in December 
1942 when I got a few days leave to go to Sydney for Christmas. Cooper was 
summoned to the UK (A.D.T. [Arthur Dale Trendall] jokingly says by his mother 
— ‘Arthur, come home to be married!’), and did not come with Trendall to ‘A’ 
Block at the start of 1943. (He did return to Australia 1949 (?) and worked with 
J.I.B. [Joint Intelligence Bureau] at Albert Park)
Trendall went back to Sydney University on 13th March 1943 (the day my 
commission came through). He returned in July/August (?) 1943, when the great 
change arrived and we had come to a grinding halt. Trendall sent me home to 
Sydney for a short break. I was more than a little tired, as Eric Barnes (who 
had arrived in late February (?), early March) and I were the only people in the 
diplomatic cryto section during the period March/July ’43.
Page 3: ‘TRENCODE’ was born at Monterey in 1942. It had been ascertained 
that the Japanese were reading the traffic sent by our troops on Timor, and this 
wasn’t very surprising considering the quality of our cyphers. Trendall, with a 
little help from Cooper, devised this simple cypher which, if not unbreakable, 
would have, even with heavy traffic, taken a long time to unravel. Treweek, who 
had alarmed Aust. Cypher Production, by breaking the codes/cyphers in use on 
Timor very quickly, claimed to have broken into TRENCODE. Whether he did 
or not, I don’t know. Perhaps Sissons’ observation is pertinent. Whether our 
(Aust.) cypher section put TRENCODE into operation, I know not. At the time I 
suspected some rivalry between Ath [Athanasius P. Treweek] and Dale: perhaps 
Ath was a trifle piqued that A.D.T., a civilian, and not he, had been asked to 
produce a product??
By the time D. C. S Sissons arrived in April 1945, we were all very tired, a trifle 
bored, and, as Sissons considered, quite ga. ga. — which we probably were! I 
sensed that we were not militarily-minded enough — we ignored rank, did not 
stand on ceremony and engaged in friendly abuse of one another’s incompetence.
Who is this ‘Cowley’? As the years went by (There was never in my time any 
question about who was the Army senior in our section) our section had imposed 
upon it ‘odd-bods’. The Central Bureau occasionally used us as a holding station 
for people in trouble e.g. Sgt Hickling — he had wife problems — a big, strong, 
fellow of some charm. As an inexperienced youth of 21 it distressed me to see 
such a fine man in tears. I can remember he disappeared for weeks: I finally 
found him to tell him to come back (to keep my attendances correct!!)
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When Trendall was present, he dealt with Archer and Little. When Trendall 
was not there, I regarded Lt. Col. Little as my chief (while according to Archer 
due deference), though I had little personal contact with R.A.L. [Robert Arthur 
Little] and generally dealt with his Adjutants(?), initially Capt. Scholes, then 
Major George Mullenger (now deceased — but who returned to Scotch to teach 
junior classes after the war) and Capt. Stuart (Stewart?)
It was Archer who wrote the [weekly] Précis [of the Section’s decrypts].
D.C.S.S. [Sissons] is not correct in assuming that Treweek recruited Barnes. It 
was I who mentioned Barnes to Trendall: When I was on leave at Xmas in 1942, I 
approached Eric in a roundabout way. It is more than likely that Professor Room 
had mentioned Barnes to Trendall. Eric had been dux of Canterbury Boys’ High 
in 1939 and had graduated in Dec. 1942 with firsts in French and Maths. In 
1942 Ron Downer had been recruited by Treweek: Downer had a first in history 
(1941) but apparently Stephen Roberts did not know him!! (‘Modern Times’?). 
Alas, Downer is out at Springvale, having died of meningitis in 1943 — my first 
military funeral!
Ken McKay was not unknown to Trendall. He was in his second year Arts in 
1941. He came to us late — 1944, perhaps 1945 — he was a Sgt. in artillery — I 
think his father had died.
A. C. Eastway (Tony) was a contemporary of Ian Smith’s at North Sydney Boys’ 
High (both were fans of their Classics Master Mr Gibbs — whom I met in 1944, 
after he had been transferred to Canterbury Boys’ High). How he came to us, 
or was acquired by Trendall, I know not. He had been with 2nd/3rd Machine 
Gun Bn at Merauke (Dutch New Guinea), arriving at the end of 1943, or early 
1944, and left early in 1945 (?) for Central Bureau. After the war he rejoined 
J.I.B. and in 1947/8? — could have been 49/50/51 — went to Cheltenham UK, 
returning to reside temporarily with A. R. V. Cooper in a remote (then) house 
on Oakleigh/Ferntree Gully Road. Later he rejoined CSR, and Ian Smith told me 
in 1990 he had departed, as a result of a heart attack while surfing/yachting. A 
competent athlete, Tony was not of the same intellectual capacity as Ian Smith 
or Ken McKay. His duties with us were ‘general purpose’: he lodged with Jackie 
(Cyril James) in Tivoli Rd South Yarra.
Ian Smith. I do not know if Gibbs had mentioned him to Trendall, but Ian was 
Prof. Chisholm’s (Melbourne) bright boy and doubtless mention had been made.
While we were at Monterey, there was contact with the Americans, who resided 
a floor below. On several occasions we gave them info about ships leaving 
Saigon, Hanoi, info which the USN subs used to telling effect (I can verbally 
supply instances): and we gave them info about agents in Peru and Chile. 
Japanese ‘machine encyphered’ intercepts we could not handle and at Monterey 
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we passed them on downstairs to the USN and to London: what happened to 
these when we moved to ‘A’ block in 1943 I’m not sure: I think Col. Little was 
given them. While we were in Monterey we received some (not much) help from 
Washington, but more from London and vice-versa. After January 1943, I think 
D.C.S.S. [Sissons] could be closer to the truth.
Page 4: When I arrived ‘in medias res’ LA was well known and generally 
disregarded, because being a straight code it had little matter of importance. 
‘FUJI’ was the encyphered code to which I was introduced. Who had broken 
the encyphering system and the code, I do not know: possibly London or one 
of its subsidiaries/Singapore/Hong Kong.) One item of the encyphering system 
changed daily — and therefore this had to be cracked daily — the other item 
changed three times a month. Occasionally the ‘CA’ code, ‘Kancho fugo’, was 
used which was for the eyes of ‘Head of Mission only’, but the material in these 
messages did not appear to be of greater importance than the ordinary ‘FUJI’. 
‘Hot’ information was entrusted to FUJI double encyphering, indicated by a 
repetition of the encyphering keyword at the end of the message. This system 
was unbreakable at that time, if you did not know the encyphering system 
for that particular day. FUJI messages began with a priority word e.g. SIKYU 
(‘requiring early attention’), followed by a five letter group giving the date of 
origin, and if this msg was part 1 of 3 etc. This second group code was well 
known by the time I had arrived in Feb. ’42.
Trendall devised an ingenious system whereby the daily FUJI cypher could 
be broken — and then to be sent by our ULTRA system to London for their 
breakfast: it became a daily challenge and a matter of kudos! It was at Monterey 
that this system was evolved. I can supply details, but, as I told David Jenkins, 
I feel that it is Trendall’s copyright, and I shall reveal it, only if he is disinclined 
to give details. ‘FUJI’ code, consisting of two letter and four letter groups was 
50–66% known by February 1942, and in the next two years, Archer, Graves, 
London and Washington were able to fill in many of the remaining gaps. In my 
wakeful hours in senility I can still recall the AG = wa KY = no HL … VB was 
‘… …’ EHZB was Chile etc. etc. So much for the sins of youth!
Greater East Asia Ministry (GEAM) commenced their own cypher system after 
July 1943. It was much simpler than FUJI, but with certain similarities. London 
broke into this quite early and from then on we had little difficulty in breaking 
the daily cypher. The material was, as DCSS says, dull, mainly economic, boring. 
I seldom read any of the translations. Basically these GEAM messages would 
have delighted economists and statisticians.
(Page 4): I have no recollection of intercepts from the Japanese ambassador to 
Sweden. Our intercepts came from French Indochina, Tokyo, Afghanistan, Peru, 
Chile, some German occupied capitals e.g. it was from Budapest that the Japanese 
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ambassador told his Foreign Affairs Office that the Germans had suggested 
that the Allies were reading his messages, but he assured Tokyo that this was 
unlikely, nay impossible, because Japanese was such a difficult language! Why I 
remember this piece of trivia, I do not know, but I do, quite well.
The military value of the contents of ‘FUJI’ traffic declined after July 1943. 
Up till then we had been able to supply information to the USN (and RAN) 
About shipping movements out of Saigon etc. — it was rewarding to read the 
subsequent messages to the effect that Mr. … would not be returning by (such 
and such date) as there had been ‘an accident’ — and we tracked down a few 
spies (agents) of the likes of ‘Mr. Gonzales Smith’. Perhaps the Japs sensed that 
their diplomatic cyphers were not as secure as they had thought. Perhaps, it was 
just a routine change, which would have been normal every six months or so, 
but in 1942/3 was delayed by distance and opportunity.
(ii) Notes on [letter from] Smith to Sissons, 8 
August 1990
Page 2: John Charles Davies who worked with us for only a brief time (3 to 4 
months) had been in my class at Canterbury Boys’ High School. Early in 1942 
I had suggested to Trendall that he could be a helpful minion; he was bright 
and had a first in Latin and in French. He arrived at Monterey about May 1942, 
worked with Trendall, Cooper and me for a few weeks and then worked with 
Treweek downstairs in Monterey. For some reason he fell into Trendall’s bad 
books and Trendall had him shipped out to the Central Bureau which had just 
moved up to Brisbane. As far as I know he spent the rest of the war with CB, 
and I did not see him, or hear of him, again until he passed through Melbourne 
about 1955/6 on his way back from Queens Belfast to New England at Armidale.
John Thomas Laird also arrived in Melbourne about June 1942. He was also a 
classmate at Canterbury, but I don’t think Trendall was interested in him and 
he went to CB at Brisbane. John, after the war, lectured in English at Duntroon.
Page 3: Paul Grange came to us in ‘A’ Block when he had moved into our larger 
room. He seemed to me ‘elderly’: he was a Czech-Jew who had served in 1914–
18 war with the Austro-Hungarian army. (I remember him telling us that when 
they captured some Roumanian officers they were all wearing corsets!) Quiet, 
docile, he did clerical duties honestly without fuss. I thought that he had been 
a Sandford cast-off and I was surprised to learn that he had been formerly a 
translator with 52 ASWG. Paul and his wife lived in East St. Kilda (or Balaclava?)
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Page 4: Ian mentions ‘Cowley’ — who is this man? I have no recollection of Biggs. 
Perhaps they arrived after September/October 1945. I had been summoned to 
Sydney in Sept/October (I think the latter) to the University of Sydney where, 
under Trendall’s eagle-eye, I was to write the war diary (history) of our section, 
presumably because I was the only one with continuous knowledge of its work 
from Feb ’42 to Sept. ’45. I clearly remember writing down every detail of our 
experiences, etc. etc. (dates, codes, cyphers, personnel) — not once, but twice, 
and in parts, thrice — until Trendall was satisfied. What happened to this 
document forged over for nearly a fortnight? Did Trendall keep it, pass it on 
to someone’s obliviontray? It was sufficiently detailed to answer any question 
posed by D.C.S.S, David Jenkins etc. etc.
I have no knowledge of Pitman — arrived after I left?
(iii) Notes on [letter from] Smith [to Sissons 8 
August 1990] on 52 ASWG 
(a) I have no idea how, from where, intercepts reached Trendall during our short 
stay with Nave and Co at the Navy Office.
(b) When we were in Monterey, intercepts came from Park Orchards by dispatch 
motorcyclist. Sometimes they arrived late, which made Trendall a trifle testy. I 
cannot recall hearing anything of Ferny Creek. I had no contact with any ASWG 
personnel.
(c) 52 ASWG moved to Bonegilla. When, I’m not sure. Why, I know not. 
However, by the time we had settled into ‘A’ Block in early 1943 somebody, (Col. 
Little?) had arranged with the PMG [Postmaster General] to run a direct ‘sound’ 
line from Bonegilla to our office. Two ex-PMG telegraphists manned our end, 
Sgt. Harry (?) Watson, who lived at West Footscray, and Cpl. Brown(e), the latter 
being a (6th or) 7th Division man who had served in Crete, and perhaps Greece. 
(I don’t know if he was there with Ryan and Ballard). This direct line meant 
that we had last night’s intercepts pronto in the morning, with confirmation 
copies coming next day, or on the next but one, from Bonegilla! Presumably 
by ‘safe hand’ D/R [dispatch rider]. It also allowed us to request checks or 
replays of garbled texts. This direct line was retained when 52 ASWG moved 
to Mornington, a move occasioned I did hear because it was a better reception 
area. 52 ASWG was quartered at Mornington racecourse.
(d) I did not ever hear KALINGA mentioned.
(e) I had virtually no direct contact with 52 ASWG personnel. I vaguely 
remember Lt. Col. Ryan coming to see Trendall and Cooper at Monterey in 1942. 
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In the winter of 1944, (or was it 1943?) I went to Bonegilla for two nights to 
see the unit at work, and to deliver an explanatory pep talk to the AWAS who 
were becoming ‘browned-off’ by the meaningless maze they were required to 
intercept. Being inexperienced in public speaking, I made quite a mess of this 
public address, mainly because I was unsure (and not briefed) what I could, or 
could not, reveal. At some time (cannot remember) Archer went to Bonegilla for 
a ‘pep’ talk, and I’m sure this experienced gentleman was more effective.
(f) I paid a flying visit to Mornington — once only — with several more senior 
officers. The reason for the visit I either did not know or have forgotten. As a 
humble lieutenant amid senior officers, I remember I kept a discrete [sic] silence.
(g) From the little I saw, I think the AWAS did a good job, especially as they 
could never be told the final fruits of their labours.
(iv) Notes on Interview by D. C. S. Sissons 
with A. P. Treweek 11 October 1990
I was not conscious of Treweek (who had been my Classics master at school and 
lecturer at University) during the short time we were in the Navy Block in Feb/
March ’42, but I am surprised by his comment on p. 3 about Trendall being in a 
different block. Treweek was with Nave and Co. on the first or ‘second’ floor of 
Monterey, and Trendall, Cooper and I on the ‘third’ (or do you say ‘second’) for 
nearly a whole year. Ath and Hazel occasionally had both us and sometimes AW 
Sandford for dinner in their Jolimont flat!
A.P.T. is correct about Arthur Cooper coming by ship from Singapore, but astray 
on the length of Cooper’s stay. Still in those days movement was very restricted: 
you moved and lived only with those with whom you worked directly, and were 
told ‘only what you needed to know’ for your work.
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Annex 7. David Sissons to  
Desmond Ball, 11 October 1993
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Annex 8. Steve Mason to  
David Sissons, 26 June 1994
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Annex 9. Steve Mason to  
Desmond Ball, 7 July 1995






Annex 10. Ronald Bond to  
Desmond Ball, 29 September 1994
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Ian Smith, Paul Grange, David Sissons plus
“Jack James” (UK) & visitors such as
Sgt Huckling
D Shepherd
alley way between A & M blocks
A BLOCK     VICTORIA BARRACKS  -  Second Floor
Moved in January 1943 — I left December 1945, but away quite a 
bit from July/August 1945.
(might have been late December 1942, but I don’t think so)
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Annex 11. David Sissons to  
Desmond Ball, 22 May 1996
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Annex 13. David Sissons to  
Desmond Ball, 16 October 1996
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Annex 14. David Sissons to  
Desmond Ball, 23 March 1998
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Annex 15. David Sissons to  
Kenneth McKay, 9 November 2004










Annex 16. Notes on the Breaking of 
GEAM Using the ‘Winds – Set-Up’ 
Message
David Sissons
Greater East Asia Ministry (GEAM) was introduced on 21 July 1943. The Report 
on Japanese Diplomatic Cyphers describes it as follows:
It was a transposition cypher with a bigram and tetragram code, the 
bigrams being consonant-vowel or vowel-consonant and the tetragrams 
made up of a double consonant and a bigram. All letters of the alphabet 
were used and Y was regarded as both consonant and vowel. The code 
was patterned after the manner of LA. Messages were transposed in 
blocks of ten by ten without blanks. There were 26 indicators each 
providing a column and a row order, the row order containing only 
nine figures as the bottom row of the cage was composed of dummies, 
namely the first letter of the indicator repeated ten times. The 26 keys 
were designated by the letters A through Z and each key was indicated 
by its letter and the following letter of the alphabet in the form ABABA. 
The indicator was located at the head of the cypher text.
In the race to break GEAM, Trendall had his solution completed by August 12th, 
beating his rivals from both London and Washington. From the account given 
in the report, and from the box-copies of Trendall's daily cables to London for 
that period (which miraculously survived among the office files of the Captain 
I(x) at Victoria Barracks), it is possible to piece together how he did it.
As the cyphertext of only one of the many thousands of messages intercepted 
by 52 Special Wireless Section has found its way to the National Archives of 
Australia (NAA), and that was encyphered in BA not GEAM, I have for the 
purposes of illustration selected a typical Japanese Foreign Ministry message1 
and encoded it using the copy of GEAM's code and encyphering instructions for 
GEAM Mark 1 that are held by the US National Archives.2 
1 Circular 2353 of 11 November 1941, the famous ‘Winds – Set-up’ message, reproduced in D. Kahn, ‘Pearl 
Harbor and the Inadequacy of Cryptanalysis’, Cryptologia, October 1991, at pp 288–92. 
2 US National Archives, Record Group 457, Box1328, File 190/37/34/3, ‘US/UK Technical Exchanges and 
Information on Solution of JBB’ (19 pp).




AC YK HU LY WA UF
Kokusai jōkyō no hippaku no kekka itsu saiaku no jitai ni 
TU YU YH YC GO HI FU QA CU GO SU CA BI FU YU BA CU GO MI WY GI
tachiitaru ka mo hakararezaru tokoro kakaru baai waga hō to aite koku no 
FA FI BI FA KU CA JO HA CA KA KE MA KU UQ CA CA KU PA TA ZZLO FO TA FE TU GO
tsūshin wa tadachi ni teishi serarubeki o motte waga hō no gaikō kankei kiken ni hinsuru 
IR ID UR XXOH AW DI DE KA KU PE CI VVQI ZZLO GO RRAD AC ZI CI EC GI IH DU KU
baai ni wa waga kaigai hōsō no kakuchi muke nihongo news no chūkan oyobi saigo 
PA TA GI UR UR LA YA VI HY DY GO ZA FI JU CE GI OH LO YQ DU GO YJ AC YE YU LO 
ni oite tenki yohō to shite (1) Nichibei kankei no baai ni wa "higashi no kaze ame"
VVEL EF KI RO HY ZZBI CCVY WI UW AC ZI GO PA TA GI UR IN HI LA DI GO CA ME BA JE 
(2) Nichiso kankei no baai ni wa "kita no kaze kumori" (3) Nichiei 
UN CCWE WI DO AC ZI GO PA TA GI UR IN RI FA GO CA ME CU JO KI UN CCWY WI XA 
kankei no baai (tai shinchū mare Netherlands East Indies kōryaku o fukumu) "nishi no 
AC ZI GO PA TA NI WY ID YJ JA OT AK IB CY YX BO IZ JU NU IN GI DI GO UN BO
kaze hare" o 2 do zutsu kurikaeshi hōsō seshimeru koto to seru o motte
CA ME HA KE UN BO VU NO MU FU CU KI CA BE DI HY DY WWKU KU CO FO DE KU VVQI 
migi ni yori angō shorui to tekitō shobun aritashi. Nao migi wa gen ni gokuhi
IW VVIK KI AB LY SO KU BI FO FE CI FY SO UP BA KI FA DI UK UX IW UR EL GI RREN
atsukai to seraretashi .
WA YA FO WWIK FA DI UK
In this example the Japanese cypher clerk would have selected the appropriate 
encyphering key (in this case FGFGE) and proceeded to enter the encoded text 
into a series of transposition blocks of 10 cells x 10 cells dimensions, row by 
row, in the row-order prescribed by the key FGFGE (which is: 1 2 3 4 5 9 8 7 6)
On completion, the first block would look like this:
6 W Y G I F A F I B I
7 F A K U C A J O H A
8 C A K A K E M A K U
9 U Q C A C A K U P A
5 Y U B A C U G O M I
4 G O S U C A B I F U
3 G O H I F U Q A C U
2 U F T U Y U Y H Y C
1 A C Y K H U L Y W A
F F F F F F F F F F
He would then write out the message for transmission, column by column, in 
the column order prescribed by the key FGFGE (which is: 10 2 6 9 7 4 3 1 5 8).
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Thus it would appear on his message pad, and on the message of the Australian 
telegraphist receiving it, as follows:
[Originator, Addressee, Number, Date, each encoded] FGFGF
IOAUO IAHYF YAAQU OOFCF FJMKG BQYLF AAEAU AUUUF BHKPM FCYWF
GKKCB SHTYF FCKCC CFYHF IAUAI UUCAF IUAAA UIUKF WFCUY GGUAF
IURYO EWROF RCAAV EREAF ZDUHL PAIFF CHIIZ UHOOF CKUDG CDITF
AGTYQ KXTZF AIGVZ KOGLF IURYO IIDAF DIAAI AXUZF REPLV DUFTF
CIIEI FEQUF YONAO OOIOF AGDJB EYYJF WAAAZ LCOIF ZUGUC KYDCF
WPHMH VYOZF UTLBZ EALFF IRONC IUUEF IAIEY VJHAF VGICR LGGGF
AJYUI OAAOF CITON ARICF PYCNW JFTDF ODBUY UIAIF TJYIX KGGAF
ZWAIC MIGWF GIIJW CRPWF AAXNA IOICF IYKZC ENOEF ANOBU CUZCF
UKUYU EUENF OIBOY UOAIF KIKFK BMKUF EVOIW AOAOF VKBSK DFUBF
FILFD KVMDF DVSCW CNHGF VIIOU IUNOF OWYEY IUEIF CQAFH CBCGF
RAAXA FKIOX PFUWF XFFWN KXIFE YDUDF URWXB FIEIX KFLAI KIFXR
WXAFU GFXUF
Trendall's technique of solution was the application of a sequence of processes, 
the first of which is is described in the report as follows
A frequency count of a few messages showed that consonants and 
vowels were used in almost equal numbers. As we already had an 
example of a vowel-consonant, consonant-vowel code (LA), the theory 
was straightway suggested that GEAM was such a code transposed. 
The regular occurrence of the dummy letter at intervals of ten gave the 
probable length of the lines as ten. Moreover, as the dummies appeared 
at shorter intervals at the end of a message (when the final transposition 
form was incomplete) and these final dummies always began after a 
multiple of 100 letters, it was obvious that the size of the block was ten 
by ten.
Applying this technique to our specimen message, an examination of the 
incoming message for periodicity reveals the Indicator (FGFGE) followed by the 
cryptogram in which the letter F appears at intervals of ten up to the 500th 
letter and thereafter at intervals of six. The latter suggests that the encoded 
message has been encyphered by transposing it in blocks of ten cells x ten cells 
until the concluding block (in which the columns are only six cells, instead of 
ten cells, high). If so, Block 1 consists of ten columns, each ten cells high, which 
for convenience we may identify by the letters a to j, thus:
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a b c d e f g h i j
I Y F A B G F I I W
O A J A H K C A U F
A A M E K K K U A C
U Q K A P C C A A U
O U G U M B C I A Y
I O B A F S C U U G
A O Q U C H F U I G
H F Y U Y T Y C U U
Y C L U W Y H A K A
F F F F F F F F F F
a b c d e f g h i j
I Y F A B G F I I W
O A J A H K C A U F
A A M E K K K U A C
U Q K A P C C A A U
O U G U M B C I A Y
I O B A F S C U U G
A O Q U C H F U I G
H F Y U Y T Y C U U
Y C L U W Y H A K A
F F F F F F F F F F
The next task is to arrange these columns in their correct sequence. If in the 
GEAM code the bigrams were restricted to vowel followed by consonant and 
consonant followed by vowel it may be possible to fit the columns into their 
correct pairs on that basis. This Trendall proceeded to do. Let us apply this 
technique to our example, omitting of course, the terminal F dummies. Take 
Column a and put it beside each of the other columns in turn to see whether in 
any case it produces only bigrams of this restricted pattern. The result is that it 
will not pair with either Column b (that would produce adjoining vowels OA AU 
OU IO AO and adjoining vowels HF), Column d (adjoining vowels IA OA AA UA 
OU IA AU), Column f (adjoining consonants HT), Column h (adjoining vowels 
II OA AU UA IU AU, and adjoining consonants HC),Column i (adjoining vowels 
II OU AA UA OA IU AI), or Column j (adjoining vowels UU). It pairs, however, 
with Columns c, e, or g.
Continue this process with each column in turn. Column b pairs with Column j. 
Column c pairs with Column a. Column d pairs with Column g. Column e pairs 
with Column h. Column f pairs with Column i. Thus we have all five pairs:
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ac ca bj jb dg gd eh he fi if
IF FI YW WY AF FA BI IB GI IG
OJ JO AF FA AC CA HA AH KU UK
AM MA AC CA EK KE KU UK KA AK
UK or KU QU or UQ AC or CA PA or AP CA or AC
OG GO UY YU UC CU MI IM BA AB
IB BI OG GO AC CA FU UF SU US
AQ QA OG GO UF FU CU UC HI IH
HY YH FU UF UY YU YC CY TU UT
YL LY CA CA UH HU WA AW YK KY
3 1 10 2 7 4 5 8 6 9
From here, the report continues:
It merely remained to put these groups together on repeats. This part of 
the job did actually present a few stumbling-blocks, as the presence of 
a row-order was not at first suspected and we were unfortunate enough 
to have constructed all the repeats backwards. The code-breakers were 
therefore somewhat baffled when these texts were presented to them—
although it was later found that the main difficulty was the fact that 
the early messages were encoded from an English text. The first guide 
to the real solution was given by the incomplete blocks in which an 
incomplete line of five letters appeared at the end of the line instead of 
at the beginning. Thus we saw that we had our keys backwards; this 
was remedied and then long repeats were found going from one line to 
another, the second line not necessarily being the next in order. From 
then on the breaking of the code and row order was a relatively simple 
matter and the complete code and cypher system were known within a 
fortnight.
The next task is to discover which five of these ten possible bigram columns 
are the correct ones and their correct sequence. (The answer is indicated by 
the italicized figures that we have inserted beneath the bigram columns above). 
How on earth Trendall managed to do this beats me.
Where a cryptogram is merely the plaintext transposed, the sequence of the 
columns can be be established by anagramming, taking advantage of the 
characteristics and idiosyncracies of the mother tongue in which it is sent. A 
good example of this method is the solution of the 
following English language cryptogram of a military report:3
3 L. D. Callimahos & W. F. Friedman, Military Cryptanalysis, part 2, vol. 2 (Aegean Park Press reprint, 1985), 
p.p. 418–20.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
N R E O U N M P L E T C A O N Y E
E T T H U E E J H R S E U T N D R
T S D O F R D A O U D H R S C Y E
E S R E I O S O E V D N A S G R S
F T H E R T H E P A S T E O E R T
L F X A R C A G M A O L E S M N H
T M S D R F R E W I E H N Y E E I
D D W U R I T W A N O F O S T O N
S C H O S E C N W A A L T T T O R
We note the J in column 8. In English, J is always followed only by a vowel, 
usually U. In this row columns 5 and 13 have a U. Let us provisionally postulate 
the latter and pair columns 8 and 13. In English the bigram JU must be followed 
by a consonant, usually N or S. These letters are present in columns 15 and 
11. We now juxtapose columns 15 and 11 in turn against our 8–13 pair. This 
provides the alternatives
8 13 15 3 13 11
P A N P A T
J U N J U S
A R C A R D
O A G O A D
E E E E E S
G E M G E O
E N E E N E
W O T W O O
N T T N T A
The English-language trigrams formed by columns 8–13–11 look more like 
plaintext trigrams than do those formed by columns 8–13–15. From here, the 
anagramming progresses rapidly, by expanding the trigrams into the words that 
have begun to manifest themselves, such as PATROL, JUST, ROAD, etc. The 
complete plaintext together transposition key emerges as below.
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E N E M Y P A T R O L E N C O U N
T E R E D J U S T T H R E E H U N
D R E D Y A R D S S O U T H O F C
R O S S R O A D S S E V E N E I G
H T T H R E E S T O P A F T E R E
X C H A N G E O F S M A L L A R M
S F I R E E N E M Y W I T H D R E
W I N T O W O O D S A N D F U R T
H E R C O N T A C T W A S L O S T
It was just in order to prevent anagramming of this nature that in the GEAM 
sytem the plaintext is encoded before transpositon. How is anagramming to 
be conducted when all one knows about the code is that it consists of vowel-
consonant and consonant-vowel bigrams and tetragrams each representing a 
kana syllable or common word or phrase?
Trendall must have gone about identifying the code groups of particular 
syllables by the frequency of their appearance. Let us attempt to apply this 
method to our specimen message. Here the report's list of the most commonly 
appearing syllables in the Japanese language is of assistance: no, ni, wa, o, shi, 
mo, to. These six, presumably, are listed in their order of frequency in a large 
collection of diplomatic messages. In a message of 833 syllables that I selected 
from the Pearl Harbor Hearings,4 the number of times each of these appeared 
was as follows: no 37, ni 15, wa 20, o 28, shi 12, mo 8, to 16.
The report says: 'It merely remained to put these groups together on repeats'. 
Which are 'these groups'? What is here meant by a 'repeat'? Does it mean the 
reappearance of a commonly occurring sequence of bigrams (e.g. VVSY AS ** 
LY VVDY = 'Reference my telegram No.**'). If so, it would not appear to be a 
technique applicable at this stage; for we do not yet know a single code group, 
or in which row the message starts. I'm afraid I've no alternative but to seek 
your [i.e., Kenneth McKay] assistance.
GEAM was introduced on July 21st. By a rare stroke of luck a complete file of 
your outward signals to London from August 5th (until the following April) has 
survived. Perhaps these cast some light on how it was done?
On August 5th and succeeding days you sent London the column order for 
about 5 keys each day.
4 United States Congress (79th Congress), Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 
Pearl Harbor Attack; Hearings, part 37, p. 988, Ambassador, Washington to Consul-General Honolulu N. 384 
of 27 November 1941.
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The following are some of your signals. I have inserted in square brackets the 
actual values taken from the code charts in Appendix L.
August 10th
Following bigram sequences have been established as frequent in more 
than one key: (a) BO [o] DI [shi] often preceded by KI [ri] or KU [ru]; 
(b) CU [ku] MU [zu] FU [tsu]; (c) FA [ta] KE [re] often preceded by CI 
[ki] and followed by UR [wa] BI [i]; (d) FO [to] CO [ko] KU [ru] (two of 
this group ususally occur in very close proximity; (e) FU [tsu] MI [ji]; 
(f) JO [mo] KU [ru] often preceded by GO [no] or FO [to] and followed by 
DU [su]; (g) KU [ru] DU [su] often preceded by JO [mo] RY [yu] and/or 
folllowed by FO [to] or CU [ku]; (h) KU (ru] GA [na] often preceded by 
LA [ga] and/or followed by AS [dai]; (i) TI [1] AS [dai]; (j) BO [o] KU [ru]; 
(k) KU [ru] MA [za] BE [e].
My comment is that, except for the fact that all of these are back-to-front, many 
of them make sense; for example, in (b) tsuzuku is a common word in such 
messages, meaning 'to continue'; in (k) ezaru is the negative potential inflexion 
meaning 'cannot'. 
August 11th
1. GEAM cypher is based on bigram table similar in general arrangement 
to LA with which many groups are identical. Individual sentences are 
read backwards but present evidence suggests that successive sentences, 
as separated by full stops UF, should be taken forwwards.
2. Following groups are different from LA: SA zero, TI 1, VU 2, WE 3, 
XO 4, AR 5, IS 6, UT 7, EV 8, OW 9, UR wa, BO o, CO ko, DO so, FO 
to, GO no, LO go, RY yō, YE oyobi, CA kan, VI gai, ZASS kiden [your 
telegram], SYVV ōden [my telegram], DYVV ni kanshi, FUQQ aritashi.
3. LA Spelling Table is used apparently with OG and QU.
My comments are that these values are correct except for 'end spelling', which 
should be YY not QU, and for the tetragrams, which are back-to-front and should 
read SSZA, VVSY, VVDY, and QQFU. 
August 12th
1. Further research shows that instruction to read backwards by 
sentences is incorrect and following should be substituted. Keep message 
in originl blocks consisting of 9 rows of 5 bigrams each. On keys so 
far supplied, each of these lines should be read backwards, but order 
of reading horizontal rows inside block varies according to key, which 
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accordingly consists of two sets of figures, one for vertical columns and 
one for horizontal rows. Rows so far established are: ABABA 1 to 9 in 
serial order; XYXYX and FGFGF 6 7 8 9 5 4 3 2 1; OPOPO and QRQRQ 4 
3 2 1 5 6 7 8 9. Blocks are read successively in natural order downwards.
2. In order to avoid nuisance of reading backwards we shall in future 
transpose column order in pairs. Thus ASASA column order will be 5 2 
8 6 4 9 1 10 7 3 instead of present 7 3 1 10 4 9 8 6 5 2. Same bigrams will 
then read naturally forwards, but tetragrams will appear with double 
consonants first, thus VVFY instead of FYVV and we shall in future 
quote them in this form.
3. LA bigrams in series BA to PA, BI to PI, BU to PU, BY to PY, UB to UP, 
EB to EP, and OB to OP seem to remain unchanged. . .
In each of the days that followed you sent London large packets of bigrams and 
tetragrams that you had established.
From the above it would appear that: (i) You had the whole game completely 
sewn up by August 12th; (ii) You had worked out how to establish column 
orders by August 5th without knowing any code groups; (iii) Without knowing 
row orders you were, by August 10th, working out indicative frequent bigram 
strings merely on the basis of individual rows of 5-bigrams length and from this 
you were able confidently to establish the correct values of some bigrams and 
tetragrams by that date; (iv) Armed with this information you were then able to 
establish row orders. Have I got this right?
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Annex 17. David Sissons to  
Kenneth McKay, 28 November 2004
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Annex 18. David Sissons to  
Kenneth McKay, 19 December 2004
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